Questions from Chairman Riegle

Aug. 94

Subject: Questions from Chairman Riegle

Ql. Was the Department of Defense intelligence apparatus aware 
of the items exported to Iraq by the United States which were 
converted to use in the Iraqi chemical, biological, and 
nuclear programs prior to the Persian Gulf War? Provide 
specific details.

Al. During the earlier years associated with Iraq's build-up 
of its scientific, industrial and military capabilities, Iraq 
was neither a proscribed nation to be denied military critical 
technology, nor an enemy. The US intelllgence community is 
forbidden from monitoring the activities of US citizens and 
its companies. Consequently, very little was known by the 
Intelligence Community about US exports of technology with 
military potential, particularly to a non-proscribed non-enemy 
nation, unless it was informed of such exports by the 
Department of Congress. During 1980-1994 Commerce requested 
review of only 16 dual-use export cases by the DoD. Of these, 
only two were forwarded to the DIA for technical review. They 
involved computers and signal processing equipment. DIA 
recommended denial in both cases. DIA was aware of the illegal 
export of thiodiglycol to Iraq by the Baltimore company 
Alcolac. DIA assisted customs and the FBI in their 
investigation and successful prosecution of that company. DIA 
biological warfare (BW) analysts were aware of some of the 
dual-use items purchased by Iraq for its BW program, but 
generally did not know what U.S. company was supplying the 

Q2. Were Iraqi chemical and biological facilities among the 
priority targets hit by Coalition bombers during the first 
days of the air war?

A2. Yes. Some Iraqi chemical and biological (CBW) facilities 
were priority targets and were among the first attacked on and 
around the first days of the air war. Not every CBW target was 
attacked during the first days however. CBW targets were 
themselves prioritized, generally by the intelligence 
community, then specifically, by the operators out of CENTCOM 
and were attacked accordingly. Generally speaking, CBW targets 
were attacked at the very beginning and throughout the air 

Q3. Were U.S. national laboratories contacted prior to the war 
and requested to assess the danger from the fallout of bombing 
Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities? What was 
their advice?

A3. The Defense Nuclear Agency was tasked to assess the danger 
of fallout from bombed Iraqi facilities. Their advice was 
passed to CENTCOM though other than intelligence channels.

Q10. Are all biological agents lethal? Isn't it true that one 
biological warfare strategy is to debilitate your adversary's 
capabilities and another is to overload his medical 

A10. No, not all biological warfare agents are lethal; some 
are only lethal if untreated, while others are almost always 
lethal, even with medical treatment. Incapacitating BW agents 
could be used to debilitate an adversary's capabilities and to 
overload his medical facllities.

Q15. Were any biological agents or materials capable of being 
used to cause disease or other illnesses discovered by the 
U.S. or any other Coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi 
Arabia? What were those materials?

A15. No such materials were found by U.S. or Coalition forces.

Q16. Were any Iraqi vaccines discovered or did interviews of 
enemy prisoners of war, or others, reveal what biological 
warfare-related materials the Iraqis had defended against?

A16. No.

Q17. Did Iraq have a biological warfare program that appeared 
to be offensive in nature?

A17. Yes. See question 29.

Ql9. Were chemical munitions or binary precursor materials 
capable of being used in chemical warfare discovered in any 
area of Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia before, during, or after 
the war by US Forces, US civilian personnel or other Coalition 

Al9. The wording of this question requires a three part answer 
to include responses addressing the Kuwaiti Theater of 
Operations (KTO), Operation Provide Comfort, and the UN 

The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) included southern Iraq 
south of 31'00 N, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This was the area 
eventually occupied by Coalition ground forces before, during 
and after Operation Desert Storm. Neither chemlcal munltions, 
bulk agent, nor binary precursors were discovered in the KTO 
before, during or after the war by US Forces, civilian 
personnel, or Coalition participants.

On 28 May 1991, several months after the war, during Operation 
Provide Comfort in Kurdish occupied northern Iraq, four Iraqi 
expended, unexploded, 122mm chemical rockets were discovered 
by US forces near the town of Kani Masi 37'13 N 043'26 E. This 
area is in extreme north central Iraq, about five miles from 
the Turkish boarder. The rounds appeared to be duds and 
appeared to have been in the field for years. The rounds were 
returned to the US, exploited, and found to contain no intact 
chemical agent, only degradation

products of the nerve agent sarin. This information, along 
with the location and condition of the rounds indicate they 
were most likely fired during the reported Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons against Kurds in 1988. These rounds in no way 
should be associated with events of Desert Storm nor be used 
as evidence in the investigation of so-called Gulf War 
Syndrome. Their only slgnificance ls that, at the time, they 
confirmed our assessment that such weapons existed in the 
Iraqi arsenal.

