72                           HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Another issue was that the communications section had no organic capability to
leave the ship and still maintain a communications center afloat. This shortfall
was made up using U.S. Navy equipment and personnel.
     Captain Headen singled out two Marines for their outstanding work. Gunnery
Sergeant Martin W. Duncan, the communications chief, kept the section's jeeps
running by securing Iraqi parts from destroyed or abandoned vehicles and
adapting them to fix American vehicles. Another resourceful Marine was ground
radio repairman Corporal Daniel J. Slagle. Although he had no formal training,
Slagle repaired satellite communication radios in the field. He repaired radios for
Marine units, U.S. Army units, and a U.S. Navy SEAL tealn. His actions saved
valuable time because without his intervention these radios would have been sent
                                             36
the United States for repair without replacement.
     Captain Timothy J. Ott, the 24th MEU (SOC) Staff Judge Advocate, was
concerned with customs procedures, the rules of engagement, host nation legal
matters, and captured weapons. Turkish customs were frustrating, lengthy,
bureaucratic battles that required careful accounting and detailed inspections. For
a time, the Turks relaxed their stringent standards but later reinstituted them so
frustrating delays of more than a week became common.      The "Rules of
Engagement" stated when and under what circumstances a Marine was allowed
to fire his weapon. General Shalikashvili, to emphasize the humanitarian nature
of Operation Provide Comfort, called such rules `Commander's Guidance for the
Use of Force."    The first rule was actually a statement of purpose. Provide
Comfort was a humanitarian relief Operation, not a combat operation and
personnel should conduct themselves in an appropriate manner. The rule stressed
that the allies were in northern Iraq to give assistance, not to start a war. The
next rule dealt with the right to use force for self-defense. Nothing in the rules
negated the commander's primary obligation to take all necessary action for self-
defense. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort units were authorized to use
force to respond to attacks or threats against humanitarian relief personnel or
displaced civilians, but were to use only the minimum force necessary. Deadly
force could be used only to protect lives in response to a hostile act or to react
to a demonstration of hostile intent. On ~ May, General Shalikashvili gave
further guidance regarding the treatment of civilians. Any armed Iraqi or Kurd
trying to enter the exclusion zone was to be disarmed and detained. This included
Iraql..police," Kurdish Peshn~rga guerrillas, and anyone without proper
authorization.
     Captain Ott faced two other issues. One was host nation status of forces
agreements. Normally when the United States deployed on foreign territory it
entered into   agreement with that particular country to pay for damage
accidentally inflicted on either citizens or their property. There was no such
agreement with the government of Iraq, therefore, payments were not authorized.
The other   issue was recovery of abandoned or lost Iraqi equipment and
documents.  Captured  major  weapons  were   turned over to  the Military
Coordination Center which then returned them to the Iraqis.  Small arms,
grenades, and explosives were disposed of by EOD teams.87