IS                                 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

    This view of a strong and capable Iraqi Army was very likely correct for
the early days of Operation Desert Shield, with morale still high and the
integrity of units not yet destroyed by death and desertion. By the middle of
December, as the division was arriving in theater, a more defined picture of the
enemy was developed. At a briefing given by Lieutenant General Bernard E.
Trainor, USMC (Ret), the strengths and weaknesses of the Iraqi Army were
detailed. The Iraqi soldiers were described as "conscripts who endure," and
who were not required to do very much. They were secular in nature, without
the religious fervor demonstrated by the Iranians. Great emphasis was placed on
maintaining their morale, but they had demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War
that given the opportunity, they would break and run. The !raqis were known
to have large amounts of artillery and they bad shown that they could use it
properly; although not as proficient as U.S. forces, when they fired massed
artillery they could assume that they had killed the target in their fire sack. Their
engineers were rated as "very good." They were said to be intelligent, highly
motivated, and innovative. They could operate quickly and efficiently under fire,
and could create defensive sectors rapidly, even building higher terrain as
necessary to take advantage of tactical situations. Their tactical air was "very
poor," and their logistics were very vulnerable, especially with the numerous
types and calibers of weapons which they had to supply.69
    The beginning of the air campaign, the first phase of Operation Desert
Storm,   on  16 January, required continuing reassessments of the enemy's
capabilities and intentions. One immediate effect of the constant bombing was
the ever-increasing number of line-crossers surrendering to the division. These
enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) often told of low morale and high desertion
rates in the Iraqi units.~ Although comforting, these tales could not be accepted
uncritically; deserters are not the most reliable sources of information.
    As the division moved up to Al Kibrit and later to Al Khanjar, the G-2
section focused its efforts on the important task of gathering information and
disseminating intelligence about the specific enemy units to the front. Their
work in identifying the enemy units facing the division was highly accurate;
prior to the attack it was known that the 2d Marine Division's area of operations
was occupied by the 7th and 14th Iraqi Divisions, both part of the Iraqi III
Corps. These divisions were composed, respectively, of the 19th, 38th, 39th,
and 116th Infantry Brigades; and the 14th,  18th, 56th, and 426th Infantry
Brigades. The brigades were arrayed in depth along the defensive lines; beyond
them were part of the III Iraqi Corps' operational reserves, the 3d Armored
Division,  composed  of the 6th and  12th Armored Brigades   and the 8th
Mechanized Brigade. Also in the zone was the 20th Mechanized Brigade, which