38                                      U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, I99O~l99I


                b. In Stage B, 2d Marine Division was to pass
                through 1st Marine Division and effect a link-
                up with two brigades of Marines of a NavCent
                landing force whose first objective was to be the
                Kuwaiti port of Ash Shuaybah.

                C. In Stage C, both divisions were to destroy
                Iraqi forces    in-zone and seize two I  MEF
                objectives: the area surrounding the Al Jahra
                main supply route intersections, plus another
                blocking position about 10 miles southwest of
                Al Jahra.

                d. In Stage D, Marine forces were to prevent
                Iraqi withdrawal from southeastern Kuwait and
                to be prepared to assist forward passage of Arab
                forces to take Kuwait City.~

   The decision in favor a single-division breach was because of the limited
engineering equipment available as well as the brief time available for 2d
Marine Division to conduct training.    To resolve the breaching gear issue, the
Marine Corps Research, Acquisition, and Development Command at Quantico
actively pursued additional breaching equipment but was frustrated by the long
lead times required.   As it turned out, by mid-February, enough breaching
equipment was in-theater to permit a second set of breaches.
   Forming a precise picture of the obstacle belts was a difficult task as General
Boomer lacked detailed imagery and first-hand reconnaissance. The intelligence
community believed that the barriers contained antipersonnel, antiarmor, and
possibly chemical mines surrounded by barbed wire.     Imagery revealed that
substantial amounts of oilfield piping had been placed in trenches in front of
parts of the first barrier.  These were rigged to sources of crude oil that could
be ignited to create a flaming barrier.
   The techniques of breaching obstacles ranged from the conventional to
untried schemes.   Each received great scrutiny. In November, Marines tested
aerial fuel/air explosive weapons (FAIS) against mines on a nearby range.
Unfortunately the overpressures generated were not high enough to reliably
detonate mines and had little effect on wire obstacles. During the air campaign,
U.S. Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers made several strikes
against sections of the obstacle belts, but they had little effect.  Thus, aircraft
delivered means would not be a major breaching aid.
   This left a combination of single and triple-segment line charges flung across
the belts by rockets, chain flails attached to armored Caterpillar D7 bulldozers,
and track-width mine plows attached to M6OA 1 tanks and D7 bulldozers.         In
addition, there was the traditional and hazardous technique of manually probing
and disarming mines.   The line charges experienced a number of fuse failures