experience of Operation EARNEST WILL es-                       no outflow of oil to supply Iraq with hard
cort missions during the Iran-Iraq war, the                    currency. Though not always an exciting mis-
U.S. Navy and coalition partners paved the                     sion that grabbed newspaper headlines, it
`way for similar success in DESERT SHIELD /                    proved highly effective in keeping pressure on
STORM. The maritime-interceptio-n campaign                     Sad dam Hussein while solidifying the inter-
was an example of multinational cooperation                    national coalition. Each successful diversion
at its best. The smooth informal organization                  proved the honorable intentions of the world
at sea provided a marked contrast to the prob-                 to attempt resolution of the crisis and ejection
lems faced by commanders ashore.                               of Iraqi forces from Kuwait through non-vio-
                                                               lent means.
     ~`Each naval force received maritime interception
Jorce tasking reporting requirements, interception and VBSS         Saddam Hussein's lack of concern for
Ivisit, boarding, search and seizurel guidance, patmi areas,   his people's suffering was the greatest obstacle
restrictions and ROE from its own national command au-
thority. Even without a formal international command and       in effecting a withdrawal from Kuwait through
control structure, MIF demonstrated superb international       the flawlessly executed maritime embargo.
cooperation, enhanced through monthly MIF conferences.         The failure of a political solution through the
(Thrferences fadhtated cooperation, ensured mutual protec-     first 177 days of Operation DESERT SHIELD
tion, and reduced redundancy."                                 caused coalition leaders to add offensive op-

     -       Vice Admiral S.A. Arthur, USN, Corn-              erations to the menu of options being played
             mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-            out against Iraq.
             mand, Quick Look - First Impressions
             Report, 22 March1991                                   The multinational maritime intercep-
                                                               tion force continued their demanding mission

                                            coalition          as DESERT STORM began. While the air war
     "Establishment and implementation of                      raged on, the maritime intercepts continued at
command relationships were difficult. We relearned that        a steady pace, especially in the northern Red
national pride, politics and public perception play as large a
role in detrnnining relationships as military requirements.    Sea, where cargo holds were meticulously
7hesefactors resulted informal command relationshipstruc-      checked for Iraq-bound materials headed for
tures which with all their attending bureaucratic problems,    Jordan, one of Iraq's strongest sympathizers
complicated ~~ther than simplified the commands ability to     throughout the crisis.
execute the mission. In a peTfect world, all military operations
would have unity ofcommand. However, in coalition wa?fare           When hostilities ended on 28 February,
where several nations temporarily unite against a common
enemy we may be obliged to seek an informal command            the maritime interception force's demanding
relationship which will work in the execution of combat        mission continued unabated to keep pressure
operations."                                                   on Iraq. As U.N. members debated the terms

     --      General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA,               of a permanent cease-fire and Navy ships re-
             Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Corn-             ceived their initial redeployment orders, the
             mand, Preliminary Report on Lessons               shipping lanes were flooded with merchants,
             Learned, 5 April 1991                             still challenged by coalition warships.

                                                                    The U.N. Sanctions Committee re-
     The coalition's naval effort to shut off                  laxed restrictions on food for civilian groups
Iraq's corrirnerce assured there would be no                   on 22 March, but food for the Iraqi military
resupply of war goods for the Iraqi army and                   was still prohibited, complicating intercep-


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