File: 970409_cia_72668_72668_13.txt
Page: 13
Total Pages: 2


Subject: SUBJ: SITE DESCRIPTIONS FROM UNSCOM 20 INSPECTION REPORT, 13 NOVEMBER 1991

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM) HAS MADE AVAILABLE THE

FOLLOWING INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THE UNSCOM 20/CW-6 MISSION (22 OCTOBER TO

11 NOVEMBER 1991) INSPECTION REPORT (DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1991):



SECTION 3



SITE DESCRIPTIONS



INTRODUCTION



68. THE UNSCOM 20 INSPECTION TEAM VISITED 6 DECLARED CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE 

SITES: SADDAM AIR BASE, AL-TUZ AIRFIELD, KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE, QADISIYAH AIR 

BASE, AL-WALID AIR BASE AND MUHAMMADIYAT CW STORAGE SITE.



KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE



78. KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE IS SITUATED APPROXIMATELY 25KM SOUTHEAST OF 

NASIRIYAH. THERE WERE TWO TYPES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORED THERE: 155MM 

MUSTARD-FILLED ARTILLERY SHELLS AND 122MM `BINARY SARIN' ROCKETS (FILLED WITH 

A MIXTURE OF GB AND GF).



79. THE 122MM CHEMICAL ROCKETS WERE STORED WITHIN THE CONFINES OF 

KHAMISIYAH AMMUNITION DEPOT. ARTILLERY SHELLS WERE LOCATED IN AN UNFENCED 

OPEN AREA ABOUT 5KM EAST OF THE DEPOT.



80. A SMALL QUANTITY OF SALVAGED 122MM ROCKETS WAS LOCATED IN A HOLLOWED-

OUT PIT. THE ROCKETS WERE PLACED IN THREE PILES. THE MAIN STOCK OF 122MM ROCKETS 

WERE STORED. IN THE REMAINS OF A DEMOLISHED STORAGE BUNKER. THE IRAQIS REFER TO 

THE BUILDING AS "WAREHOUSE 73". THE ROCKETS IN AND AROUND THIS STRUCTURE WERE 

DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR. THE BUNKER ITSELF HAD BEEN REDUCED TO A PILE OF RUMBLE. 

COUNTING OF THE CONTENTS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS AND CONTAMINATED 

AREAS EXIST WITHIN THE DEPOT. MOVEMENT THROUGH THE DEPOT WAS RESTRICTED 

BECAUSE OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT

THE AREA. MUNITIONS CANNOT BE TRANSPORTED AND MUST BE DESTROYED WHERE 

THEY ARE. DESTRUCTION OF THE ROCKETS WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS OWING 

TO THEIR DETERIORATION AND PRESSURE BUILD-UP WITHIN THE CASING. CAREFUL 

ADDITIONAL STUDY IS NECESSARY BEFORE A DETAILED DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDATION 

CAN BE MADE.



81. THE IRAQI EXPLANATION THAT THE ROCKETS HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE 

WAR WAS INADEQUATE. THE INSPECTION TEAM OBSERVED THAT THE STRUCTURES DID 

NOT LOOK AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN BOMBED, BUT RATHER DESTROYED BY LOCALLY 

PLACE DEMOLITION CHARGES. SINCE THAT THE IRAQI ARMY EVACUATED THIS AREA 

DURING THE WAR, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE DESTROYED 

BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE CANNOT NOT BE EXCLUDED.







82. IN CONTRAST TO THE CONDITION OF THE ROCKETS, THE ARTILLERY PROJECTILES 

APPEARED TO HAVE RETAINED SOME UTILITY. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL INDICATION THAT 

THE 155MM PROJECTILES WERE MOVED TO THE PRESENT LOCATION AFTER THE WAR. 

THE 155MM SHELLS COULD BE TRANSPORTED TO AL-MUTHANNA FOR DESTRUCTION 

WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. 



83. A MAP OF KHAMISIYAH AREA AND DIAGRAMS OF THE RELEVANT CW STORAGE SITES 

ARE ATTACHED.



SECTION 5



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



CONCLUSIONS



136. A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTS AT KHAMISIYAH WITH REGARD TO THE 122MM ROCKETS. 

THEY ARE TO DANGEROUS TO MOVE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WRITTEN PERMISSION HAS 

ALREADY BEEN GIVEN TO THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MOVE THE AMMUNITION WHICH HAS 

BEEN DEEMED FIT TO BE TRANSPORTED. THE IRAQIS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD TO TAKE NOT 

ACTION CONCERNING ALL OTHER AMMUNITION UNTIL THEY RECEIVE ADVICE FROM UNSCOM.



138. DURING UNSCOM 20 FURTHER DISCUSSION WERE HELD WITH THE SENIOR IRAQI CW 

OFFICIALS. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THE QUESTIONS OF THE TEAM WERE MET WITH 

OBFUSCATION, PREVARICATION AND DOWNRIGHT LYING.



139. ANOMALIES WERE DISCOVERED AT SEVERAL SITES CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF 

AMMUNITION. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT AMMUNITION HAD BEEN MOVED TO ITS CURRENT 

LOCATION WELL AFTER THE END OF THE GULF WAR. THE REASON FOR THIS IS NOT CLEAR. 

THE IRAQIS DENY THAT THEY HAVE REMOVED ANY AMMUNITION AND WILL PROVIDE NO 

INFORMATION ON THIS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IS HARD TO ASSESS.



140. THE INCIDENT WHICH WHILST OPENING A 122MM ROCKET AT KHAMISIYAH 

PROVED THAT BOTH THE EQUIPMENT USED AND THE PROCEDURES ADOPTED 

WERE CORRECT.



ANNEX F - DETECTION INFORMATION



7. KHAMISIYAH STORAGE:



- NO POSITIVE DETECTION AND NO HAZARD WITH 155MM SHELLS, IF NOT UNSCREWING

HANDLING RINGS.

- ON AND AROUND THE 122MM ROCKETS:



´┐ŻNO VAPOUR DETECTION



- MANY LEAKS ON THE GROUND (LIQUID DETECTION: 5 BARS PHOSPHORUS WITH

AP2C)



OPERATIONS



18. AN NASIRIYAH DEPOT. TWO 122MM BINARY GB/GF ROCKETS WERE SELECTED FOR 

CHEMICAL SAMPLING, AND ONE OF THESE TWO ITEMS WAS EXAMBLED WITH ARS ALONE. 

THE INAICATION WAS LIQUID. THIS WAS THE ITEM WHICH SPRAYED LIQUID G-AGENT ON THE 

EOD PERSONNEL DRILLING THE MUNITION.



19. A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY WAS MISSED BY NOT INTERROGATING ANY OF THE 

5.000+ MUSTARD- FILLED 155MM PROJECTILES. ARS WOULD HAVE BEEN IDEAL IN 

THIS SITUATION.







1.5(c)

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