usmcpersiangulfdoc2_065.txt
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT                                   57


                                    V,,,


                                        Photograph courtesy of BGeo James L. Jones, USMC
The leaders of JTF Bravo in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort are LtCol John P.
Abiziad, USA (CO, 3-325 ABCT); Co! James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (CO, 24th MEU jSOCj);
MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA (CG, JTF-B), LtCol Cees Van Egmond, DKM (CO, Netherlands 1st
ACG); LtCol Thny L. Corwin, USMC (CO, BLT 2/8); and LtCol Jonathan Thompson, RM (CO,
British 45th Ct~mmando).

to plan both opposed and unopposed scenarios. If hostilities broke out, the 24th
MEU   faced vastly superior Iraqi combat power.      The MEU was        a light
expeditionary force with no tanks, limited antitank assets, and only about 2,000
Marines. Major Richard J. Raftery, the intelligence officer, reported two Iraqi
infantry divisions and several independent tank units inside or near the target
area. Also, Iraqi paramilitary guards manned border positions; a brigade of the
Iraqi 44th Infant,y Division was still at Zakho; a dozen T-55 tanks lurked in
armor revetments between Zakho and Dohuk; Iraqi artillery outnumbered and
outranged    American guns;   antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles
remained in the hills; two Republican Guard armored brigades waited near
Mosul, less than an hour's ride from Zakho; and the Iraqis had planted more
than a million mines in northern Iraq. In the words of one Marine, ?~The MEU
has enough combat power to get into a fight, but may not have enough to finish
the job.,' If fighting broke out, Colonel Jones would have to conduct a delaying
action and rely on timely air support from Incirlik or the aircraft carrier
Roosevelt, on station just off the Turkish coast, to tip the combat balance.
   There were also concerns about Kurdish reactions. It was obvious that most
Kurds were in dire need of assistance, but they were notoriously fragmented
politically.  Allied forces assisting them had  to be   neutral dispensers  of
humanitarian aid and never appear to be `1playing favorites." There were fears
that Kurdish guerrillas might use the security zone as a base of operations,

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