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JULY 9, 1996

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The meeting convened at the Ambassador

West Hotel, 1300 North State Parkway, at the hour of

9:00 o'clock a.m.




Sylvia Copeland and Rich McNally 3

Brian Martin 42

Colonel Edward Koenigsburg 77

Holly Gwin 139

Mark Brown 144

Kelley Brix 187

Michael Kowalok 219

Lois Joellenbeck 228


1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (9:30 a.m.)

3 DR. LASHOF: We are ready to resume our

4 meeting.

5 This morning we are going to begin with a

6 presentation by CIA on the chemical, biological, and

7 radiological weapons from the Gulf War. I want to

8 thank the CIA for its diligence in this effort and for

9 catalyzing the investigation into the Kamisiyah

10 incident and we're very pleased to have you here this

11 morning.

12 Ms. Copeland, do you want to start off?

13 MS. COPELAND: Thanks. Dr. Lashof,

14 members of the Committee, we are pleased to appear

15 before you this morning to discuss our on-going

16 efforts related to reports of possible exposure of our

17 troops to chemical or biological agents in the Persian

18 Gulf.

19 Our Director strongly supports CIA's work

20 on this important issue and continues to encourage us

21 to bring forth important results of our study. Today

22 we will provide our key findings and some new


1 information regarding the presence of chemical agents

2 at Kamisiyah, Muhammadiyat, and Al-Muthanna.

3 First our key findings. We conclude that

4 Iraq did not use chemical agents, nor were chemical

5 agents located in Kuwait. In addition, on the basis

6 of intelligence information available, and modeling to

7 date, we assess that U.S. troops were not exposed to

8 chemical agents released by aerial bombing of Iraqi

9 facilities.

10 However, we have identified, and will

11 discuss, potential fallout concerns in the case of a

12 rear area chemical weapons storage bunker in southern

13 Iraq that was destroyed by U.S. ground troops shortly

14 after the end of the war.

15 Chemical weapons in the Kuwaiti Theater of

16 Operations. We conclude that Iraq had chemical

17 weapons at two sites in Iraq within the Iraqi, within

18 the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, or the KTO.

19 Chemical weapons were destroyed by U.S. forces at one

20 of these facilities, Kamisiyah, also called Tall Al

21 Lahm. It's an ammunitions storage area.

22 Both Kamisiyah and the second site, An


1 Nasiriyah ammunition storage depot southwest, were

2 rear areas depots near the northern boundary of the

3 KTO in Iraq and stored mostly conventional munitions.

4 UNSCOM inspected chemical munitions at or

5 near Kamisiyah in October 1991 and identified 122

6 millimeter cycloserine, also called GB/GF, nerve

7 agent-filled rockets, and one 55 millimeter mustard

8 rounds. At the time, it was not clear whether the

9 chemical weapons identified had been present during

10 the war or whether, as was suspected at other

11 locations, the Iraqis had moved the munitions after

12 the war and just prior to the 1991 UNSCOM inspection.

13 This uncertainty was only cleared up

14 through the recent comprehensive review of all

15 intelligence information and the UNSCOM inspection in

16 May 1996. The following information was obtained by

17 UNSCOM during its October 1991 inspection:

18 At a pit area, about 1 kilometer south of

19 the Kamisiyah storage area, UNSCOM found several

20 hundred, mostly intact, 122 millimeter rockets

21 containing nerve agent. Detected by sampling and with

22 a chemical agent monitor CAMs.


1 In an open area, about 5 kilometers west

2 of Kamisiyah, inspectors found approximately 6,000

3 intact 155 millimeter rounds containing mustard agent,

4 as indicated by CAMs.

5 At a third location, a single bunker,

6 among 100 bunkers, called bunker 73 by Iraq, remnants

7 of 122 millimeter rockets were identified.

8 The 1991 inspection and also a 1992

9 inspection, in which UNSCOM destroyed rockets in the

10 pit, left uncertainty as to whether the munitions in

11 bunker 73 were chemical, because there was no sampling

12 or positive CAM readings and inspectors did not

13 document characteristic features of chemical munitions

14 in that bunker.

