wJTH THE I MARINE EXPED~IONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM      43

                         Supporting the Move North

   In early January, the MarCent area of operations was significantly expanded
north to include the port and airfield of Mishab (Ras Al Mishab), 50 kilometers
southeast of the Kuwait border.      The  Arab      forces of the Joint Forces
Command-East began assembling in the sector to the north for their attack into
Kuwait along the coastal    main  supply route.      Moroccan troops provided
additional external security for the Safaniyah area. To the west of Mishab, the
MarCent area extended over 125 kilometers and included the western half and
all of the north-south portions of the Kuwait border along the heel.
   Brigadier General    Krulak  established the Direct Support Command      at
Combat Service Support Area 1 behind earthen blastwall berms on an otherwise
featureless desert about 57 kilometers west of the coast highway at Mishab.
This base quickly became known as Kibrit after Abraq al Kibrit, a tiny Bedouin
settlement with a few trees and ramshackle houses about 20 kilometers further
west.  Significantly the base was only 52 kilometers south of the border and
ahead of both divisions for the moment, so Krulak had most of the billets and
workspaces put in underground revetments.   Within a few weeks, Kibrit had a
470-bed ~ospital,    1.8 million gallons of fuel storage, and   15,800 tons of
ammunition.  Marine engineers and SeaBees widened the dirt track leading past
it to eight lanes and improved a disused 6,500-foot dirt airstrip to accept turbo-
prop Lockheed C-i 30 Hercules transports.   Under normal circumstances, the
Kibrit Main Supply Route was a hardpacked marl road, but with heavy use,
traffic on it produced either choking clouds of talcum-like dust or small seas of
sticking mud in low areas known as sabkha's that presented challenges to driver
and engineer alike.
   The winter rains had now begun.    Even though the area's annual average
was about four inches, as was typical in the desert, it arrived either nearly all
at once or not at all.  The winter of 1990-91 was much wetter than normal,
possibly exacerbated by the oil well and refinery fires the Iraqis began setting
in February. During one storm in early January, 3.6 inches fell on Safaniyah
which flooded out excavations for fortifications and the Direct Air Support
Center.  The low lying sabkha dry lake areas that dotted the area became
treacherous and untrafficable.
   Of particular importance to General    Boomer's offensive plan was the
granting of rights to use the Mishab Royal Saudi Naval Force port and its
adjacent airfield.   The I MEF staff believed that port could accept AMSEA-
class cargo ships of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron despite its tight
channel and turning basin.  There were also mine and missile threats along the
circuitous route around the Safaniyah offshore oil fields, so the Navy, and the
civilian crews of the MPS, were understandably reluctant to attempt it.


   During the period, there were many references to the "Elbow" of the heel of Kuwait, but
there was never any consistency as to its location; i.e., the southwest corner of the heel or the
bend near Al Manaqish. Therefore all reference to the Elbow is omitted herein.