usmcpersiangulfdoc3_013.txt
U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991


With the 2d Marine Division
in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
    The news of the invasion of Kuwait by the army of Iraq on 2 August 1991
caught many Americans by surprise. Although the news media had reported the
possibility of an invasion for some days previous, many Americans did not
immediately comprehend the implications of Saddam Hussein's actions upon the
American economy and way of life. In one quick stroke the Iraqi dictator con-
trolled 20 percent the world's oil reserves, and threatened the 25 percent owned
by Saudi Arabia.  Such blatant aggression, affecting the nation's vital inter-
ests, demanded a strong response. Accordingly, President George Bush ordered
a major deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf on 7 August.2

                           Initial Preparations

    This initial deployment included the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),
with the 1st Marine Division as its Ground Combat Element (GCE). Included
with  the forces  afloat with the U.S. Naval  Forces Central Command
(ComUSNavCent) was the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB), under
the command of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr.3 The brigade included
two battalions of the 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina. The division prepared to support this brigade's deployment, as it had
done with other MEBs and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) over the years.
The division ensured that the brigade was provided the personnel and equipment
required for its role as a landing force. Particularly, the brigade was provided
large amounts of the division's available communications equipment, including
two of its position location reporting system master stations. In the end, some
of this equipment was inappropriate or, as in the case of the satellite equipment,
excessive to the brigade's needs.4
    The division's participation in Operation Desert Shield was only beginning
with the deployment of the 4th MEB on 17 August 1990. The sustainment of
U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area became a critical issue as they increased
in numbers. With the initial mission being one of the immediate defense of
Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggressions, a "line was drawn in the sand,"
behind which additional troops, supplies, and equipment could be brought into
the theater. During the first several weeks, the replacement of units by a rotation
policy was considered to be the best solution to maintaining a strong and
effective force for an indefinite period in the harsh climate of the desert.
Accordingly, the   2d  Marine Division began a program  of training and
preparation for the time when it might be called to deploy and replace the 1st
Marine Division.
    An immediate question, requiring considerable detail to answer, was how
the division should be structured for possible combat operations. Over the past
two decades, the experience of the Marine Corps, and of the 2d Marine Division

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