END NOTES

[1] Field Manual No 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-3.

[2] Field Manual No 3-100, NBC Operations, HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 17 September 1985, p. 3-3.

[3] Field Manual No 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-2 to 2-4.

[4] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-11 - 2-12.

[5] After the war, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf noted: "I also worried about the great empty area of southern Iraq where the Army would launch its attack. I kept asking myself, 'What does Saddam know about that flank that I don't? Why doesn't he have any forces out there?' They then nicknamed the sector the 'chemical killing sack.' I'd flinch every time I heard it. I had a nightmare vision of Fred Franks and Gary Luck hitting that area only to have the Iraqis dump massive quantities of chemicals while the Republican Guard counterattacked and fought us to a stalemate. I became increasingly jumpy." Quoted in Army Training Circular 3-10, Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 29 September 1994, p. 1-1.

[6] Manley, Captain T. F., Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p. 10-11.

[7] Manley, Captain T. F., Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p.40 and Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Handbook, Second Edition, September 1995, section on "Chemical Defense Equipment," US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, Chemical Casualty Care Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, p. 4.

[8] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-0 to 1-2 and 1-8.

[9] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-5.

[10] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-4.

[11] The M17 Series includes the M17, M17A1, and the M17A2 protective masks. Most troops in the Gulf would have had the M17A1 or the M17A2.

[12] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-5 to 1-8.

[13] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-6.

[14] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-3 to 1-4.

[15] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-9 - 1-13.

[16] M8 and M9 paper are used to detect liquid chemical contamination.

[17] Field Manual No. 3-100, "NBC Operations," HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 17 September 1985, p. 1-11.

[18] Field Manual No. 3-100, "NBC Operations," HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 17 September 1985, p. 1-12.

[19] The Rate of Action is the time required for symptoms to appear in a person exposed to a particular agent. The rate of action is affected by the route of entry into the body. For example, symptoms for nerve agent vapor can affect the eyes and lungs within minutes of exposure, while blisters from mustard exposure may not develop for up to 8 hours. Army TM 8-285, Navy NAVMED P-5041, Air Force AFM 160-12, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, May 1974.

[20] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-0, 1-1, 1-4, 1-5.

[21] Extracts, History of CP Overgarment, undated.

[22] Air Force Manual 32-4005, Personnel Protection and Attack Actions, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC, 1 October 1995, Attachment 2 section A2.11.

[23] Field Manual No. 3-100, "NBC Operations," HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 17 September 1985, p.1-2 and 1-3.

[24] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-3.

[25] The soldiers in the pictures in Figure 2 are not wearing head coverings. While performing military operations all personnel wear helmets. At MOPP levels other than MOPP-0 personnel may also wear Chemical Protective Helmet Cover.

[26] Derived from Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-3.

[27] Different sources interpreted "readily available" in different ways—from within arms reach to within one minute away. XVIII Airborne Corps message 040645Z January 1991, Subject: Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), p. 3 ; and TAB A to Appendix 2 to Annex C to (USMC) Direct Support Command Operations Order 1-91, Chemical Warfare, Direct Support Command, 6 February 1991, p. 1.

[28] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-4.

[29] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 3-10 and 3-11.

[30] Derived from Field Manual No. 3-100, "NBC Operations," HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, September 17, 1985, p. 3-4.

[31] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-1 - 1-2.

[32] Memorandum for US Central Command Army LNO Team F, Subject: Chemical Protective Overgarments, AFRD-DTO, 8 February 1991.

[33] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 1-1.

[34] Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps (G3) message 231215 Jan 91, subject: Chemical Overgarment Wear Life and Serviceability, p. 2.

[35] Commander, US Army Central Command Main message 091035Z Feb 91, Subject: Determination of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), 9 February 1991, pp. 5-6.

[36] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, pp. 2-6 to 2-12.

[37] For example, the Marines estimated water consumption at about double normal. HQ US Marine Corps/LRCC message 130148Z August 1990, Subject: Care and Use of Chemical Protective Overgarment 84 (OG84), paragraph 1d.

[38] Inadequate nutrition affects personnel at MOPP 3 and 4, when the protective mask cannot be removed for several days or weeks.

[39] Technical Report, Assessment of Performance of Tasks by Personnel Dressed in Chemical Protective Clothing, Technical Analysis and Information Office, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, June 1987, p. 1.

[40] Acclimatization and Adaptation for Troops in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), Joint Operational Test & Information Directorate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, October 1991, p. 9.

[41] Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, p. II-10.

[42] Acclimatization and Adaptation for Troops in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), Joint Operational Test & Information Directorate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, October 1991, p. v.

[43] Technical Report, Assessment of Performance of Tasks by Personnel Dressed in Chemical Protective Clothing, Technical Analysis and Information Office, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, June 1987, p. 1.

