File: 070296_cia_70086_70086_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 1


Subject: IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE





IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR,

1990-91







DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE





IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR,

1990-91







IN

ADDITION TO LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES, IRAQ TRIED TO PROVOKE COALITION GROUND

OPERATIONS BY SETTING KUWAITI OIL WELLS ON FIRE AND BY CREATING A LARGE OIL

SLICK IN THE PERSIAN GULF THAT THREATENED SAUDI WATER DESALINATION FACILI-

TIES.







IRAQ'S POLITICAL STRATEGY. TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEIVED

INTERNAL WEAKNESSES AND DIVISIONS IN THE COALITION,

BAGHDAD CONCENTRATED ITS DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA

EFFORTS ON SEVERAL THEMES. IRAQ DECRIED THE COALITION

EFFORT AS AN ISRAELI-INSPIRED PLOT TO DESTROY THE LARGEST

AND MOST POWERFUL ARAB ARMED FORCES AND THREATENED

TO STRIKE ISRAEL. BELIEVING ARAB MEMBERS OF THE

COALITION WOULD FIND HOSTILITIES WITH BAGHDAD UNPAL-

ATABLE WHILE IRAQ WAS FIGHTING ISRAEL. BAGHDAD ALSO

HIGHLIGHTED THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE OIL-RICH GULF

STATES THAT HAD JOINED THE COALITION AND THE POOR ARAB

STATES THAT SUPPORTED SADDAM, PORTRAYING THE CONFLICT

AS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN "GREEDY " OIL SHAYKHS AND

IMPOVERISHED ARAB MASSES. IRAQ THREATENED TO ATTACK

THE SAUDI OILFIELDS, TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AGAINST COALITION FORCES AND ISRAEL, TO CONDUCT SABO-

TAGE AND TERRORIST ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND

TO DESTROY KUWAIT AND ITS OIL INDUSTRY IN THE "MOTHER

OF ALL BATTLES" TO DRIVE HOME IRAQI DETERMINATION TO

HOLD KUWAIT AND TO TERRIFY WESTERN AND ARAB PUBLICS.

FINALLY, SADDAM USED THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO

NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT TO BUY TIME AND

DIVIDE THE COALITION, HOPING THAT, AS LONG AS HE HELD OUT

THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE COALITION WOULD NOT BE

ABLE TO AGREE TO FORCIBLY EVICT IRAQ FROM KUWAIT.







THE "SADDAM LINE"





 IRAQI FORCES BUILT          FORTIFI-

CATIONS ALONG THE SAUDI BORDER







CALLED THE "SADDAM

LINE" BY US TROOPS, THESE DEFENSES,

CONSISTED

OF OBSTACLES

FLAME TRENCHES. THE FLAME

TRENCHES WERE LONG DITCHES FILLED WITH OIL THAT THE

IRAQIS INTENDED TO IGNITE TO HINDER A COALITION ASSAULT,







READYING THE STRATEGIC FORCES

AT LEAST INITIALLY, BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVED ITS UN-

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY COULD HAVE A SIMILARLY STRONG

IMPACT IN A WAR WITH THE COALITION FOR KUWAIT AS IT HAD

IN THE WAR WITH IRAN. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PLAYED A KEY ROLE

IN IRAQ'S OFFENSIVES IN 1988. IRAQI ATTACKS ON

IRANIAN CITIES WITH          MISSILES

-TERRIFIED IRANIAN CITIZENS

ALREADY WEARY OF THE LONG, COSTLY WAR. IRAQ PROBABLY

ASSESSED THAT BOTH WEAPONS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO TEH-

RAN'S DECISION TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. AS A RESULT,

BAGHDAD CAME TO LOOK ON ITS UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES AS

IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY AND ROUTINE COMPO-

NENTS OF ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS







IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL ARSENAL





BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ POSSESSED AN IMPRESSIVE

ARRAY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EXTENSIVE COM-

BAT EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND

BALLISTIC MISSILES. 





CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN 1990, IRAQ HAD THE LARGEST

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND

COULD PRODUCE          THE

BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS SARIN AND

GF. THE IRAQIS HAD EMPLOYED THESE AGENTS AGAINST

IRAN IN ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS, AERIAL BOMBS, AND

OTHER MUNITIONS. IRAQ ALSO PRODUCED BINARY CHEMICAL

MUNITIONS AND WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD MISSILES







BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. BAGHDAD HAD ONE OF THE MOST

AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

IN THE WORLD AND PROBABLY COULD FIELD AN OPERATIONS

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ HAD

THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE LARGE QUANTITIES OF BOTULI-

NUM TOXIN, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, AND ANTHRAX







IRAQ PROBABLV FILLED SOME MUNITIONS WITH

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS







BALLISTIC MISSILES. BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ HAD A

LARGE FORCE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES CONSISTING

MAINLY OF DOMESTICALLY MODIFIED VARIANTS OF THE

SOVIET SCUD.







CHEMICAL WARFARE. IRAQI







PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT IN A CHEMICAL WARFARE

ENVIRONMENT:







ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

WERE TRANSPORTED







-TO          SOUTHERN IRAQ.







ACTIVITY

AT          BUNKERS

SUSPECTED OF STORING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS







CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION SITES IN THE

KUWAIT THEATER







IN OUR JUDGMENT, SADDAM READIED HIS FORCES TO USE

CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ONLY TO REVERSE HIMSELF LATE IN THE

FALL. IRAQI ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND

THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND TRACES

OF CHEMICAL AGENT DISCOVERED BY COALITION MILITARY

PERSONNEL AFTER THE WAR INDICATE IRAQ INITIALLY MOVED

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO THE KUWAIT THEATER AFTER THE

INVASION. REPORTING          INDI-

CATES THESE STOCKS PROBABLY WERE MAINTAINED IN SPECIAL

AMMUNITION BUNKERS. UNDER IRAQI DOCTRINE BAGHDAD

WOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO COMBAT

UNITS UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE BATTLE. THE CHEMICAL

WEAPONS APPARENTLY WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE THEATER

LATE IN THE FALL.







WE NOW BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED TO WITHDRAW HIS

CHEMICAL ORDNANCE FROM THE KUWAIT THEATER BECAUSE

HE CONCLUDED THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF CHEMICAL WAR-

FARE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY THE

UNITED STATES AND OTHERS.







WE BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED THE ADVANTAGE HIS

FORCES WOULD ACCRUE FROM CHEMICAL WARFARE WAS NOT

WORTH THE GAMBLE OF THE UNITED STATES OR UNITED

KINGDOM RETALIATING WITH ATTACKS BAGHDAD COULD NEI-

THER MATCH NOR ABSORB. SIMILAR CONSIDERATE PROBA-

BLY INFLUENCED SADDAM'S DECISION NOT TO USE

CHEMICAL-FILLED SCUD MISSILES

AGAINST ISRAEL.







THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN





ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE US AIR FORCE,

THE PLAN FOR THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN ENVISIONED

FOUR DISTINCT PHASES. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE, COALI-

TION AIRFORCES WOULD CONCENTRATE ON GAINING AIR

SUPERIORITY OVER IRAQ AND DESTROYING IRAQS STRATEGIC

CAPABILITY, INCLUDING ITS MISSILE, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,

AND CHEMICAL WARFARE FACITILIES. PHASE TWO WOULD

SHIFT THE BRUNT OF AIR OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESSING IRAQI

AIR DEFENSES PROTECTING THE KUWAIT THEATER. DURING

PHASE THREE, TARGETS IN IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO BE

STRUCK AND AIR DEFENSES ATTACKED AS NEEDED, BUT THE

FOCUS WOULD INCREASINGLY BE ON ATTACKING IRAQI GROUND

FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER TO SOFTEN THEM  UP FOR THE

GROUND OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY INTENSIVE

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION IN PHASE

FOUR.







THE SCUD CAMPAIGN PROVED TO BE A DISAPPOINTMENT

IRAQ BECAUSE IT SUCCEEDED ONLY IN DIVERTING COALITION

SORTIES FROM MORE LUCRATIVE TARGETS. OF GREATEST IMPOR-

TANCE, THE SCUD ATTACKS FAILED TO BRING ISRAEL INTO THE

CONFLICT. DESPITE THE TERROR CREATED BY THE SCUDS, THEIR

LIMITED PAYLOAD AND POOR ACCURACY CAUSED ONLY SLIGHT

DAMAGE.







