WrrH THE 2D MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM             39


the berm to the Saudi side.'33 They returned on the 23d, and continued to report
on enemy troops and activities, engaged enemy troops, and brought in 168
prisoners.1~ Most importantly, the battalion kept the enemy at a distance, and
ignorant of the division's intentions.
    That evening, Company B, 2d LAl Battalion, scouted the entrances to the
six breach lanes through the minefields.  Captain Martin T.     Wolf led his
company's 1st Platoon and provided security to the other platoons as they
marked their lanes. He then dismounted from his vehicle and went forward on
foot to personally mark the last two lanes. These were further north than the
others, and closer to the burning oil wells. The light from these great plumes of
flame made discovery by Iraqi patrols very likely. But Captain Wolf calmly
avoided obstacles and `inexploded ordnance and despite the presence of Iraqi
troops only 500 meters away, he supervised the marking of the lanes.13~
    With the successful completion of this work, the division bad prepared its
zone for the assault. Now some of the division's units started to occupy their
assembly areas or firing positions in preparation for H-Hour, early the next
morning.

               Into Kuwait: G Minus 1 through G Plus 1

    I can't say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I use words like
    "brilliant" it would be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job
    that they did in breaching the so-called impenetrable barrier . . . . It was
    a classic . . . absolutely superb Operation, a text book, and I think it
    will be studied for many, many years to come as the way to do it.
       General H. Nonnan Schwarzkopf press briefing, 27 Februa~y 1991

    On 23 February 1991, final preparations were made for the division's
assault. One of the tasks given to the 2d LA! Battalion, when it moved across
the berm on G minus 3, was to protect artillery survey parties from the 10th
Marines.1~ An important part of the division's plan called for four of the six
artillery units to move forward of the berm on G minus 1.137 Their firepower
would be critical to a successful breach by conducting counterbattery fire or in
breaking up enemy armor   counter-attacks. During the night of 23 February,
the 2d Battalion,  12th Marines; the 3d Battalion,  10th Marines;    the 5th
Battalion, 10th Marines; and the MLRS battery were in firing positions east of
the berm, inside of Kuwait itself. The 6th Marines' own direct support battalion,
the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, would be moving with that regiment in the
assault, and taking up its firing positions beyond the second breach. The 1st
Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, had taken its position on the west side of the berm
and would move through with the Tiger Brigade.'~
    This positioning of artillery units forward of the maneuver elements which
they were to support may seem, at first glance, to violate all doctrine on the
employment of artillery. It made proper tactical sense, however. Intelligence
had reported that the Iraqi brigades to the division's front and flanks could reach