The Army, Air Force and Marine Corps able U.S. ground forces and major deploy- have standing preparations to provide such ments will still be required in the post cold war support, but moving the equipment, supplies, world. In Saudi Arabia, unlike Europe or and personnel takes time. For example, the Korea, the U.S. did not have significant ground large stocks of ordnance required for an air forces or equipment on scene. The U.S. was strike campaign must generally come by sea. faced with a major expeditionary operation in In DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the transporta- which speed of deployment was potentially tion time was minimized because of the fore- crucial. sight in P~~P~Oa~ri0j~i.~~~ ordnance ships The U.S. was generally well-prepared prepositioning ships with USMC air ordnance for a major expeditionary operation. Creation arrived on 14 August -7 days after the de- of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), along ployment order. Two Afloat Prepositioned with major improvements in expeditionary Force ships carrying USAF ordnance arrived capabilities in the 1980s - particularly strate- in theater between 17 August and 19 August. gic sealift - provided a solid force structure on which to base DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The experience in DESERT SHIELD/ Specific mobility enhancement programs in- STORM has validated the Services' aviation cluded: deployment concepts. The Navy and Marine Corps fulfilled their assigned role in the Se- * AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED SHIPS quencing of joint airpower - the early arrival (APS). Eleven ships, carrying ord- of combat-ready, sustainable airpower. In nance, supplies, and fuel for the Army DESERT SHIELD/STORM, as in any major and Air Force, plus one ship carrying a air-land campaign, the Air Force provided the naval field hospital. These ships are majority of fixed-wing aircraft. continuously manned by civilian crews under contract to the Military Sealift Even after the initial buildup was com- Command (MSC). Since initial deploy- plete, however, Navy and Marine airpower ment, most of the ships have been sta- remained important elements of total U.S. tioned at Diego Garcia in the Indian airpower. One reason was limitation on facili- Ocean, but they can be quickly reposi- ties. Even the numerous airfields of Saudi tioned in response to a crisis elsewhere Arabia and other Gulf states could only oper- in the world. ate so many aircraft. The three aircraft carriers on scene in early September provided 2Q% of the total combat airpower. The three addi- * MARITIME PREPOSITIONING tional carrier battle groups deployed in re- SHIPS (MPS). Thirteen ships, carrying sponse to the CINCs' request as part of the unit equipment and 30 days of supplies reinforcing buildup prior to the air war further for three Marine Expeditionary Brigades increased the Navy's contribution. Marine (MEBs). The ships form three MPS aircraft not only added to overall numbers, but squadrons, which are normally based were integral to Marine air-ground task forces in Guam, Diego Garcia, and the Atlan- (MAGTFs). tic. They are manned continuously with THE BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES. MSC. DESERT SHIELD I STORM illustrated that siz- - 13 -
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