Finally, it has been widely circulated that UN inspection 
teams found thousands of destroyed and intact chemical rounds 
in an ammunition depot at Nasiriyah, and that this discovery 
contradicts our statement in paragraph one of this answer. 
Nasiriyah technically is outside the KTO, being north of 31'00 
N and the Euphrates River. More importantly, it was not in the 
territory occupied by Coalition forces after the war. 
Moreover, the following points are relevant because UN 
inspectors did not really "find" the subject munitions. In 
reality, the Iraqis declared the munitions to the UN and the 
lnspectors eventually went to that location to check what the 
Iraqis had reported:
l) the UN inspection occurred at least eight months after the 
2) the location of the "found" chemical rounds was 15 miles 
from the widely discussed CBW bunkers bombed at Nasiriyah (the 
site which was originally expected to be inspected). The 
bombed bunkers were not inspected until one year later in Oct 
1992 and found to contain no chemical or biological weapons;

Q20. What evidence, if any, is there concerning the forward 
deployment of chemical and biological warfare agents or 
weapons prior to or during the Persian Gulf conflict? What 
evidence, if any, is there of Iraqi attempts to avoid the 
destruction of chemical or biological warfare agents or 
weapons by Coalition bombings? For example, transshipment 
activity just prior to the initiation of the air war from 
chemical production facilities such as Samarra Habbaniyah, or 

A20.         There is no evidence, that Iraq forward deployed 
chemical and/or biological agents or weapons prior to or 
during Desert Storm. Even though at the time, many analysts 
expected and warned against potential Iraqi use of CBW, it is 
our position now, and has been since the end of the war, that 
Iraq did not intend to use CBW because of the fear of massive 
retaliation, and the conclusion that Coalition troops Were too 
well prepared to fight in a CBW environment, if not, far 
better prepared than Iraqi troops, thus eliminating their 
advantage. This conclusion is based primarily, but not 
totally, on:

- their were no indications and warnings of imminent Iraqi use 
of CW i.e. heavy transshipment activity of CW transport trucks 

Samarra to the forward areas. - not one CBW munition was found 
in the captured/occupied Iraqi territory.

Even if Iraq intended to use CW against the Coalition, the 
pace and ferocity of the air ahd ground campaign was such that 
Iraq's ability to produce, weaponize, forward deploy, and 
deliver CW on a target was virtually eliminated. The only CW 
which could have been used had to be pre-positioned in 
substantial amounts. The pace and ferocity of the air and 
ground campaign, in our opinion, rendered it impossible to 
move any CW munitions into or out of the KTO. Because the 
ground campaign quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi forces, we would 
expect to find abandoned CW munitions, as was the case for 
conventional munitions and equipment. It is difficult to 
believe that under the mass1ve bombardment levied against the 
Iraqi troops that they somehow managed to move substantial 
amounts of CBW munitions out of the KTO, undetected, leav1ng 
not a trace of it behind. Since no CBW was found in the KTO we 
believe it never was there.

There is evidence that Iraqi attempted to avoid destruction of 
its CBW production equipment prior to the air war. Besides 
camouflaging many of its production buildings, cargo trucks 
did move an unknown amount of CW production equipment from 
Samarra. Equipment-moving trucks and refrigerated trucks were 
also observed at the Salman Pak BW facility prior to the onset 
of bombing, suggesting that Iraq was moving equipment or 
material into or out of the facility. Information obtained 
after the conflict revealed that Iraq had moved BW agent 
production equipment from Salman Pak to the Al Hakam suspect 
BW facility.

QZl. What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi chemical and 
biological warfare defensive measures during or prior to the 
Persian Gulf War?

A21. Iraq claims it did not have a dedicated BW defensive 
program. Iraq distributed drugs for the treatment of nerve and 
mustard exposure to at least some of its Republican Guard 
Divisions. There was an effort to outfit their troops with 
chemical protective gear; this usually consisted of a gas 
mask, gloves, boots, simple poncho, and individual chemical 
agent antidote kits. Additionally, decontamination stations 
were established throughout Iraq.

Q22. What evidence, if any, exists of Iraqi command 
instructions to use chemical weapons prior to or during the 

A22.         There is no/evidence to indicate instructions or 
orders to use chemical weapons were given by Iraqi command 
authorities prior to or during the war.

Q23. Were any Iraqi chemical units in Iraq or Kuwait located 
or reported on by US or Coalition sources during Operation 
Desert Shield or Desert Storm? Explain.

A23.         No. Specific locations of Iraqi chemical units 
were never reported by US or Coalition sources during 
Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm. See question 35.

Q24. In the Department of Defense's final report to Congress 
on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, it was reported that 
88 Scud launches were detected. Saddam Hussein has claimed to 
have launched at least 93 Scuds. Can you explain the 
discrepancy? Were any Scud missiles launched by Iraq against 
Turkey or any other location other than Israel or Saudi 
Arabia? Were U.S. forces and dependent personnel in Turkey 
ever ordered into MOPP gear?

