WrrH THE 2D MARINE DWISION JN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM


division, he ordered increased equipment readiness. Through his emphasis on
this aspect of maintenance, the division's readiness level rose from between 88%
and 91% in September of 1989, to 97.5% in February 1991, just prior to the
start of the ground campaign.'3
    General Keys also continued the field training for the division staff begun
by his predecessor, Major General Orlo K. Steele. Two of these earlier exercises
provided many lessons which were of value as the division prepared itself for
desert combat. In October 1988, the division had conducted "Combined Arms
Operation 89," an exercise in which the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,
the 2d Tank Battalion, and other units maneuvered from Camp Lejeune into
Virginia. This exercise helped to define command structures for the division,
and also identified solutions for long-range communications. In the summer of
1989, the "South Carolina TEWT" (tactical exercise without troops) proved
especially helpful in working out communications for the artillery regiment and
in the employment of artillery in a movement-to-contact. These and other
exercises had oriented the division to the size of the zone it would occupy in the
desert and how that ground should be organized.'4
    In anticipation of the division's role in the conflict, General Keys ordered
the division to conduct a field training exercise in September. During this
three-day exercise, the II MEF wargame center's tactical warfare simulation
evaluation analysis system was used to simulate an aggressor force in a Saudi
Arabian desert scenario. The division command post (CP) responded to tactical
situations, tested communications with subordinate units, and practiced convoy
control. Most important, the exercise was used as a vehicle to determine the best
configuration of the division CP. It evaluated personnel assignments, tentage
requirements, and the physical layout. The most important lesson to come from
this exercise was that the division could not fight a desert war from a traditional
command post; General Keys and his staff were convinced that the CP had to
be made more mobile.   There were several  configurations tried, and this
experimentation continued even through the division's movements in Saudi
Arabia. Ultimately, the division had a main, rear, forward, and mobile CP.
The mobile CP included the commanding general, the operations officer, the air
officer, and the fire support coordinator, and other officers as necessary, all
working out of four light armored vehicles (LAV)--two command and control
LAV-Cs, one LAV-25, and one LAV-AT (anti-tank variant) mounting the TOW
missile system. It was from this mobile CP that General Keys would lead the
division during the ground campaign. `~
    On 18 November, the division received its long-anticipated deployment
orders in a message from the commanding general of II MEF.'6 Training had
already begun in earnest, with an emphasis  on breaching operations and
intelligence briefings on Iraqi doctrine and capabilities.17 The newly joined
Reservists had an intensive program of instruction prepared for them by the
Southwest Asia Training Group, which bad formed from the II MEF wargame
center. This instruction was set in two courses, one for enlisted Marines up to
the rank of sergeant, and the other for officers and staff noncommissioned
officers. The enlisted course emphasized individual marksmanship; nuclear,