broad categories: areas not tested, old lessons ment for forcible entry. Amphibious revalidated, and new lessons learned. Areas assault was not fully tested. not tested encompass those systems and capa- bilities which, because of the special circum- * Confrontation by an integrated de- stances of these operations, were not realisti- fense and strong resistance from a cally stressed, tested or evaluated. Reviewing capable adversary with modern high- the areas not tested helps avoid learning the tech weapons. Neither close air wrong lessons. support nor anti-air warfare were fully tested by this conflict. AREAS NOT TESTED. Nearly every early attempt to extract the lessons of DESERT * Limited host-nation support and SHIELD/STORM has begun with a caution- infrastructure. ary note concerning the "unique aspects" of those operations and the "lessons not learned." * While the extreme and unique topc This assessment reviews those "areas not graphical and climatological condi- tested" in context with the old and new lessons tions of Southwest Asia posed special to foster critical examination of the entire range challenges, DESERT SHIELD/ of naval warfare capabilities and their applica- STORM only tested our capabilities to bility to future scenarios. Specific areas not operate in one of many possible tested by DESERT SHIELD/STORM include: environments. * Limited access to critical enroute OLD LESSONS REVALIDATED. DESERT support bases, aircraft refueling SHIELD/STORM reaffirmed the importance facilities and overflight rights. of clear-cut military objectives, political cohe- sion and popular support. Established prin- * Non-availability of overseas bases ciples of war such as concentration of force, from which to conduct offensive or unity of command, effective leadership, the support operations. will to fight, and detailed planning were also reaffirmed. Ot~er lessons revalidated include: * Force and mobility requirements for a second major simultaneous crisis in * The value and effectiveness of joint another region. and combined military operations. * An opponent who receives support * The importance of control of the sea from allies with significant capabili- for successful power-projection. ties such as the USSR or China. The importance of maritime superior- * U.S. action without strong regional or ity in affording the United States a international support. position of leadership. * Rapid transition to hostilities. * The vital role of sealift in moving heavy equipment and supplies into * Significant naval opposition, the theater. antisubmarine warfare, or a require- - vii -
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