15 The Iraqis claim during the October 1991

16 inspection, that coalition troops had destroyed bunker

17 73 earlier that year. These Iraqi statements were

18 viewed at the time with skepticism because of the

19 broad and continuous use of deception by the Iraqis

20 against UNSCOM. In conjunction with DOD

21 investigators, in March 1996, we determined that the

22 U.S. 37th Engineering Battalion had destroyed that


1 bunker, along with a number of other bunkers on March

2 4th, 1991. However, it was not until UNSCOM's May

3 1996 inspection at Kamisiyah, that it was determined

4 that bunker 73 contained remnants of 122 millimeter

5 chemical rockets. Again, this was a fact that earlier

6 inspections left uncertain.

7 UNSCOM in May 1996 documents the presence

8 of high density polyethylene inserts burster tubes,

9 fill plugs, and other characteristics of Iraqi

10 chemical munitions. The rockets had been filled with

11 a combination of the agent sarin and cycloserine, or

12 GB/GF, based on analysis of the contents of the

13 rockets UNSCOM found in 1991 in the pit area just

14 outside Kamisiyah storage area. Iraq now claims to

15 have moved 2,160 unmarked 122 millimeter nerve agent

16 rockets to bunker 73 from the Al-Muthanna CW

17 production storage facility just before the start of

18 the air war.

19 According to Iraq, rockets started leaking

20 immediately, motivating the Iraqis to move 1,100

21 rockets, one-by-one, out of the bunker to a pit area

22 2 kilometers away where they were buried.


1 During the May 1996 inspection, Iraq also

2 told UNSCOM that the 6,000 155 millimeter mustard

3 rounds UNSCOM found in the open area at Kamisiyah in

4 October 1991 had been stored at one bunker at An

5 Nasiriyah until 15 February 1991, just before the

6 ground war. Iraq claims that fear of coalition

7 bombing motivated An Nasiriyah depot personnel to move

8 the intact mustard rounds to the open area 5

9 kilometers from the Kamisiyah depot, where the rounds

10 were camouflaged with canvas.

11 Modeling of the potential hazard caused by

12 the destruction of bunker 73, indicates that an area

13 around the bunker, at least 2 kilometers in all

14 directions, and 4 kilometers downwind, could have been

15 contaminated at or above the level for causing acute

16 symptoms, including runny nose, headache, and miosis,

17 as you see in this figure. An area upwind, up to 25,

18 excuse me, up to 25 kilometers downwind, could have

19 been contaminated at the much lower general population

20 dosage limit.

21 This dosage, from army manuals, is for

22 protection of the general population and is a 72-hour


1 exposure at 0.000003, five zeros and a three,

2 milligram per cubic meter. Significantly lower than

3 the .0001 milligram per cubic meter occupational limit

4 defined for 8 hours. Based on wind models and

5 observations of a video of destruction activity at

6 Kamisiyah, we determined that the downwind direction

7 was northeast to east.

8 Some of the following modeling assumptions

9 were based on data from U.S. testing in 1966 that

10 involved destruction of a bunker filled with 1,850 GB

11 rockets of similar maximum range to the Iraqi rockets

12 found in bunker 73. U.S. rockets had a range of about

13 15 to 20 kilometers and the Iraqi rockets had a range

14 of 18 kilometers.

15 Our assumptions on the model were: We

16 used 1,060 rockets, as was indicated by Iraq that were

17 in the bunker, the rockets were filled with 8

18 kilograms of a 2:1 ratio of GB to GF. We assumed the

19 contents to be 100 percent pure agent, so therefore,

20 we didn't take into account any impurities or

21 degradation products, making a conservative estimate.

22 10 percent of the rockets we modeled


1 ejected from the bunker, half of which falling

2 randomly within a 200-meter circle, the other half

3 falling within a 2-kilometer circle, based on U.S.

4 test data.

5 All but 2.5 percent of the agent in the

6 bunker degraded by heat from explosion and motor crate

7 burning, based on U.S. tests, and the Iraqis also had

8 crates that the rockets were in.

9 The winds were slow to the northeast, then

10 to the east, based on modeling and again, analysis of

11 the videotape of destruction activity at Kamisiyah.

