26                                     U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

been impressed by the U.S. Army's use of teams of laser-designating Bell
011-58   Kiowa   scout and  Hughes     AH-64    Apache   attack   helicopters   as
independent maneuver elements against armored and mechanized forces in
training.  Airborne laser designation for the force's Hellfire anti-armor missiles
was not yet a Marine Corps capability.
    Although Task Force Cunningham demonstrated a new concept, it was
difficult to move the unit around in the defense during the exercise, and even
more so on the offense. The added command element complicated air tasking
procedures as well, especially for the control of fixed wing aircraft.  In the end,
the consensus of commanders and staff was that the scheme limited the amount
of air Support that ground commanders could draw upon, and that it was better
to keep helicopter assets in general support for more flexibility.    On the other
hand, Kurth was later inspired to place ground laser designation gear aboard
some of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing's Bell Ull-iN Huey helicopters to give his
Hellfire-equipped Sea Cobras added capability.18
    Phase IV was primarily NavCent cross training and Phase V was a critique
and discussion of lessons learned. Imminent Thunder's main issues centered on
air and communications issues.    In the joint air control arena, there was a need
for closer coordination and refinement of aircraft control and use.       Some of
these lessons would not be fully appreciated until after the commencement of
hostilities two months later.
    Imminent   Thunder also   revealed   the  difficult and complex       state of
communications.   As fortune would have it, 1990 was a transition year for
Marine Corps communications.       For I MEF's chief communicator, Colonel
Robert G.    Hill, the assistant chief of staff G-6 for communications        and
computers, the exercise, and indeed the entire Gulf operation, was a constant
scramble to balance scarce equipment against the needs of a force spread far
beyond    the  distances specified   in  doctrine.    For  example,       although
computer-compatible, high-speed digital switching equipment was replacing older
analog switching gear, both types were stilt in service.  This complicated the
interface or "connectivity" of the two systems both internally and with the
outside.   Within the force, there was great reliance on voice communications
conducted via venerable workhorse high (HF) and very high frequency (VHF)
radio. High frequency suffered from its traditional problems of fading and noise
while VHF was limited to line-of-site ranges.   Digital secure voice telephones
(DSVT-68) were in use, but demand exceeded supplies.           Some of Hill's
enterprising subordinates partially made up the shortfall by stripping secure
executive telephones, General Electric STU Ills, from offices in the U.S. and
wiring them into the Saudi international telephone system.  The clarity of this
secure secondary network was actually better than the primary military Autovon
link.
    The exercise also proved the worth of the latest technology.   The linkup of
computers through local and wide area networks, man-pack AN/LST-5 satellite
communication (SatCom), and encrypted facsimile (secure FAX) all functioned
well.   To solve the problem of navigating on a featureless desert, the hand-held
Hughes Position Locating and Reporting System (PLRS) gave users a precise