File: 970409_cia_72668_72668_13.txt
Page: 13
Total Pages: 2
Subject: SUBJ: SITE DESCRIPTIONS FROM UNSCOM 20 INSPECTION REPORT, 13 NOVEMBER 1991 Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM) HAS MADE AVAILABLE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THE UNSCOM 20/CW-6 MISSION (22 OCTOBER TO 11 NOVEMBER 1991) INSPECTION REPORT (DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1991): SECTION 3 SITE DESCRIPTIONS INTRODUCTION 68. THE UNSCOM 20 INSPECTION TEAM VISITED 6 DECLARED CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE SITES: SADDAM AIR BASE, AL-TUZ AIRFIELD, KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE, QADISIYAH AIR BASE, AL-WALID AIR BASE AND MUHAMMADIYAT CW STORAGE SITE. KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE 78. KHAMISIYAH CW STORAGE SITE IS SITUATED APPROXIMATELY 25KM SOUTHEAST OF NASIRIYAH. THERE WERE TWO TYPES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORED THERE: 155MM MUSTARD-FILLED ARTILLERY SHELLS AND 122MM `BINARY SARIN' ROCKETS (FILLED WITH A MIXTURE OF GB AND GF). 79. THE 122MM CHEMICAL ROCKETS WERE STORED WITHIN THE CONFINES OF KHAMISIYAH AMMUNITION DEPOT. ARTILLERY SHELLS WERE LOCATED IN AN UNFENCED OPEN AREA ABOUT 5KM EAST OF THE DEPOT. 80. A SMALL QUANTITY OF SALVAGED 122MM ROCKETS WAS LOCATED IN A HOLLOWED- OUT PIT. THE ROCKETS WERE PLACED IN THREE PILES. THE MAIN STOCK OF 122MM ROCKETS WERE STORED. IN THE REMAINS OF A DEMOLISHED STORAGE BUNKER. THE IRAQIS REFER TO THE BUILDING AS "WAREHOUSE 73". THE ROCKETS IN AND AROUND THIS STRUCTURE WERE DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR. THE BUNKER ITSELF HAD BEEN REDUCED TO A PILE OF RUMBLE. COUNTING OF THE CONTENTS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS AND CONTAMINATED AREAS EXIST WITHIN THE DEPOT. MOVEMENT THROUGH THE DEPOT WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE AREA. MUNITIONS CANNOT BE TRANSPORTED AND MUST BE DESTROYED WHERE THEY ARE. DESTRUCTION OF THE ROCKETS WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS OWING TO THEIR DETERIORATION AND PRESSURE BUILD-UP WITHIN THE CASING. CAREFUL ADDITIONAL STUDY IS NECESSARY BEFORE A DETAILED DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDATION CAN BE MADE. 81. THE IRAQI EXPLANATION THAT THE ROCKETS HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE WAR WAS INADEQUATE. THE INSPECTION TEAM OBSERVED THAT THE STRUCTURES DID NOT LOOK AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN BOMBED, BUT RATHER DESTROYED BY LOCALLY PLACE DEMOLITION CHARGES. SINCE THAT THE IRAQI ARMY EVACUATED THIS AREA DURING THE WAR, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE DESTROYED BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE CANNOT NOT BE EXCLUDED. 82. IN CONTRAST TO THE CONDITION OF THE ROCKETS, THE ARTILLERY PROJECTILES APPEARED TO HAVE RETAINED SOME UTILITY. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL INDICATION THAT THE 155MM PROJECTILES WERE MOVED TO THE PRESENT LOCATION AFTER THE WAR. THE 155MM SHELLS COULD BE TRANSPORTED TO AL-MUTHANNA FOR DESTRUCTION WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. 83. A MAP OF KHAMISIYAH AREA AND DIAGRAMS OF THE RELEVANT CW STORAGE SITES ARE ATTACHED. SECTION 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS 136. A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTS AT KHAMISIYAH WITH REGARD TO THE 122MM ROCKETS. THEY ARE TO DANGEROUS TO MOVE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WRITTEN PERMISSION HAS ALREADY BEEN GIVEN TO THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO MOVE THE AMMUNITION WHICH HAS BEEN DEEMED FIT TO BE TRANSPORTED. THE IRAQIS HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD TO TAKE NOT ACTION CONCERNING ALL OTHER AMMUNITION UNTIL THEY RECEIVE ADVICE FROM UNSCOM. 138. DURING UNSCOM 20 FURTHER DISCUSSION WERE HELD WITH THE SENIOR IRAQI CW OFFICIALS. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THE QUESTIONS OF THE TEAM WERE MET WITH OBFUSCATION, PREVARICATION AND DOWNRIGHT LYING. 139. ANOMALIES WERE DISCOVERED AT SEVERAL SITES CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF AMMUNITION. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT AMMUNITION HAD BEEN MOVED TO ITS CURRENT LOCATION WELL AFTER THE END OF THE GULF WAR. THE REASON FOR THIS IS NOT CLEAR. THE IRAQIS DENY THAT THEY HAVE REMOVED ANY AMMUNITION AND WILL PROVIDE NO INFORMATION ON THIS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IS HARD TO ASSESS. 140. THE INCIDENT WHICH WHILST OPENING A 122MM ROCKET AT KHAMISIYAH PROVED THAT BOTH THE EQUIPMENT USED AND THE PROCEDURES ADOPTED WERE CORRECT. ANNEX F - DETECTION INFORMATION 7. KHAMISIYAH STORAGE: - NO POSITIVE DETECTION AND NO HAZARD WITH 155MM SHELLS, IF NOT UNSCREWING HANDLING RINGS. - ON AND AROUND THE 122MM ROCKETS: �NO VAPOUR DETECTION - MANY LEAKS ON THE GROUND (LIQUID DETECTION: 5 BARS PHOSPHORUS WITH AP2C) OPERATIONS 18. AN NASIRIYAH DEPOT. TWO 122MM BINARY GB/GF ROCKETS WERE SELECTED FOR CHEMICAL SAMPLING, AND ONE OF THESE TWO ITEMS WAS EXAMBLED WITH ARS ALONE. THE INAICATION WAS LIQUID. THIS WAS THE ITEM WHICH SPRAYED LIQUID G-AGENT ON THE EOD PERSONNEL DRILLING THE MUNITION. 19. A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY WAS MISSED BY NOT INTERROGATING ANY OF THE 5.000+ MUSTARD- FILLED 155MM PROJECTILES. ARS WOULD HAVE BEEN IDEAL IN THIS SITUATION. 1.5(c) 72668:72668
| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Back to Text |