12 Our models, however, do not include

13 affects of the reported 32 to 37 conventional

14 ordinance bunkers detonating and simultaneously with

15 the chemical bunker. The added thermal energy created

16 by explosions and fires in the other bunkers and solar

17 heating, caused by the increased amounts of smoke,

18 would tend to degrade agent, as well as more quickly

19 fill the column of air near the bunker, to an altitude

20 of 800 to 1,200 meters.

21 This more rapid vertical spreading would

22 tend to lower ground contamination area and actually


1 shorten the footprint of the model.

2 Chemical fallout from aerial bombing in

3 Iraq. On the basis of all available information, we

4 conclude that coalition aerial bombing resulted in

5 damage to filled chemical munitions at two facilities,

6 Muhammadiyat and Al-Muthanna. Both locations, both

7 are located in remote areas west of Baghdad. Our

8 modeling indicates that fallout from these facilities

9 did not reach troops in Saudi Arabia. According to

10 the most recent Iraqi declarations, less than 5

11 percent of Iraq's approximately 700 metric tons of

12 chemical agents stockpile was destroyed by chemical,

13 by a coalition bombing.

14 In most cases, the Iraqis did not store CW

15 munitions in bunkers they believed the coalition would

16 target. The Iraqis stored many of the CW munitions in

17 the open to protect them from coalition detection and

18 bombing. In addition, all known CW and precursor

19 production lines were either inactive or had been

20 dismantled by the start of the air campaign.

21 Bombing of An Nasiriyah storage area

22 southwest on 17 January 1991 did not produce any


1 chemical agent fallout. In May 1996, UNSCOM

2 inspectors inspected the bunkers at the site and were

3 able to discover that with one exception, the bunkers

4 had only contained conventional weapons.

5 According to Iraq, the one bunker that did

6 contain chemical agent, contained 6,000 mustard rounds

7 on 17 January. It was identified as bunker 8 by Iraq.

8 But this bunker was untouched throughout the war by

9 aerial bombing. And as I discussed earlier, these

10 mustard rounds began to be moved to an open area near

11 Kamisiyah on 15 February 1991.

12 Therefore, the bunker that was bombed on

13 17 January did not contain chemical agent and could

14 not have produced any fallout.

15 At Muhammadiyat, also called Qubaysah

16 storage area, Iraq declared that 200 mustard filled

17 and 12 sarin filled aerial bombs were destroyed by

18 coalition bombing.

19 We have modeled the contaminated area,

20 resulting from bombing of Muhammadiyat, a site at

21 least 410 kilometers from U.S. troops stationed at

22 Rafa and even further from the bulk of U.S. troops.


1 Bombing of this facility started on

2 19 January and continued throughout the air war. We

3 have been unable to determine exactly when the

4 chemical bombs were destroyed. Based on recent Iraqi

5 declarations, we have modeled release of 2.9 metric

6 tons of sarin and 15 metric tons of mustard, for all

7 possible bombing dates.

8 For these days, as for the whole time

9 period of the bombing, southerly winds occur only a

10 few days. The following figures show that for general

11 population limit dosages above 0.013 milligram minutes

12 per cubic meter, maximum downward dispersions in the

13 general southerly direction for sarin is about 300

14 kilometers. And then for mustard, is 130 kilometers.

15 Neither the first effects, nor the general

16 population limit levels reached U.S. troops that were

17 stationed in Saudi Arabia.

18 When predicting very low concentration

19 levels far down range of the source, large dispersions

20 are created that are difficult to model. However, we

21 assess that all results are conservative, because

22 optimal times and dates to produce the maximum


1 dispersions toward Saudi Arabia were chosen.

2 In addition, the models do not account for

3 phenomena such as deposition onto the ground, and rain

4 removal of agent, that would greatly diminish

5 potential downwind exposure.

6 At Al-Muthanna, also called Samarra, the

7 primary Iraqi CW production and storage facility, Iraq

8 declared that 2,500 chemical rockets containing about

9 17 metric tons of sarin nerve agent, had been

10 destroyed by coalition bombing. UNSCOM's inspectors

11 were unable to verify the exact number because of

12 damage to the rockets.

13 We have modeled the possible for this

14 single bunker as well and determined that for the

15 general population limit dosage, the most southerly

16 dispersion is 160 kilometers. Again, well short of

17 U.S. troops.

18 Finally, we have found no information to

19 suggest that casualties occurred inside Iraq as a

20 result of CW agents released from the bombing of these

21 sites. This is probably because these two facilities

22 are in remote locations, far from any population


1 centers. The Muhammadiyat and Al-Muthanna sites are

2 both over 30 kilometers from the nearest Iraqi towns.

