52                                      U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, I99O~I991

of Phase I in an effort to destroy Iraq's ballistic missile capability.  This came
mostly at the expense of Phase III, battlefield preparation, which was intended
to "shape the battlefield" for ground operations. Although General Boomer
understood the political necessity of hunting down and striking the Scud systems,
he could not afford to let the battlefield shaping operation be compromised.
Accordingly,  as G-Day approached, he directed the 3d MAW to fly an
increasing amount of offensive sorties against selected targets in southeastern Ku-
wait.
   In the area of targeting, under the air tasking order system, Lieutenant
General Horner as JFACC coordinated all missions in the Kuwait Theater of
Operations. General Boomer's targeting cell selected targets to be struck in the
MarCent sector and then arranged them on a priority basis.    These primarily
were enemy command and control nodes and indirect fire weapon systems such
as artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and Frog surface-to-surface rockets in
southeastern Kuwait.  General Boomer believed these presented the greatest
threats to the force in the assault.  He directed that the order in which these
targets were to be struck be varied so that the Iraqis would have difficulty in
determining the likely penetration points and avenues of approach of Marine
forces. As part of the overall theater air campaign, MarCent target nominations
competed with others presented to JFACC.          If MarCent targets were not
attacked due to operational priorities of CentCom, General Boomer had the
discretionary authority to task MarCent aircraft to attack MEF-designated targets
and often did so.~
   One significant example of this occurred during the Khatii actions on the
evening of 31 January.  The I MEF all-source fusion center for intelligence
received a report from the Kuwaiti Resistance that a high-level meeting of Iraqi
military officers was occurring at a former Kuwaiti military base about 11
kilometers south of Ash Shuaybah near the coast.    The Resistance was able to
identify the specific site, a small building in a park.  The force relayed the
information to the wing which launched two Marine all weather attack A-6E
Intruders from Shaikh Isa Air Base to attack the site. The aircrews located the
building in the dark with their forward-looking infrared sensors, designated it
with laser guidance, and then struck the building at about 1925 with laser
seeking GBU-10 2,000-pound bombs.       Their attack apparently caused the death
of the commander of the Iraqi III Corps who was Lieutenant General Boomer's
opposite number.~
   After the air campaign began, an important targeting issue from General
Boomer's perspective was bomb damage assessment (EDA).         Both force and
wing intelligence officers found it difficult to ascertain actual results due to the
Scarcity of MarCent-controlled overhead imagery systems and usable aircraft
sensor video recordings. Moreover, there was a lack of trained target analysts.
As  mentioned, the Marine Corps'        last high-speed imagery platform,      the
McDonnell RF-4B Phantom photo and radar reconnaissance aircraft, had been
decommissioned in August 1990. This placed the force at the mercy of national
and other services' assets for good quality imagery.      These agencies were
themselves  saturated with requests and  generally were unable to get imagery