WrrH THE 2D MARINE DWi5ION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM             35


company operated on the northwest flank of the battalion and it preceded the
other companies in the battalion movement into Kuwait. The company's mission
was to seize key terrain overlooking the enemy's positions and the obstacle belts.
The company's attack was violent and aggressive in order to draw attention to
it and away from the division breach sites.
    The attack was expected to draw fire from the Iraqi artillery and mortars
and to expose them to counterbattery fire of the 10th Marines. In this aspect, the
attack exceeded expectations. Shortly after crossing the border, about 1030,
Company C came under considerable artillery, antitank, and mortar fire. So
many weapons were firing that the counterbattery program proved inadequate to
service the available targets. Captain Amidon calmly and skillfully withdrew his
company until fire support took the desired effect.
    Company C returned to the attack shortly thereafter, maneuvering to assault
the flank of Iraqi forces which were forward of the minefields. Under continuing
artillery and antitank fire, Captain Amidon advanced his company to the edge
of the minefield, classified the mines, and identified a gap for possible use by
the Tiger Brigade. For the next two days, Company C maneuvered aggressively
and exploited Iraqi weaknesses. By 23 February (G minus 1), it had destroyed
10 tanks and eight wheeled vehicles, and killed numerous infantry with organic
                   125
and supporting arms.
    The 2d LAl Battalion sought contact and reported information on enemy
troops, activities, and equipment. Operating almost continuously under antitank,
rocket, and indirect fire, the battalion's companies engaged enemy troops,
artillery, and tanks on at least 17 occasions, using organic antitank weapons,
artillery fire from the 10th Marines, and close air support. During these three
days, the battalion accounted for numerous enemy KIA, the destruction of 12
enemy tanks, a further 35 tanks with air strikes, and the capture of 120 EPWs.1~
    One major consideration for the employment of the 2d LAl Battalion as it
went into Kuwait on 6 minus 3, was that the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion also
would be operating in front of the division. In order to keep these units'
movements coordinated and prevent the possibility of friendly casualties, the 2d
LAl Battalion would begin its screening mission in the northwest corner of the
division's zone, and work its way across the division's front over the next few
days.  This would enable the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion to complete its
surveillance mission and withdraw back across the berm.     Of even greater
importance, such conspicuous activity by the LAVs would have the desired
effect of drawing the enemy's attention away from the actual area of the
division's assault and breach.l2?
    Another benefit of the 2d LAl Battalion's operations was that the Iraqis
began to use their artillery against it. In almost continuous contact with the
enemy for three days, the battalion frequently came under mortar and heavy
artillery fire. While casualties from enemy fire were light, the enemy disclosed
the locations of many batteries to American counter-battery radar. Using air and
artillery, the division was able to put numerous Iraqi artillery pieces out of
action before the 6-Day assault. 128 If they had remained undiscovered, these
same guns could have caused the division heavy casualties as it went through the