WrrH THE I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM      9S


   General Boomer felt the situation was well enough in hand for him to shift
his mobile command group (F#j~~p CP'1) to the southwest corner of the Ice Tray
later that evening. That afternoon about 25 kilometers east southeast of the Ice
Tray, 1st Marine Division consolidated its positions to the north and east of Al
Jaber Air Base in the wake of the counterattack.
   As darkness descended, Marine forces once again set up defenses for the
night.  The divisions were in a staggered formation with 2d Marine Division at
Phase Line Horse, an east-west line running immediately north of the Ice Tray.
The divisions' advance had now taken them far enough north that they were
within the fan of USS Missouri's 16-inch guns.   At 1815 Boomer asked the I
MEF fire support coordination center if the ship could fire safely into the
MarCent area of operations.  Colonel Bill Schopfel radioed back that there were
no spotters available, human or remotely piloted vehicle, to control fires near
the force.  However, he could and did clear the ship to fire at targets at Kuwait
International Airport, the final objective of the 1st Marine Division.  In turn
General Myatt radioed to General Boomer that 1st Marine Division's attack
toward the airport would begin at first light but no earlier than 0600, weather
permitting.  Myatt also requested Cobras and the heliborne PsyOps team for the
next day since the division would be moving into built-up areas.      At the 2d
Marine Division, General Keys' planners worked through the night to develop
a plan for the attack on the Al Jahra chokepoints.    During the night, both
artillery regiments moved their artillery forward by    echelons.     The poor
visibility caused by dense smoke from the Burqan Oilfield hampered their
progress to their new sites and caused General Boomer to worry about the
potential for fratricide incidents.
   By 2218, General Boomer established his forward command post about five
kilometers southwest of the Ice Tray, just south of an east-west berm. The area
was not completely secure, and:

              the command convoy was suddenly surrounded by armed
         Iraqis.   Confused radiomen    screamed warnings about ~dis-
         mounted infantry!"  Some Iraqis appeared ready to surrender,
         others remained prone behind sand berms with rifles pointed
         toward the convoy.  It turned out that the Iraqis were indeed
         surrendering, but the convoy was immobilized for three hours
         while the Marines rounded them up.~

Boomer, as all of his commanding generals, had positioned himself where he
thought he could get the best awareness of the situation.
   At the I MEF main command post beginning about 1950 that evening,
seismic intrusion devices from 1st SRIG's Sensor Control and Management
Platoon (SCAMP) and moving target indicator radars on board Marine A6E
Intruder aircraft began picking up vehicle movements near the Ali Al Salem Air
Base, located to the north of Tiger Brigade.   As the night progressed, there
were other   intelligence reports indicating movements, but none of the reports