CREATING AN ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE. IRAQ'S FIRST EF-

FORTS TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE WAR WERE TO PUT

KUWAIT'S OIL PRODUCTION AND SAUDI WATER DESALINATIO

AT RISK. ON 22 JANUARY, IRAQ IGNITED THE FIRST KUWAITI

OIL WELLS. INITIALLY, ONLY A SMALL NUMBER WERE SET

ABLAZE. IRAQ HELD BACK UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE TO

IGNITE THE REST. THREE DAYS LATER IRAQ BEGAN PUMPING

KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF, CREATING AN OIL SLICK

THAT COVERED THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES. IRAQ CONTIN-

UED TO DUMP OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF UNTIL 27 JANUARY

WHEN COALITION STRIKE AIRCRAFT INTERRUPTED THE FLOW BY

DESTROYING THE MAIN MIXING MANIFOLD OF THE KUWAITI

OIL SYSTEMS



WE BELIEVE IRAQ'S INTENTION IN BOTH CASES WAS TO GOAD

THE COALITION TO ACCELERATE THE TIMETABLE FOR THE

GROUND WAR. SADDAM PROBABLY BELIEVED THESE MOVES

WOULD PUT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE COALI-

TION LEADERSHIP TO TRY TO RETAKE KUWAIT IMMEDIATELY TO

PREVENT FURTHER DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS

AND TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE SAUDI DESALINATION

SYSTEM. BOTH ACTIONS WERE PROBABLY IMPROVISED IN

RESPONSE TO THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR.







DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS





SADDAM'S PRINCIPAL

MOTIVE IN DESTROYING THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS WAS TO

ENSURE THAT THE COALITION RECAPTURED NOTHING OF VALUE

IN KUWAIT. IN ADDITION TO THIS SCORCHED EARTH POLICY,

IRAQ'S GENERALS SAW TACTICAL VALUE IN IGNITING THE OIL

WELLS AS PART OF THEIR RESPONSE TO A COALITION GROUND

OFFENSIVE. THEY HOPED THAT THE SMOKE WOULD INHIBIT

THE OPERATION OF COALITION AIRFORCES AND THAT THE

BURNING WELLS WOULD SERVE AS OBSTACLES TO THE MOVE-

MENT OF COALITION GROUNDFORCES. AFTER IGNITING A SMALL

NUMBER OF KUWAITI OIL WELLS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE

START OF THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN, IRAQ REFRAINED

FROM FURTHER DESTRUCTION AND WAITED FOR THE GROUND

WAR





IRAQ BEGAN IGNITING

ADDITIONAL KUWAITI OIL WELLS IN MID-FEBRUARY. WE

BELIEVE THIS MOVE WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO TRY TO MITIGATE

THE IMPACT OF THE AIR WAR. BAGHDAD PROBABLY HOPED

THE SMOKE OF THE FIRES WOULD CONCEAL MUCH OF KUWAIT

AND HINDER COALITION AIRSTRIKES AGAINST IRAQI FORCES

THERE          IRAQ EMPLOYED

SIMILAR METHODS AT STRATEGIC FACILITIES IN CENTRAL IRAQ,

SMOKE GENERATORS NEAR INSTALLATIONS TO PRE-

VENT A PILOT FROM SEEING-AND THEREFORE TARGETING-

THE SITE







BAGHDAD RADIO BROADCAST THAT

THE "MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES" HAD BEGUN. IN RESPONSE,

IRAQI FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER DILIGENTLY

SET ABOUT BLOWING UP KUWAITI

OILFIELDS. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OILFIELDS WAS  ACCOM-

PLISHED WITH ASTONISHING EFFICIENCY-OVER 85 PERCENT

OF KUWAIT'S WELLS WERE DAMAGED. NEVERTHELESS, IT

PROVED OF LITTLE MILITARY VALUE, COALITION AIRCRAFT

CONTINUED TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE THEATER, AND THE

BURNING OIL WELLS DID NOT HAMPER THE ADVANCE OF

COALITION GROUND FORCES.







9 AUGUST      AN IRAQI ENVOY          ANNOUNCES IRAQ WILL USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF

 ATTACKED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ISRAEL.







JANUARY     IRAQ BEGINS TO DESTROY OIL WELLS IN KUWAIT.







JANUARY     IRAQ BEGINS DUMPING KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF,







1.5(C)

70086:70086

 

| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Back to Text |