34                                   U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 199O-19~I

them if possible. 180 For this day it was General Keys' intent to have all three of
the division's assault elements on the attack; this would require waiting for the
arrival of 8th Marines on the right flank, and realigning some of the subordinate
units. The 8th Marines was leaving its assembly areas in Saudi Arabia at first
light. At 0550 it passed through the berm, moving on lanes Blue 3 and 4 and
Green S and 6. By 0740 the regiment's lead elements were through the breach
lanes. At the same time, the 5th Battalion,  10th Marines, the last artillery
battalion, was at the mid-point of lanes Red  1 and 2 preparing to add its
firepower to that of the four battalions which moved up on the previous day.'8
    As the 8th N~arines came up into position in their zone, certain adjustments
had to be made. First, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was returned to the
operational control of its parent regiment; since it was already in the 8th
Marines' zone, no movement was required. It was a different matter with the
3d Battalion, 6th Marines. This battalion was positioned in what would be the
8th Marines zone to the west of Al Jaber airfield. It therefore had to move to
the northwest to rejoin the other battalions of the 6th Marines.1~ The 2d
Battalion, 4th Marines, moved up between the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, on its
left and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, on its right. The 3d Battalion, 23d
Marines, came in behind, as the regimental reserve of the 8th Marines.
    The taking of Division Objective 1 was to be the aim of this day's efforts.
The objective was in the middle of the division's zone. It was a gently sloping
rise, several kilometers across, which dominated the surrounding desert literally
to the horizon. It was covered with defensive positions set in depth, consisting
of trench-lines, bunkers, and dug-in tanks. Depriving the Iraqis of it would be
of great value  in  preventing their interference  with the   division's future
movements. To the west of the objective were two important features, built-up
areas known popularly as the "ice-tray  and the "ice-cube," because of their
appearances on a map.
    While  the  repositioning of  some  of their   battalions took place,  the
commanders of the 6th and     8th Marines made a personal liaison visit to
coordinate their regiments'  roles in the coming assault.   Colonel Larry S.
Schmidt,  the commanding     officer of the 8th  Marines,   met with   Colonel
Livingston at 0930.!S3 The main issue was to agree on the boundary between
their commands. The boundary as originally set placed the feature known as the
  ice-tray" within the 8th Marines' zone, but this limited the 6th Marines to a
narrow front in their assault to Division Objective 1. By mutual consent, the
regimental boundary was shifted to the east, widening the 6th Marines' zone to
include the "ice-tray." The smaller feature known as the "ice-cube" remained
within the 8th Marines' zone.
    Throughout the morning, the division's elements came under indirect fire
from enemy artillery. The division's artillery fired counter-battery missions
when targets were acquired. In one of the more memorable artillery actions of
the campaign,  the  10th Marines'   counter-battery radar acquired an enemy
self-propelled artillery battalion. Four of the regiment's five battalions fired a