3 We have completed the main part of our

4 review of intelligence and will be submitting a final

5 report to you in the next couple of weeks that will

6 also go on GulfLINK.

7 We will continue to be diligent in

8 tracking any leads that surface in the future. If we

9 find any information pointing to chemical or

10 biological agent exposures, or impacting significantly

11 on the issue of Gulf War veterans' illnesses, we will

12 again work with the Department of Defense to announce

13 those findings.

14 DR. LASHOF: Thank you very much,

15 Ms. Copeland.

16 Let me ask a couple of questions first to

17 start this off and then I'll turn it to the whole

18 panel.

19 I want to be completely clear on the time

20 frame at which we knew what we knew, when did we know

21 it, and what we knew.

22 From what we heard from UNSCOM yesterday,


1 both in '91 and '92, they did inspect the Kamisiyah

2 area and reported and stated that it was a public

3 report that there were chemical weapons, rockets

4 containing chemical weapons at those sites.

5 You stated in your testimony that there

6 was uncertainty as to whether the munitions in bunker

7 73 were chemical and you state that because there were

8 no sampling of positive CAM readings. Now, does that

9 mean that no sampling was done and no CAM readings

10 were taken, and so they were negative, and so there

11 were no positive because you didn't do any readings,

12 or CAM readings were done and they were negative,

13 therefore, you had no positive. Can you enlighten?

14 MS. COPELAND: Yeah. I know what you

15 mean. The focus at that time was on identifying the

16 chemical munitions in order for destruction. And to

17 our knowledge at that time, there was no positive CAM

18 readings. I'm not sure whether or not they actually

19 took CAM readings, they did take, okay, they did take

20 CAM readings.

21 DR. LASHOF: They took CAM readings?

22 MS. COPELAND: There were no positive CAM


1 readings.

2 DR. LASHOF: That's prior to our

3 destroying, you're talking about now?

4 MS. COPELAND: No, no, that's after.

5 DR. LASHOF: After our destruction?

6 MS. COPELAND: After destruction.

7 DR. LASHOF: Okay.

8 MS. COPELAND: UNSCOM went there after

9 destruction.

10 DR. LASHOF: Right. That's what I

11 thought.

12 MS. COPELAND: Right.

13 DR. LASHOF: I thought, when you said you

14 were, they were looking to destroy.

15 MS. COPELAND: Well, they were looking to

16 destroy the, right, that was UNSCOM mission.

17 DR. LASHOF: Right.

18 MS. COPELAND: And so when they found the

19 other munitions there, their goal and their job was to

20 destroy those munitions.

21 DR. LASHOF: Right. Right.

22 MS. COPELAND: That was the focus.


1 DR. LASHOF: So you're saying that UNSCOM

2 was not sure that there were chemicals in those at

3 that time? That's not what I got from yesterday's

4 testimony?

5 MS. COPELAND: In bunker 73.

6 DR. LASHOF: Yeah.

7 MS. COPELAND: There was no documentation

8 on the types of rockets in that bunker. And so

9 therefore, there was, there was not a positive

10 conclusion, that's why the last time I testified, I

11 couldn't say that those were chemical rockets. I

12 could say that those were 122 millimeter rockets,

13 there was suspicion that there were chemicals. The

14 Iraqis claimed that they were chemical rockets. But

15 since they hadn't characterized and documented the

16 characteristics of those rockets, we couldn't be for

17 certain.

18 MS. NISHIMI: But you knew that there were

19 chemical shells in the open pit?

20 MS. COPELAND: In the open pit, correct.

21 In the open pit adjacent to it and that's what I think

22 they were answering yesterday.


1 In Kamisiyah, we were sure there were

2 chemical weapons. In the open pit and in the area

3 that contained the 6,000 mustard rounds.

4 MS. NISHIMI: And when were you sure there

5 were chemical weapons present there?

6 MS. COPELAND: We were sure there were

7 chemical weapons present at Kamisiyah in '91, what we

8 were unsure of was whether or not those rockets were

9 brought in just prior to the inspection, or were there

10 during the war. But the presence was known.

