46                                     U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

early January with Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Beinhart III and Commander
Ghazi Asleiten, RSNF, as the senior members. The successftil effort by Marines
of the force to assist in the training of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Marine
Corps led to approval by Headquarters Marine Corps to establish a permanent
Saudi Advisory Group.

                               Refining the Plan

    On 6 January, representatives of staff of the force's major units came to the
Safaniyah headquarters to discuss and wargame USMarCent Operations Plan
Desert Storm.  General Boomer encouraged them to critically analyze all aspects
of his plan so that it might be refined.   Two days later, Lieutenant General
Calvin A. H.    Waller, USA,     General Schwarzkopf's  Deputy Commander-
in-Chief, visited for a briefing on General Boomer's concept of operations and
to present the CentCom perspective.    These events resulted in pivotal meetings
on 13 and 15 January when Boomer and his staff conducted map exercises and
wargames of the execution phase of the plan with the commanders of the major
subordinate units and their key staff.   During the exercises, the 1st Marine
Division commander, Major General Myatt, raised concerns about the coordi-
nation and space required for both MarCent and the Joint Forces Command-East
to carry out their plans.
    Like General Boomer, Myatt was in the habit of conducting round table
discussions with his commanders and staff.   In the course of one of these, his
operations officer, Colonel James A. Fulks, who would later lead an infantry
task force through the obstacle belts, argued convincingly that under the existing
plan, too many enemy forces were positioned in MarCent's avenue of approach,
thus potentially compromising the penetration and exploitation phases.   Fulks
wanted to revisit an earlier course of action that involved a MarCent breach
between the Al Wafrah and Umm Gudair (South) oil fields in the southwest
portion of the heel of Kuwait.   Fulks felt that this avenue of approach was not
only less defended--it bypassed the bulk of the defenders in southern Kuwait-
-but it also was more difficult for the Iraqis to reinforce, since only one main
supply route serviced the area.  It permitted rapid engagement of the operational
reserve and was close to General Boomer's objective at the Al Jahra intersection
chokepoint.  Another factor was the Iraqi command and control system.    Many
officers studied it and concluded that Iraqi forces above the brigade level were
not well versed in coordination with other units for political reasons.  They
thought Saddam Hussein viewed that as a threat to his power.   Therefore, by
penetrating along divisional and brigade boundaries, confusion might be sown
to the benefit of Marines in the assault. General Boomer was receptive, eyen
though logistically it was far more difficult.   The clinching argument was
General Schwarzkopf's continuing disapproval of an amphibious operation for
reasons  not  yet  clear.    It  gradually  became  quietly known  that    the
commander-in-chief wanted to use the two Marine brigades afloat as part of a
grand deception strategy.   (These were the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade