We originally published this narrative on February 21, 1997. After that time, we intensified our efforts to address the five questions that had remained unanswered in the first publication and to fully understand the effect of the demolition operations on US soldiers. Hundreds of additional veterans’ interviews provided answers to the remaining questions from the first publication. Research added insight into Iraq’s chemical munitions markings and the ambiguous information that existed among US forces on the last day of the war. We greatly expanded the discussion of the government’s response to an increased number of unexplained illnesses among Gulf War veterans and the subsequent discovery of the Khamisiyah demolitions. The intelligence community provided new details that enabled us to remodel the Pit demolition with greater confidence and publish refined potential hazard areas. Improved source term data from the CIA, better unit location data, and revised modeling techniques contribute critical improvements to the revised modeling efforts, which we address in this updated narrative.

We published a second interim report of this narrative on December 7, 2000, and made the following additional changes to the paper:

• Referenced new source documents to enhance the accuracy and level of detail;
• Added improved graphics to exemplify information;
• Expanded the narrative with "Assessment," "Lessons Learned," and "Methodology for Modeling a Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Khamisiyah," sections to aid understanding; and
• Revised the narrative to correct editorial errors, and to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments.

Final Report – April 2002

We occasionally received new information from veterans inquiring about their inclusion or exclusion from the possible hazard area. After reviewing each request, we have notified the veteran (and any others affected) of the results of the review, including any change in their possible exposure status. Accounting for these changes has revised the number of possibly exposed personnel to 101,752 versus the previous 100,923. Examples of some of the reasons for change include:

• Personnel deployed with a provisional designation (507^th Tactical Air Wing (Prov)).
• Personnel identified on a unit manning list who did not actually deploy with the unit.
• Air Force personnel attached to Army units who were not on Army personnel lists (e.g., the 227^th Aviation Company).
• Army reserve civil affairs units attached to military police brigades (401^st Civil Affairs Company to 14^th Military Police Brigade).

As a result of the updates since the previous publication, the number of possibly exposed personnel now stands at 101,752 versus the previous 100,923. Otherwise, except for minor editorial changes, we have not changed information provided in this report.

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