76                                 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


than  the enemy  expected. Caught  off-balance,  the Iraqis     were given no
opportunity to respond effectively to the division's subsequent actions. Using
superior firepower and  rapid maneuver, the division threatened       the Iraqi
commanders with encirclement in the environs of Al Jahrah and Kuwait City.
When they chose to escape the trap, their movement was turned into a rout by
the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the division's timely actions. What the division
accomplished in its area was duplicated, on a larger scale, throughout the theater
by the combined actions of the coalition forces.
    There were some guiding principles which distinguished the division's
actions and enabled it to be so successful. Rapidity of movement and shock
action appear to be both more necessary and easier to achieve in desert warf&e.
In writing about the highly successful British desert campaign of 1918, Cyril
Falls states that ". . . the most interesting feature of the campaign . . . was the
success of shock action. Almost every charge was made in extended formation
and driven home at the gallop . . . . On many occasions it was not the speed of
the  charge alone but  the celerity with which   brigadiers     and  regimental
commanders made up their minds which led to           success."~ What was true of
the British cavalry was equally certain, 73 years later, of the mobile and
armored formations of the 2d Marine Division.
    To General Keys, maneuver warfare is essentially a "way of thinking about
everything in combat, the ultimate goal [of which] is the destruction of the
enemy." He believes it to be the province of the division and     higher-level


                                                                Photograph by author
LtCoi John Kiser and Capt James Van Emburgh inspect captured FRO~ 7 rockets on a
mobile launcher.