experience of Operation EARNEST WILL es- no outflow of oil to supply Iraq with hard cort missions during the Iran-Iraq war, the currency. Though not always an exciting mis- U.S. Navy and coalition partners paved the sion that grabbed newspaper headlines, it `way for similar success in DESERT SHIELD / proved highly effective in keeping pressure on STORM. The maritime-interceptio-n campaign Sad dam Hussein while solidifying the inter- was an example of multinational cooperation national coalition. Each successful diversion at its best. The smooth informal organization proved the honorable intentions of the world at sea provided a marked contrast to the prob- to attempt resolution of the crisis and ejection lems faced by commanders ashore. of Iraqi forces from Kuwait through non-vio- lent means. ~`Each naval force received maritime interception Jorce tasking reporting requirements, interception and VBSS Saddam Hussein's lack of concern for Ivisit, boarding, search and seizurel guidance, patmi areas, his people's suffering was the greatest obstacle restrictions and ROE from its own national command au- thority. Even without a formal international command and in effecting a withdrawal from Kuwait through control structure, MIF demonstrated superb international the flawlessly executed maritime embargo. cooperation, enhanced through monthly MIF conferences. The failure of a political solution through the (Thrferences fadhtated cooperation, ensured mutual protec- first 177 days of Operation DESERT SHIELD tion, and reduced redundancy." caused coalition leaders to add offensive op- - Vice Admiral S.A. Arthur, USN, Corn- erations to the menu of options being played mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn- out against Iraq. mand, Quick Look - First Impressions Report, 22 March1991 The multinational maritime intercep- tion force continued their demanding mission coalition as DESERT STORM began. While the air war "Establishment and implementation of raged on, the maritime intercepts continued at command relationships were difficult. We relearned that a steady pace, especially in the northern Red national pride, politics and public perception play as large a role in detrnnining relationships as military requirements. Sea, where cargo holds were meticulously 7hesefactors resulted informal command relationshipstruc- checked for Iraq-bound materials headed for tures which with all their attending bureaucratic problems, Jordan, one of Iraq's strongest sympathizers complicated ~~ther than simplified the commands ability to throughout the crisis. execute the mission. In a peTfect world, all military operations would have unity ofcommand. However, in coalition wa?fare When hostilities ended on 28 February, where several nations temporarily unite against a common enemy we may be obliged to seek an informal command the maritime interception force's demanding relationship which will work in the execution of combat mission continued unabated to keep pressure operations." on Iraq. As U.N. members debated the terms -- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, of a permanent cease-fire and Navy ships re- Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Corn- ceived their initial redeployment orders, the mand, Preliminary Report on Lessons shipping lanes were flooded with merchants, Learned, 5 April 1991 still challenged by coalition warships. The U.N. Sanctions Committee re- The coalition's naval effort to shut off laxed restrictions on food for civilian groups Iraq's corrirnerce assured there would be no on 22 March, but food for the Iraqi military resupply of war goods for the Iraqi army and was still prohibited, complicating intercep- -24-
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