11 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Are there, does the

12 Committee have other questions?

13 DR. TAYLOR: I guess I have one question

14 about the documentation.

15 Was that throughout Iraq that they didn't

16 document which rockets were chemical versus those that

17 weren't?

18 MS. COPELAND: If they found rounds that

19 were intact, they documented it and then they went

20 through and described that yesterday.

21 In this particular bunker, they didn't

22 document what they had found in that bunker.


1 Therefore, others looking at it and trying to

2 determine whether or not there were actual chemical

3 munitions, have no hard evidence to go forward with.

4 I mean, now we can say they've documented the liners,

5 they've documented the burster tubes, and feel very

6 confident that in fact those were chemical munitions.

7 DR. TAYLOR: But prior to that, they could

8 not do that.

9 MS. COPELAND: But prior to that they had

10 not done that.

11 MS. NISHIMI: In bunker 73?

12 MS. COPELAND: In bunker 73.

13 MS. NISHIMI: But in the open pit adjacent

14 to the bunker. In 1991 and in 1992 UNSCOM did

15 document.

16 MS. COPELAND: Did document those chemical

17 munitions --

18 MS. NISHIMI: Those munitions.

19 MS. COPELAND: And did document the type

20 of agent in those munitions.

21 MS. NISHIMI: But your position is that

22 CIA did not know when those munitions were brought in


1 1991 and 1992, is that a fair assessment?

2 MS. COPELAND: That's, that's correct.

3 MS. NISHIMI: What makes you believe that

4 here in 1996, you know whether Iraq brought those

5 munitions in or not?

6 MS. COPELAND: Now that we've gone through

7 and done a thorough assessment, first of all, let me

8 go back a bit and just kind of give you some of the

9 atmospherics in the focus at the time.

10 MS. NISHIMI: Well, no.

11 MS. COPELAND: Okay.

12 MS. NISHIMI: I'd like to, to focus on

13 that question. What changed between 1992 and 1996?

14 MS. COPELAND: But that sites --

15 MS. NISHIMI: The atmospherics, I

16 understand.

17 MS. COPELAND: Right.

18 MS. NISHIMI: But UNSCOM's material

19 findings apparently did not differ between 1991, 1992,

20 and 1996. You didn't believe the Iraqis in 1991 and

21 1992, what's changed now in 1996?

22 MS. COPELAND: In 1991, when the Iraqis


1 were deceiving us at every single one of the locations

2 and not being forthcoming with their chemical agent

3 stockpile, we did not investigate when those munitions

4 were brought in there because at that time our focus

5 was on identifying chemical munitions, identifying the

6 residual Iraqi capability, in order for it to be

7 destroyed so it wouldn't be there in the future.

8 So in March '95 when our focus changed,

9 when CIA then changed the focus from identifying

10 stockpile and capability, to looking at whether or not

11 there is possibility for exposure or use, that we

12 start looking at this information in a different light

13 and then did a comprehensive intelligence review

14 looking at it in a different light and started

15 investigating it.

16 So it's that thorough investigation,

17 thorough review, in combination with the recent Iraqi,

18 I mean UNSCOM inspection.

19 DR. LASHOF: Can you explain why we waited

20 from '92 to '95 to go back and do that thorough

21 investigation. I understand what you just said about

22 the fact that initially you were there to try to


1 document what they had, to decide what had to be

2 destroyed, to understand everything that was going on

3 and that you didn't go back to this documentation in

4 '95.

5 But in view of the fact that concerns

6 about Gulf War illness, concerns among the veterans of

7 having been exposed came up a lot before '95. What

8 participated our deciding in '95 and not in '93, not

9 in '92, not in '94, to go back and look?

10 MS. COPELAND: CIA was asked in '95 to do

11 an in-depth, comprehensive intelligence review and to

12 look at that. Up until that time, our focus was

13 identifying threat, which include capabilities of

14 other countries. And in fact, in Iraq, it was the

15 capability, the residual stockpile of Iraq.

16 When we were tasked in '95, then we

17 started looking at it and put a lot of resources on

18 this issue.

