wITH THE I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM         93


155mm howitzer battery near the Emir's Farm successfully engaged an Iraqi
multiple rocket launcher system with direct fire only 800 meters away in the
center of what turned out to be a brigade of D20 152mm howitzers.
   The discovery of the counterattack, and the Marines' prompt response to it,
disrupted the Iraqis who were defeated by antitank fire, tank main guns, and
air attack in a series of actions lasting until the middle of the day. Although at
a seeming disadvantage in their older Chrysler M6OAl tanks equipped with a
lOSmm gun, 1st Marine Division tankers achieved high rates of success with
armor-plercmg discarding-Sabot, fin-stabilized depleted uranium rounds.       The
tank engagements that day were the largest in Marine Corps history.
   While the counterattacks were being dealt with, a command group of 48
Marines including Lieutenant General Boomer, Colonel Steed, and a news
correspondent mounted two command variant light armored vehicles and some
utility vehicles. They departed the I MEF main command post at 0650 to join
Major General Keys at 2nd Marine Division.   Major General Hearney ran the
main command post in Boomer's absence, assisted by Colonels Lohman and
Bedard.  By 0806, Boomer's group had crossed through the breaches and was
discussing plans with Keys for an attack further north.  The purpose was to
seize a built-up area of concrete block corrals and buildings laid out in a pattern
that looked on a map like an ice tray of a refrigerator, which is how it became
known.   The Ice Tray dominated the area  between Al Jaber Air Base and the


Co! James A. Fuits, commander qf Task Force Gri~~, was photographed on 26 February 1991
during clearing operations at Al Jaber Air Base. As operations officer of the 1st Marine Division,
he had earlier argued successf~lly to move the site of the force \s penetration points to less well
defended areas.