WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT                                       83


   Iraqi representatives met with Kurdish elders  and political leaders         at
Kanimasi on 13 May 1991. The Kurds were pleasantly surprised to discover they
were being invited to return to Dohuk. However, they made their return
dependant on two requests. First, an agreement had to be worked out with
Baghdad to guarantee a return to democratic principles, institution of civil rights,
and Kurdish autonomy. Second, they wanted allied security forces to protect
them. Without both guarantees, the Kurds would not return. In the words of one
Kurd, "We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like           pigs."1~
   The continued Iraqi occupation of Dohuk remained fl~e main stumbling block
to successfully concluding Operation Provide Comlort, and became a very sticky
point when the Iraqis refused to leave. General Nashwan told Colonel Naab "If
you enter . . . Dohuk, we will . . . take [military] action . . . . "~~  The Iraqi
army responded by moving a mechanized battalion nearer to Dohuk. Unsure of
allied resolve, Saddam instigated several provocative acts to test the waters. An
American EA-6B Prowler was fired on twice during a routine reconnaissance
flight. On S May, two Iraqi civilian helicopters spraying pesticides "slimed"
Company F while flying over the Marine lines. Although the Iraqi pilots claimed
innocence, this incident appeared to be a deliberate provocation. The helicopters
were quickly intercepted and forced down. A search of the aircraft revealed a
camera and some film, but it was never determined if this was Iraqi intelligence
equipment or the im~cent tools of an Iraqi "shutterbug."  The chemicals were
tested but contained only normal pesticide toxins and the incident was closed.
   There was a major shooting incident on 13 May between Saddam's palace
guards at Sirsenk and the British Marines. No allied troops were hit during the
firefight. The Iraqis reported two wounded, but burial parties the next day
indicated this report was in error. About a week later, members of the Joint
Historical Team were sent running for cover when Iraqi 82mm mortar rounds
were fired near allied positions.
   Several firefights, a few food riots, and continual scuffles broke out between
the Kurds and the Iraqis. In Zakho, General Garner became increasingly anxious
about fl~e safety of General Nashwan after his car was vandalized by angry Kurds
on two different occasions, so the Americans found themselves in the awkward
position of defending the Iraqis from the Kurds rather than vice versa.102

                             Opening Dohuk

   Fed up with Iraqi harassment, General Shalikashvili decided to use some
more "aggressive restraint" and ordered an American response. American air
activity increased and Joint Task Force Bravo turned its attention south. Colonel
Jones anticipated three possible solutions to the Dohuk crisis: 1) forcible entry
of Dohuk, 2) peaceful entry into Dohuk, and 3) neutralization of Dohuk with
neither Iraqis nor coalition forces inside the city. Lieutenant Colonel Liun and
                                                            103
the S-3 section prepared plans for all three courses of action.
   The plan to capture Dohuk using military force impacted the 24th MEU
(SOC) the most. The 24th MEU (SOC) was given considerable additional combat