usmcpersiangulfdoc5_094.txt
90                                    U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

nearly dark by then and it was not practical to begin clearing the airfield until
the next day.  If the base was suitable, General Boomer intended to use it as
the next main command post for I MEF.      General Moore also wanted to use
the airfield as a forward aerial resupply point (FARP) and to push out I MEF's
air defense umbrella by placing Hawk missiles there. Further east, on the other
side of the Burqan Ojlfield, the Joint Forces Command-East was making fine
progress until it ran into the Iraqi 18th Infantry Division occupying positions in
the built-up areas along the coast north of Ras az Zawr.
   The Marines conducted their breachings rapidly. As I MEF forces emerged
out of the second obstacle belt, the first significant numbers of Iraqi troops
began to surrender. The estimated number of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)
taken on G-Day was more than 8,000.        Most of them were infantry who
suddenly found themselves surrounded by Marines.   In this regard, deception
and the speed of the Marine attack worked as well as General Boomer had
hoped.  However, the EPWs became a logistical problem that threatened to
slow the advance.   The rapid reversal of fortunes stunned many Iraqi troops,
but in general, the prisoners were orderly and cooperative.  Late the next day,
25 February, Brigadier General Krulak at the Direct Support Command was
able to gather up some transport to evacuate the EPWs by using empty returning
logistics support vehicles and Saudi buses.   The Marine drivers somehow
squeezed their buses through the breach lanes which still had mines remaining
in their sand wind-rows.  Most of the prisoners spent a cool and wet night or
two huddled in the open before the DSC could move them in stages to the main
EPW compound at Kibrit. They were given the same water and food rations as
Marines.
   To support the force in the attack, the Direct Support Command used a
"push" system.   To eliminate the inherent lag of processing resupply requests,
General Krulak and his staff selected items of resupply they believed would be
moSt requested by the attacking units.  The command brought these forward
through the breaches the night of 24-25 February to place them immediately
next to combat units.   The first women Marines through the breaches were
drivers of resupply vehicles.  To keep up the pace of resupply through the
breaches, Marine combat engineers continually improved the main supply route
from Al Khanjar.   Engineers and Navy SeaBees accompanied the two artillery
regiments for quick construction of emplacements between the obstacle belts.
Other SeaBees improved the main supply route from Qaraah through the 1st
Marine Division breaches to eventually connect with a paved road about five
kilometers southeast of Al Jaber Airfield.
   As I MEF moved toward the barriers early on 24 February, amphibious
ships carrying the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade steamed closer to Mishab
in order to launch its ground and aviation combat elements ashore as the force
reserve. The commander of Regimental Landing Team 5, Colonel Randolph A.


   ~The buscs had becn configured for mass casualty medical evacuation with up to 60 litters
each for use in arcas where helicoptcrs could not operatc bccausc of air defense threats.

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