WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT                                   15


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A CH~46 Sea Knight helicopter of HMM-264 takes off from the flight deck of the amphibious
assauh ship Guadaicanal (LPH 7) as another Sea Knight remains on the deck during vertical
replenishment operations during Operation Provide Comfort.

of personnel and aircraft (TRAP), clandestine reconnaissance, military Operations
in urban terrain (MOUT), special demolitions operations, and in-extremis hostage
rescues.
   Marine       expeditionary units   sailed on board the  ships of U.S. Navy
amphibious squadrons which were designated "amphibious ready groups" (ARGs)
when deployed to forward areas with Marines embarked. Most ARGs consisted
of four or five ships, usually including an amphibious assault ship (LHA or
LPH), amphibious dock landing ships (LPD 3r LSD), and some tank landing
ships (LSTs).'7 However, the demands of the crisis in the Persian Gulf changed
that. In January 1991, the 4th MEB, the 5th MEB, and the 13th MEU (SOC)
were in the Persian Gulf on board more than three dozen amphibious ships. This
caused a "ship crunch," so          Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 1-91
(MARG 1-91) had to sail shorthanded.
   Conn~odore (Captain, USN) Dean Turner's three-ship Amphibious Squadron
8 (Phibron 8) included the amphibious assault ship Guadalcanal (LPH 7), the
amphibious transport dock Austin (LPD 4), and the amphibious cargo ship
Charleston (LKA 113). 18 The ship shortage forced careful planning, detailed
loading, and use of surge quartering, but still vital equipment and personnel had
to be left behind.19 The 24th MEU (SOC) was forced to sail without tanks.
Motor transport assets were restricted. MSSG-24 had to leave critical support
items and equipment behind. No fixed-wing aircraft were in the aviation package.
Only one ship could conduct a traditional amphibious assault using amphibian
tractors and surface landing craft. The lack of LSTs meant there was no over-the-
beach unloading capability for vehicles or other heavy equipment and logistics
over the shore (LOTS) operations would strain an already short-handed combat
service support element.