66                          HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

to patrol the streets. They gently reassured the civilians and sent the previously
arrogant Iraqis scurrying out of town. By sundown Zakho was in allied hands.
The 24th MEU (SOC) and its attachn~ents promptly began a rigorous security
program using squad-size patrols to criss-cross the area of operations.77

                               Life in Zakho

     After securing Zakho, BLT 2/8 conducted defensive operations. Roadblocks
were established on the main supply routes south and west of Zakho. Companies
E and F provided rifle platoons and either a fast attack vehicle (a jeep with a
machine gun mounted on top) or a combined antiarmor team (CAAT) at each
checkpoint. Company G pulled security duty at the Zakho hospital. Company H
secured headquarters and one of its rifle platoons stood by as the "Sparrowhawk"
rapid reaction force. Weapons Company was divided among the rifle companies
or integrated into il~e command post security forces. Light armored vehicles
(LAVs) conducted daily road reconnaissance and MSR security operations.
Battery H, reinforced by six lightweight lO5mi~ howitzers of the British 79th
Battery, 29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, set up near Zakl~o.
     The Black Knights of HMM-264 operated from Silopi, usually flying
morning   and evening  missions   to MlEU  headquarters, providing visual
reconnaissance and medical evacuation flights on request, and making daily runs
to Landing Zone (LZ) Raven and other camps as needed. The squadron's ground
support personnel ran landing zones at Silopi and Zakho, and manned the Silopi
forward arming and refueling point. MSSG-24 set up shop at Silopi, manned rear
areas at Incirlik and iskenderun, and furnished a combat service support
detachment at Zakho.
     In addition to running combat patrols, holding observation outposts on key
terrain, and manning road checkpoints the Marines undertook a wide variety of
humanitarian functions. Such operations were described by Lieutenant Colonel
Kohl as being "right up MSSG-24's alley. "7s A t07-man combat service support
detachn~ent (CS SD) moved to Zakho on 2 ~ April. The greatest logistics challenge
was to equitably distribute MSSG-24's limited resources to support the 24th
MEU (SOC) and still meet the needs of so many starving refugees. The first
attempts to provide relief were marked by mass confusion caused by mobs of
hungry people. Organizational meetings with Kurdish leaders, additional camps,
and increased supply flow reduced these problems. Soon, the distribution system
was operating smoothly. The Marines first realized the situation had drastically
improved when Kurdish leaders began to complain about the suitability of MREs
as a food source.79 ironically, this seemingly ungrateful criticism was an
unconscious compliment, because by then the Kurds were getting enough food
to be picky about what they were eating. Supplies of dry goods and fresh food
stuffs soon replaced MREs.~0
     West of town the Marines helped a Kurdish work party pitch more than 600
tents at Camp One, the first of three resettlement camps eventually built near
Zakho.   The CSSD established LZ Raven to serve Camp One.     A Marine