14                                U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

system. The greatest danger to discovery was from enemy ground surveillance
radar. To counter this threat, the movement was routed entirely outside of the
range of the enemy's radar, and these were jammed at critical moments by
EA6B Prowler electronic countermeasure aircraft.s~ As an additional precaution
to mask the disappearance of the division from its sector, the MIEF established
a deception unit, Task Force Troy. This task fcrce had a special deception
capacity: to emit the electronic signature of a division. If successful it would
appear that the 2d Marine Division was still operating in its original area.~
    As in the previous move, the division's forward CP personnel led the
quartering party. Accompanied by representatives of the 6th and 8th Marines,
the Tiger Brigade, the 2d LAl Battalion, and the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion,
the members of the CP scouted the division's new zone near the area soon to
be named Al    Kilanjar. There they met with members of the 1st Marine
Division's 1st LAl Battalion, who briefed them. In order to conceal the division,
advantage was made of the natural lay of the ground. Sites for all of the
division's units were selected as close as possible to the berm at the Kuwaiti
border.
    The next consideration in this movement was the need for the division to be
able to maintain its tactical integrity and defend itself if attacked on the march.
This would be accomplished by moving the division by echelon, and completing
the move as rapidly as possible. G-Day had been set for 24 Febniary 1991. To
have the entire division in its positions in time to conduct final maintenance and
pre-assault operations, General Keys ordered that the move be completed by 19
Febniary.~7  Accordingly, 2d LAl Battalion led forward on the 12th; one week
later, the division's last unit, the 8th Marines, was in position.
    The division was now within range of the enemy's guns. While maintaining
an active outpost line to the front, the division began those final preparations
which would bring it into the attack in five more days.
    In these days prior to the start of the ground campaign, General Keys' other
task for the division was to train for the type of combat it expected to face.
Division Frag Order 001 stated all units would "begin (field) unit training as
soon as possible" after arrival in Southwest Asia.~ It was recognized that this
training would have to be integrated with the division's defensive missions and
forward movements.
    On 31 December, General Keys clearly expressed his intent for the type of
training the division was to undertake. In Operations Order 2-90 he stated that
he wanted to "focus the efforts of the Division on the training/preparation for
combat during the transition period prior to the beginning of offensive ops. This
will be oriented towards preparing the Division for mechanized operations and
                                                                 "39
obstacle breaching. Reserve battalions will have priority of training . . .
    To provide training to all units in the time remaining before the onset of
hostilities, a program of instruction was organized in four phases. The first
phase was unit training as prescribed by the regimental and separate battalion
commanders. The second phase was the zeroing and calibration of individual
and crew-served weapons. The third phase was for battalion-size units to receive
mobile assault training. Finally, there were to be regimental combined arms