[44] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[45] Acclimatization and Adaptation for Troops in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), Joint Operational Test & Information Directorate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, October 1991, p. 7.

[46] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-2.

[47] Test Report - Force Development Test and Experimentation - Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment - Close Combat Light, United States Army Test and Experimentation Command, Fort Hood, Texas, November 1992, p.-vi.

[48] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-2.

[49] Test Report - Force Development Test and Experimentation - Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment - Close Combat Light, United States Army Test and Experimentation Command, Fort Hood, Texas, November 1992, p. vi.

[50] Test Report - Force Development Test and Experimentation - Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment - Close Combat Light, United States Army Test and Experimentation Command, Fort Hood, Texas, November 1992, p. vi.

[51] Acclimatization and Adaptation for Troops in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), Joint Operational Test & Information Directorate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, October 1991, p. 10.

[52] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[53] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[54] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[55] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[56] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-3.

[57] Training Circular 3-1, Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 3 December 1993, p. 5-4.

[58] Test Report - Force Development Test and Experimentation - Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment - Close Combat Light, United States Army Test and Experimentation Command, Fort Hood, Texas, November 1992, p. vi.

[59] Test Report - Force Development Test and Experimentation - Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment - Close Combat Light, United States Army Test and Experimentation Command, Fort Hood, Texas, November 1992, p. vi.

[60] Acclimatization and Adaptation for Troops in a Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), Joint Operational Test & Information Directorate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, October 1991, p. 10.

[61] Summary Evaluation Report - Phase I, Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, March 1986, p. 1-2 - 1-3.

[62] Training Circular 3-1, Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 3 December 1993, p. 5-3.

[63] Training Circular 3-1, Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 3 December 1993, p. 5-3.

[64] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-17.

[65] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. A-3.

[66] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-22.

[67] With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, p. 145.

[68] Derived from Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-24.

[69] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-24.

[70] HQ, 210th Military Police Battalion memorandum, subject: Scud/Aerial Attack Procedures, 21 September 1991, p. 4.

[71] Field Manual No. 3-4/Fleet Marine Force Manual No. 11-9, NBC Protection, HQ, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 29 May 1992, p. 2-4.

[72] Memorandum from Commanding General, 1st Force Service Support Group, Subject: Policy for NBC Defense Preparedness for 1st FSSG Personnel, 13 October 1990, p. 2.

[73] Attachment to US Central Command Air Force/Chief of Staff letter, Subject: Attack Actions Handout, 15 January 1991, p. 6.

[74] 4404 TFW(P) Combat Operations Synopsis, Day 5, 21 January 1991.

[75] "KKIA Activates MOPP Alpha," The Sand Paper newsletter, King Khalid International Airport, January 31, 1991.

[76] Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps message 031535Z Dec 90, Subject: NBC Readiness, 3 December 1990, p. 2.

[77] Commander XVIII Airborne Corps (G3) message 220830Z Dec 90, subject: Chemical Protective Overgarments.

[78] Information Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: Mask Rework Operation, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 25 December 1990.

[79] Information provided in anticipation of question by news media during 11 Feb 91 evening news briefing, undated.

[80] US Army Office of the Surgeon General, Preventive Medicine Situation Summary Report, 13-26 October 1990.

[81] ARCENT lessons learned report, subject: New Equipment Fielding, 4 April 1991.

[82] Commanding General, Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, message 010226Z Apr 91, subject: Inventory of Lightweight Chemical Suits, British Mark IV.

[83] 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Operation Desert Storm After Action Report, subject: Chemical Defense Equipment Readiness, 20 May 1991, p. 4.

[84] 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Operation Desert Storm After Action Report, subject: Chemical Defense Equipment Readiness, 20 May 1991.

[85] 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Operation Desert Storm After Action Report, subject: Chemical Defense Equipment Readiness, 20 May 1991.

[86] XVIII Airborne Corps information paper, subject: Protective Mask Carrier Repair and Rebuild, 10 November 90.

[87] 926th Engineer Group, AAR Comments, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, forwarded 11 February 1991.

[88] Fleet Hospital Five NAVGRAM, subject: Lessons Learned, Fleet hospital Five, 01 Jan 91 through 31 Jan 91, JULLS Format, undated.

[89] Fleet Hospital Five NAVGRAM, subject: Lessons Learned, Fleet hospital Five, 01 Jan 91 through 31 Jan 91, JULLS Format, undated.

[90] Fleet Hospital Five NAVGRAM, subject: Lessons Learned, Fleet hospital Five, 01 Jan 91 through 31 Jan 91, JULLS Format, undated.

[91] Captain T. F. Manley, Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, July 1991, p. 47.

[92] Captain T. F. Manley, Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, July 1991, pp. 50.




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