A24. DIA holds a total of 88 SCUD launches against Israeli and 
Saudi Arabian targets only. We cannot explain the discrepancy 
between Saddam's claim to have launched at least 93 SCUDs.

Q26. Did Iraq conduct test firings of Scuds or other short or 
medium range ballistlc missiles during Operation Desert 
Shield? What was the assessed purpose for these tests since 
Iraq already had extensive knowledge of the capabilities of 
Scud missiles?

A26. No. Iraq did not conduct test firings of SCUDs or other 
short or medium range ballistic missiles during Operation 
Desert Shield.

Q27. Did Iraq have the capability to deliver biological 
weapons via ground based aerosol generators, aircraft, 
helicopters, or FAW missiles? Did they have any other means of 
delivering biologlcal weapons?

A27.            Iraq had a capability to deliver BW agents 
from missile warheads and aerial bombs. Iraq also had the 
capability to disseminate biological agents from ground-based 
aerosol generators; however we found no evidence that they had 
attempted to do so. Other delivery systems (helicopters) and 
munitions (i.e., CW munitions) could be used to disseminate BW 
agents; however, we found no evidence that Iraq had loaded BW 
agents into any such munitions.

Q29. What was the Defense Intelligence Agency evaluation of 
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and delivery 
means, prior to, during, and after the Persian Gulf War? What 
delivery means were within range of Coalition forces at the 
beginning of the air war and by the end of the ground war?

A29.      Prior to the Persian Gulf War Iraq was assessed to 
possess roughly 1000 MT of chemical agent equally split 
between the blister agent mustard and the nerve agents sarin 
(GB) and GF. Small amounts (possibly tens of tons) of the 
persistent nerve agent VX were assessed as possibly available 
from ongoing R&D programs The nerve agent soman (GD) and the 
psychochemical BZ were also assessed to be in the R&D stage. 
Much of the above 1000 MT of agent was assessed

to be weaponized in the following munitions with the remainder 
stored as bulk agent:


155mm *
122mm rocket *




250kg bomb
500kg bomb
Cluster bombs
90 mm rocket

Note: (l) * Preferred weapon for artillery
(2) Landmines were assessed as possible.


Al Husayn
Al Abbas

(3) Frog missiles are capable of CW delivery but no evidence 
existed for such a warhead in Iraq.

Prior to the Persian Gulf War, DIA assessed that Iraq had BW 
agents weaponized in aerial bombs and Scud missile warheads, 
and that Iraq was capable of disseminating BW agents with 
ground-based aerosol generators. Scud missiles and alrcraft 
capable of carrying aerial bombs probably were within range of 
Coalition forces during the war, but we know of no BW 
munitions for these systems which were ever forward-deployed. 
Further, we know of no occasion when such dissemination 
systems or munitions were used to disperse BW agents during 
the war.

After the war, DIA assessed the CW program to be severely 
degraded but not eliminated. The BW program was assessed to 
have retained the infrastructure needed to reestablish itself. 
UN inspections and ongoing intelligence efforts have resulted 
in DIA's reassessment that although nearly all known buildings 
and bunkers associated with CBW programs were destroyed, CW 
and BW production equipment, precursors and munitions have 
been hidden or salvaged and that both programs could be 
reestablished shortly after UN inspections ceased.

Iraqi CBW delivery assets in range of Coalition troops both 
before and after the war were SCUDs, aerial bombs, and 
potentially any lSSmm artillery or 122mm mobile rocket 
launcher within approximately 25 kilometers of Coalition 
forces. One must keep in mind that during the war, Coalition 
air superiority largely eliminated aircraft delivery of CBW 
agents to forward areas, and that by the end of the ground 
war, Iraqi air and ground forces, as well as its command and 
control structure were in complete disarray.

Q30. Describe the evolution of Iraq's battlefield employment 
of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, did Iraq's 
ability to use these weapons improve over the course of the 

A30. Generally speaking Iraq's use of CW against Iran during 
their war improved dramatically as the war progressed. 
Essentially, Iraq learned how to use CW through on the job 
training, very inefficiently at first then becoming quite 
effective towards the end. Iraqi use of CW against Iran can be 
divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, which 
continued until 1986, involved the use of CW agents in a 
strictly defensive role, to disrupt Iranian offensives. In a 
transitory phase lasting from late 1986 to early 1988, Iraq 
used CW preemptively against staging areas prior to Iranian 
offensives. Flnally, and most significantly, Iraq used massed 
nerve agent strikes as an integral part of its well-
orchestrated offensive in the spring and summer of 1988. The 
success of these offensives prompted Iran to accept a cease-
fire in August 1988.

