usmcpersiangulfdoc2_078.txt
70                            }JUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTlIERN IRAQ, 1991:

American support for Desert Storm resulted in an unexpected influx of mail
addressed to "Any Serviceman." However, while the volume of mail caused the
postal section headaches, the field Marines loved it.~3 Captain Jordan's most
unenviable task was    casualty reporting. Two Marines were killed during
Operation Provide Comfort; one in a traffic accident and the other as the result
of a tragic accidental weapon discharge. Several other Marines were seriously
injured and required evacuation to Europe or the United States.
     Major Raftery and the intelligence section were busy from the time the MEU
departed  Sardinia until it was on the way home five months later.     The
intelligence section was charged with data collection and interpretation. There
were three primary collection sources: 1) aerial reconnaissance, 2) ground
reconnaissance, and 3) human intelligence. Aerial reconnaissance was limited at
first. Operation Provide Comfort was only one of many agencies seeking input
from national intelligence sources and the Marines lacked an organic tactical
reconnaissance  aircraft because the venerable McDonnell Douglas     RF-4B
Phantom II had been recently retired and was no longer in the Marine aviation
inventory. The Marines were scheduled to receive modified F/A-18 Hornets as
replacements, hut these aircraft were not yet in the pipeline. The arrival of the
aircraft carrier Roosevelt allowed U.S. Navy F- 14 Tomcat fighters mounting
TARPS (Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photographic System) pods to provide
tactical aerial reconnaissance. These specially equipped airplanes flew photo
missions over iraq and returned to the Roosevelt for film processing. The
finished photographs were loaded on a Lockheed S-3 Viking which dropped the
pictures to ground units inside a Sono-Buoy canister.
     Major Raftery used intelligence data to identify enemy positions, estimate
Iraqi strength, evaluate threat capabilities, and anticipate possible Iraqi courses
of action. The S-2 section acquired numerous documents and a lot of Iraqi
equipment, including sophisticated communications gear that ranged in size from
an electronics van to hand-held security radios. An extensive human intelligence
collection network was developed. Interrogator-translator teams exploited "walk-
in" sources. One such source was Iraqi defectors. Another source was non-
Kurdish local citizens who pointed out minefields, booby traps, and weapons
caches. The Kurds   identified strangers and reported atrocities. They also
identified Iraqi secret police. These suspects were investigated, their presence
reported to the Military Coordination Center, and they were removed from the
area. Local citizens appreciated these actions and readily cooperated in the
intelligence collection effort.
     One reason for this wealth of human intelligence was that the Kurds were
not the only oppressed minority in the vicinity. Northern Iraq was also the
traditional home of many Christian Iraqis. These Chaldeans, as they called
themselves, were impressed by the generosity and even-handed distribution of
supplies by the Americans.   The Marines soon developed a good working
relationship with the Christian clergy and made friends among the Chaldean
people, many of whom spoke English and had relatives living in the United
States.85

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