19 DR. LASHOF: So basically the mission that

20 CIA was given by the government was what changed?

21 MS. COPELAND: Right.

22 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? Yes, Art.


1 DR. CAPLAN: Yesterday one of the things

2 we were told is Iraqis were not particularly picky

3 about marking their munitions, that they didn't have

4 a system or a coding system and so on.

5 And I guess I'd like you to comment, our

6 certainty that they didn't put any of these weapons

7 into the battlefield theaters based upon, knowing that

8 they weren't all that careful and cautious about what

9 was what, either accidental or intentional use, you're

10 certain that they weren't in the Kuwaiti theater or

11 not used against our troops under any circumstances

12 because?

13 MS. COPELAND: The Iraqis didn't mark

14 their munitions, that's correct. But what they did do

15 is they had units that traveled from cradle till, till

16 they were used. They had units that were with those

17 munitions, stationed with those munitions, that took

18 them from the production facility to the storage

19 facility, and then to the firing lines.

20 So therefore, even though they weren't

21 marked, and even the people who were firing them

22 didn't know what they were firing, there was a unit


1 that did know. And so they were under security.

2 So the chance of inadvertent use, we think

3 is quite minimal. From all information that we've

4 looked at, there's no information that would lead us

5 to conclude that Iraq used chemical weapons, or that

6 they were located in Kuwait.

7 DR. TAYLOR: And that's based on the fact

8 that the units were able to identify and, what are the

9 units?

10 MS. COPELAND: The, the special unit that

11 guarded these munitions. From the time that they were

12 produced, actually went with the convoy to the storage

13 area and stayed there at the storage area until they

14 would move up front, would take them there and would

15 give them then to the individuals that would fire

16 them. So there was control, but there was no

17 markings.

18 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? David?

19 DR. HAMBURG: As I understand it, it's

20 been a very difficult task to know whether to believe

21 the rocky statements about these matters and it's

22 further my understanding that it continues up to the


1 present time to be a very difficult task, or at any

2 rate there's a high level of skepticism within UNSCOM

3 about that matter. And I'm not quite clear on whether

4 you're saying that you've come to accept Iraqi

5 statements more fully in recent times or what is your,

6 what criteria do you use to, whether to accept the

7 Iraqi statements or not?

8 MS. COPELAND: Some of them we're

9 accepting because we've done this in-depth

10 intelligence review, looking at this information from

11 a different perspective. And from looking at all the

12 information, looking at what they said, we've been

13 able to conclude that yes, we believe this part of it.

14 We certainly don't believe everything they say even

15 today.

16 But this particular part, as far as those

17 munitions being present and now that the munitions in

18 bunker 73 have been documented, we believe that in

19 fact they were there, and that there were chemical

20 munitions in bunker 73.

21 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? Jim?

22 MR. TURNER: Yeah, I'd like to turn to


1 Kamisiyah specifically if we could for a minute. You

2 have reviewed a videotape that was provided to the

3 Committee by Brian Martin, a soldier who served with

4 the 37th Engineers at Kamisiyah. Are you satisfied

5 that that videotape portrays events that occurred on

6 March 4th, 1991?

7 MS. COPELAND: That videotape, it does

8 portray events. It is not a complete videotape.

9 MR. TURNER: Correct. You've matched it

10 up with meteorological indicators.

11 MS. COPELAND: We haven't matched it up,

12 we haven't matched it up with meteorological. There

13 are gaps.

14 MR. TURNER: But you are satisfied that

15 that is a tape of that event, correct?

16 MS. COPELAND: Yeah, right. Correct.

17 MR. TURNER: Now, the modeling that you've

18 done of Kamisiyah indicates that traces of sarin could

19 be spread as far as 25 kilometers downwind. As I

20 understand it, none of our chemical detectors could

21 pick up those traces, they're not that sensitive. Is

22 that your understanding?


1 MS. COPELAND: You want a go on that?

2 MR. MC NALLY: The, if, if you look back

3 at footprint, Larry, could you put up the footprint?

4 The, the general answer is, for most of the region of

5 that low level footprint, our detectors would not have

6 picked up presence, if they were on. If you look

7 towards the area between the green and, and light

8 blue.

