62                           HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

officer escorted Kohl ~o the center of the bridge where they met an Iraqi border
guard. Kohl again explained the situation, then indicated he was concerned about
explosives on the bridge and along the main supply route. The Iraqi remained
silent about the mines, but stated he did not have the authority to allow the
Americans to cross and would have to check with his superiors. While Kohl
waited for an answer, Iraqi reinforcements occupied the heights overlooking the
road. To counter this show of force, Marine Sea Cobras, Army Blackhawks, and
Air Force Warthogs droned ominously in the sky overhead. About 20 minutes
later fl~ Iraqi returned and granted permission to cross the bridge. For the
second time that day, the 24th MEU (SOC)'s policy of aggressive restraint paid
big dividends.74
    Unfortunately, the Turks had neither instructions nor authority to allow the
Americans across the border. About 90 more minutes lapsed before Turkish
permission to cross was granted. On the bridge, several Iraqis worked with an
American explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) team. They discovered no mines
but found explosive charges under the bridge and removed them. Lieutenant
Colonel Kohl's mission was a success; the first American convoy moved into
northern Iraq at 0800 the next day (21 April).
    During this time, the MEU Command Element,         the Aviation Combat
Element, and MSSG-24 settled in at Silopi, while back at Iskenderun convoys
carried the final Marine increments forward. The Charleston and the Austin were
completely offloaded  and the MEU's   15-day Landing     Force  Operational
Readiness Material (LFORM) was on shore. The Guadalcanal remained nearby
to provide aviation support.75 Messages to the United States requested further
logistics and combat support. Included in these requests were those for additional
firepower control teams from 2d ANGLICO, an RPV detachment from 2d SRIG,
and more engineer assets. It was also hoped that an AV-8B Harrier II detachment
might be made available.

                             Securing Zakho

    On 22 April, a Military Coordination Center was established at Zakho. Army
Colonel Richard Naab, a team chief, two liaison officers, and two linguists
comprised the allied team. A similar Iraqi contingent was led by Brigadier
General Nashwan. The Center operated 24 hours a day to provide face-to-face
discussions during tense situations, kept both sides  infon~ed about future
operations, and acted as a sounding board for opposing views about current
operations.
    General Nashwan used the first meeting to announce that Iraqi forces north
of the 37th Parallel had been ordered to pull back and that Iraqi commanders
were cooperating completely. However, despite these congenial relations at the
MCC, the Iraqis quickly tested the coalition's deten~ination. Although all Iraqi
troops had allegedly left Zakho, more than 300 "policemen" wearing military
uniforms and carrying automatic weapons remained. Major Raftery's intelligence
section later confirmed that they were soldiers from the 66th Special Assault