broad categories: areas not tested, old lessons            ment for forcible entry. Amphibious
revalidated, and new lessons learned. Areas                assault was not fully tested.
not tested encompass those systems and capa-
bilities which, because of the special circum-          *  Confrontation by an integrated de-
stances of these operations, were not realisti-            fense and strong resistance from a
cally stressed, tested or evaluated. Reviewing             capable adversary with modern high-
the areas not tested helps avoid learning the              tech weapons. Neither close air
wrong lessons.                                             support nor anti-air warfare were
                                                           fully tested by this conflict.
AREAS NOT TESTED. Nearly every early
attempt to extract the lessons of DESERT                *  Limited host-nation support and
SHIELD/STORM has begun with a caution-                     infrastructure.
ary note concerning the "unique aspects" of
those operations and the "lessons not learned."         *  While the extreme and unique topc
This assessment reviews those "areas not                   graphical and climatological condi-
tested" in context with the old and new lessons            tions of Southwest Asia posed special
to foster critical examination of the entire range         challenges, DESERT SHIELD/
of naval warfare capabilities and their applica-           STORM only tested our capabilities to
bility to future scenarios.  Specific areas not            operate in one of many possible
tested by DESERT SHIELD/STORM include:                     environments.

   *  Limited access to critical enroute             OLD LESSONS REVALIDATED. DESERT
      support bases, aircraft refueling              SHIELD/STORM reaffirmed the importance
      facilities and overflight rights.              of clear-cut military objectives, political cohe-
                                                     sion and popular support. Established prin-
   *  Non-availability of overseas bases             ciples of war such as concentration of force,
      from which to conduct offensive or             unity of command, effective leadership, the
      support operations.                            will to fight, and detailed planning were also
                                                     reaffirmed. Ot~er lessons revalidated include:
   *  Force and mobility requirements for a
      second major simultaneous crisis in               *  The value and effectiveness of joint
      another region.                                      and combined military operations.

   *  An opponent who receives support                  *  The importance of control of the sea
      from allies with significant capabili-               for successful power-projection.
      ties such as the USSR or China.
                                                           The importance of maritime superior-
   *  U.S. action without strong regional or               ity in affording the United States a
      international support.                               position of leadership.

   *  Rapid transition to hostilities.                  *  The vital role of sealift in moving
                                                           heavy equipment and supplies into
   *  Significant naval opposition,                        the theater.
      antisubmarine warfare, or a require-


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