9 MS. COPELAND: Put on the other one.

10 SPEAKER: The larger one?

11 MR. MC NALLY: Between the green and the

12 light blue. That area inside of that boundary is

13 about the furtherest extent that a detector that was

14 turned on would have detected.

15 DR. HAMBURG: So for those very low

16 traces, it's, our detectors were not sensitive enough

17 for the darker blue and the predominant, call it

18 turquoise?

19 MR. MC NALLY: That's correct.

20 DR. HAMBURG: I'd like to also just talk

21 for a minute about some of the assumptions that went

22 into the modeling, if we could, so that people


1 understand what the basis of it is.

2 Wind direction and wind speed are both

3 critical parameters, is that correct in modeling?

4 MS. COPELAND: That's correct.

5 DR. HAMBURG: And you base that on 3 mile,

6 3 to 5 miles-an-hour wind speed and the direction that

7 you modeled was towards the northeast?

8 MR. MC NALLY: That's right. The

9 direction was towards 26 degrees. And what we had

10 found in matching the observations in the global

11 optimized interpellation results that were put

12 together by the National Center for Atmospheric

13 Research, as well as our own modeling, shows that at

14 the surface, the winds start blowing to the northeast,

15 over the next three hours, they rotate more towards

16 the east. And as you go up in altitude, the winds

17 start, as I said, going to the northeast, and with

18 growing altitude up to the height of the, the top of

19 where the cloud is, there's also a rotation towards

20 the east.

21 MR. TURNER: Now, at those levels of

22 winds, there's a greater degree of uncertainty in the


1 data that you're relying on, isn't there? When you've

2 got 3 to 5 mile-an-hour winds, there can be periods

3 when they aren't blowing that hard, there can also be

4 some variation in direction that again, limit the

5 conclusiveness that you can draw from your atmospheric

6 modeling, is that a fair statement?

7 MR. MC NALLY: It is a fair statement. As

8 the winds get calmer, they can become more variable.

9 It is also true that this was during, during the mid-

10 afternoon, starting at 2 in the afternoon with strong

11 sunlight. That tends to make the wind direction a

12 little bit more stable.

13 And we looked at the wind direction

14 essentially over the, over the 2 10-minute time

15 windows that we had in the videotape. And during,

16 which covered from the initiation to about 30 minutes

17 after the release. And during that time period, we

18 did see a slight wind shift in the patterns.

19 And we also saw, and one of the events

20 that happens with a very high thermal environment like

21 this, it tends, in sucking the smoke and debris

22 vertically, it will start taking the wind at its base


1 and sucking it towards the ground from all directions.

2 So what we see in the second 10 minutes of

3 the videotape for instance, is where the plumes are

4 leaving the bunkers, they're tilting in towards

5 center. And as you look higher in the, higher up into

6 the cloud, they're, the movement is still in the

7 general direction. And we see a slight shift between

8 the two tapes, but not, not very much.

9 MR. TURNER: Yesterday, UNSCOM told us,

10 what I believe is new information, that the Iraqis

11 have now made a representation that they believe

12 sarin-filled rockets in the pit area were also

13 destroyed by U.S. forces in this March time frame.

14 You did not model that, did you? In this model that

15 you presented to the Committee?

16 MS. COPELAND: No, we didn't model that

17 for several reasons. Because it is new information.

18 MR. TURNER: Right.

19 MS. COPELAND: We haven't really

20 investigated it, and as I mentioned in the testimony,

21 when they took those munitions out of bunker 73, they

22 buried them. So how many were still buried, how many


1 would've been present when U.S. troops were there,

2 unburied or on top, is questionable. Because when

3 UNSCOM went in there the first time, it appeared that

4 some of the munitions had literally been bulldozed out

5 of the bunker, so how many of those were destroyed by

6 somebody blowing them up and how many destroyed by

7 bulldozing or smashing, is something that we haven't

8 been able to determine.

9 MR. TURNER: Is it fair to say that the

10 CIA's modeling to date of the Kamisiyah incident

11 represents that Agency's best assessment, given the

12 limitations of the data that's available about the

13 events that we've been reconstruct?

14 MS. COPELAND: That's correct.

15 MR. TURNER: Another feature that was

16 modeled in your modeling, and this is the last

17 question on model, I promise.

