4                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

The brigade's aviation combat element was Marine Aircraft Group 70 under
command of Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch, who also commanded Marine Aircraft
Group 11, a fighter-attack group at MCAS El Toro, California.                His group
included  fixed wing, helicopter,  and        air defense missile       units. Colonel
Alexander W. Powell's I3rigade Service Support Group 7 handled the combat
service support tasks.
    General Hopkins' operations officer, Colonel Charles M.               Lohman, was
awakened at 0130 on 4 August and ordered to Tampa where he participated in
72 hours of non-stop planning.  To save time, General Schwarzkopfs planners
used Internal Look as a model for future theater operations for the crisis.
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy E. Donovan, a tanker who had learned the plans
trade during a joint tour in Korea, worked up the brigade plan.
    Among the planning issues for immediate attention was communications.
Boomer's G-6    in charge of communications, electronics, and computers at I
MEF    was  Colonel Robert G.    Hill,      one of the Corps'         most experienced
communicators. The Marine Corps was in a transition period in communications
equipment, and the switchboard gear on hand was not fully interoperable with
Central Command.    General Schwarzkopf promptly lent a hand by attaching a
joint communications support element with T'TC-39 switching equipment to
improve the force's "connectivity."
    The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated 1700 Greenwich time as L-Hour and 7
August as C-Day for the commencement of operations, i.e., the day before
Boomer assumed command.    The code name given to the operation was 1,Desert
Shield."  The Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force began to deploy to the
Gulf in four phases over the next 40 days.
    The mission of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, MarCent, as the
Marine component of Central Command was known, was to protect the critical
oil and port facilities of Jubayl, Ju'aymah, and Ras Tannurah (Ra's at Tanura)
in Saudi Arabia, plus the island emirate state of Bahrain by destroying or
delaying enemy forces as far north as possible.              In addition to operations in
support of Marine forces, MarCent aviation was to conduct theater counterair,
close air support, and interdiction operations.    As a contingency, MarCent was
to be prepared to reembark its forces for amphibious operations.            In a ftirther
contingency,   if enemy forces occupied Saudi Arabia,               MarCent was to be
prepared to eject them and restore the territorial integrity of that nation. General


    `l'1arine Corps principal staff functions gcncrally followed joint U.S. military practice. At 1
Marine Expeditionary Force during this time,  scction heads wcre normally colonels, titled
Assistant Chief of Staff with the following rcsponsibilities: G-1  ManpoweriPersonnel, G-2
Intelligence, G-3 Operations, G-4 Logistics, and G-6 Communications/Electronics and In formation
Systems Managcment. G-3 assumed the contingency and future operations planning f'nctions of
the G-5 section during the campaign.

     The dcfcnsc of the Ras Tannurah sector south of Jubayl was later assigned to U.S. Army
Forces, Central Command (ArCent).