U.S. MARINES: IN THE~PER5IAN GULF, 1990-1991


Company was formed and attached to the combat engineers. The Headquarters
and Service Company of the battalion was placed in general support of the
division.10s
   The three weeks prior to the assault was a period of continuous activity for
the division staff and subordinate units. The division's staff sections prepared
their own supporting plans. Critical issues were discussed and solutions refined.
The division had to move to its final assembly areas in such a manner that there
would be no need for a maintenance stand-down. Fueling points and sources of
water for decontamination still had to be identified.'~ Essential elements of
information included the construction of the obstacle belts themselves, the types
and numbers of mines found there, and of the possible danger caused by the
presence of hydrogen-sulfide (112S) gas (escaping from unlit oil wells) in the
attack and breach area. To ensure that the division had the latest information
about the enemy's defenses, Lieutenant Colonel Mark E.      Swanstrom, the
division engineer officer, was dispatched to Washington, D.C., on 5 February.
He met with representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Army
Intelligence Agency. He reviewed the division's essential elements of information
for the-breach, and checked the intelligence products available, leaving requests
for the collection of additional information."0 Upon his return to the division,
the information he brought back was used to produce a series of maps of the
Iraqi defensive lines, on a scale of 1:12,500. These detailed maps were issued
down to company level.
   Command and control of the division's movement to and through the breach
site was another major concern. Winston Churchill had likened desert warfare
during World War II to fighting at sea.111 The division staff agreed with him.
Ultimately, it was decided to handle this problem in a manner with which all
Marines were familiar; the assault thn~ugh the Iraqi defensive lines would be
conducted in the same manner as an amphibious assault, except-that this assault
would be made in wheeled and tracked vehicles driving across the desert floor
and not by landing craft racing through a choppy surf. Instead of a beachhead
line, there would be a breachhead line, which would have to be held to allow
follow-on movement by the remainder of the division as it came through.
Assembly areas, where division elements would await their turn to be called
forth, in waves and serials, were tentatively identified on the map. Colored
approach lanes led from the assembly areas to the breach site itself. Lieutenant
Colonel Shores and Captain James T. Van Emburgh created a system of marking
these approach lanes, using appropriately colored plastic barrels placed every
250 meters along the route. A breach approach sequence table was formulated
to regulate the traffic of the division, and a breach control group was activated
to ensure the orderly and timely flow of the division through the breaches.
   To attack the enemy's artillery and air defenses before and during the
assault, a fire support plan was developed by the fire support coordination center
(FSCC). The enemy's artillery, the major means of delivery for chemical
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munitions, was identified as a key target.   An initial list of 156 targets was
identified for the division fire plan. A target bulletin issued on 21 February
deleted 20 targets and added 57 others for a total of 193. The targets were set