Q31. What chemical and biological agents were assessed to be 
in the Iraqi operational inventory and test inventories prior 
to the Persian Gulf War?

Chemical agents assessed to be in the Iraqi operational 
inventory prior to the Persian Gulf War were mustard, sarin, 
and GF. Tabun and dusty mustard were known to have been used 
against Iran but were thought to possible have been dropped 
from the 1990 inventory. Agents assessed to be in the R&D 
stage were VX, BZ and Soman.

Biological agents assessed to be in the pre-war inventory were 
anthrax and botulinum toxin in a limited number of missile 
warheads and aerial bombs.

Q34. What evidence exists, if any, to indicate that Iraq 
deployed chemical mines in the Kuwaiti theater of operations?

A34. There is no evidence that Iraq deployed chemical mines in 
the KTO. In fact, over 350,000 Iraqi mines have been found and 
removed from Kuwait, none of which were chemical mines.

Q35. Did Iraq deploy any chemical units or establish any 
chemical decontamination sites in the Kuwaiti or Iraqi theater 
of operations - or in the disputed territories?

A35.          Iraqi defensive chemical units are a standard 
complement of a typical Iraqi Corp and Division. Our best 
information suggests that most but not all of Iraqi divisions 
deployed with their standard chemical units. Dedicated 
offensive chemical units were assessed to be part of 
Republican Guard Divisions only, however, theoretically, 
virtually any 155mm artillery piece or 122mm mobile rocket 
launcher could fire CW rounds.

Yes. Iraq establish chemical decontamination sites in the KTO 
as well as throughout Iraq. Similar decontamination sites are 
located at known chemical training schools and therefore, 
their appearance is assessed more as standard operating 
procedure rather than a hard indicator of intent to use CW.

Q36. Which country provided the chemical Scud warheads to Iraq 
that were later located by the UN inspections? If by another 
country, how many of these warheads were initially provided? 
Did Iraq also manufacture its own?

A36.         Iraq manufactured all of its chemical SCUD 
warheads indigenously.

Q37. Was the [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] suspected of 
providing chemical or biological warfare training to Iraqi 
officers either in Iraq,
or any other country? Explain.

A37.            there is absolutely no evidence to suggest, 
that they provided offensive chemical or biological weapons 
training to Iraq at any time. [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    
]involved in providing defensive CBW equipment and training to 
the Iraqis in the early 1980's.

038. Is the Department of Defense aware of any to the Iraqis
in setting up any chemical training center or production 
facility in Iraq? Explain.

[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]in setting up a chemical
training facility in Iraq- 
constructed a CW training center
near Habbaniyah, and may have helped train Republican Gaurd 
troops in field
operations in a chemical environment.

Q40. Is there any classified or unclassified information that 
would indicate any exposures to or detections of chemical or 
biological agents?

A40. Other than the Czech detections on 19 and 24 January 91, 
which have been discussed at length during testimony and other 
questions for the record, there is no information, classified 
or unclassified, which would indicate any exposures to or 
valid detections of chemical agents. There were many, probably 
thousands, of false chemical alarms experienced by the 
Coalition, however, no alarm ever was verified using follow-up 
confirmation procedures. This issue has also been discussed at 
length in testimony and other questions for the record.

As with the alleged CW detections, there are some 
unsubstantiated reports that allege exposure to BW agents. 
However, despite concerted efforts, Coalition assets were not 
able to confirm any of these reports.

Q41. Is there any classified or unclassified information that 
would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by U S. or 
Coalition forces before, during, or after the Persian Gulf 

A41. There is no information, classified or unclassified, that 
would indicate the discovery of any chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear warfare related materials by the US or 
Coalition forces before, during or after the Persian Gulf War. 
See question 19.

Q46. What is the role of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 
the investigation into the exposure of U.S. forces to 
chemical, biological or radiological materials during 
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm?

A46. DIA's role, as always, has been to provide intelligence 
to the OSD. DIA has been deeply involved with the 
investigation into alleged exposure of US forces to chemical, 
biological or radiological materials during Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm since the investigation began in early summer 
1993. DIA has reviewed every aspect of its assessment of Iraqi 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, the 
possibility of their use against Coalition troops, and the 
possibility of accidental release from bombed Iraqi targets. 
DIA has spearheaded the investigation into the alleged Czech 
detections, making the honest assessment that the Czech 
detections were likely valid. Leaving no stone unturned, DIA 
traveled to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Czech Republic, 
France and England to further investigate the issue. Likewise, 
through the Defense Attache system, DIA requested information 
and assessments regarding the issue from other Coalition 
members and allies. To date, all of DIAs efforts and contacts 
point to the unanimous conclusion that coalition troops were 
not exposed to chemical or biological agents, either 
accidently (as a result of downwind exposure from bombed Iraqi 
facilities) or purposely (from direct Iraqi use).

[    b.2.    ]

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