18 DR. LASHOF: That's all right. I should

19 apologize for not introducing Mr. McNally, who I

20 understand did the modeling, and that's why he is

21 responding to these questions, but for the panel

22 information.


1 MR. TURNER: U.S. tests at dugway, in the

2 dugway area indicated that when a bunker is burned

3 like this, you not only have rockets inside the bunker

4 that emit or, or expel sarin, but also that there are

5 secondary explosions, sometimes rockets ignited that

6 fly out.

7 Now, your modeling took account of that

8 and that went how far, was it 2 kilometers?

9 MS. COPELAND: 2 kilometers.

10 MR. TURNER: Are there, are you aware of

11 indications that there were debris falling at further

12 distances, and would you comment on that?

13 MS. COPELAND: We are aware of that. But

14 again, we couldn't figure out quite how to model it

15 because there were so many ambiguities. How many flew

16 out? When I mentioned that the tape didn't go far

17 enough, we saw no fly-outs. If we could've seen fly-

18 outs and their general direction, that would have been

19 more helpful.

20 Also, what types of munitions flew out?

21 There were more than one bunker that blew up, 30-some.

22 So was it, what type of rocket flew out? We don't


1 know. Also, was that particular rocket that flew out,

2 how many of them were chemical, if any that flew that

3 distance.

4 So there were so many questions, so, so

5 many ambiguities, that we modeled data that we knew

6 was, was a real test with GB rounds that were of the

7 same type as the Iraqis.

8 MR. TURNER: On the other two sites that

9 you modeled, just quickly. If I understood correctly,

10 at Muhammadiyat, your modeling indicates that the

11 furthest southerly exposure was 300 kilometers?

12 Again, at this very trace level, which if my rough

13 math is right, is 186, 190, that kind of framework of

14 miles.

15 And at Al-Muthanna, it's 160 kilometers,

16 which is again about roughly 100 miles downwind.

17 If I understood again what you said

18 correctly, there is some greater level of uncertainty

19 about modeling at that great distance, of dispersal

20 and there are greater limitations when you're modeling

21 an event that large. Is that a fair summary, Mr.

22 McNally?


1 MR. MC NALLY: That, that's a very fair

2 assumption. One, one of the things that happens is

3 the models we're using to do this have a very large

4 validation experience, within essentially the first 20

5 to 30 kilometers downwind travel.

6 There is comparisons with these classes of

7 models for some of the biological tests that bring

8 those very low concentration levels out to hundreds of

9 kilometers, similar to what we're looking at here, but

10 the validation database is much, much smaller.

11 There are reasons to have some qualms

12 about exact predictions going out that length of time.

13 Some of them that are based on modeling methodology

14 itself, some of them based on the weather

15 representation itself.

16 Essentially what we did was we took an

17 atmospheric stability, or a measure of the turbulence

18 in the atmosphere that was very conservative for the

19 length of time that this would be traveling. For

20 instance, we didn't use the kind of turbulence that

21 would be associated with daylight, which would very

22 much shorten the curves. We kept the stability


1 category that would allow the, the hazard to go out as

2 far as we possibly could for the various wind speeds

3 that we were looking at.

4 We, we also, in this modeling, weren't

5 able to represent what would happen with rain

6 occurring during the transmit time. Rain would, would

7 take and collect the agent and bring it down to the

8 ground, therefore shortening the downwind distance

9 that it would go.

10 We know in several of the dates that we

11 were looking at that there was rain, later from the,

12 from the point, but again, we didn't represent that

13 forced shortening of the downwind distance.

14 We also didn't, didn't represent

15 essentially the scavaging from the ground that occurs

16 when an agent cloud will pass by. Some of the agent

17 will become entrained in the soil and we didn't reduce

18 the amount of agent by that.

19 So we took a series of assumptions in

20 implementing this modeling to try to be as

21 conservative in estimating the downwind extent as we

22 could possibly be with these tools.


1 MR. TURNER: And this is kind of my, the

2 final thing that I would like to ask. Based on that

3 conservative modeling, as to Muhammadiyat and Al-

4 Muthanna, the closest U.S. troops were 400 kilometers,

5 or thereabouts, away, and your assessment is that

6 agent would've only traveled with 60 miles, 100

7 kilometers of those troops, is that correct?

8 MS. COPELAND: That's correct.

9 MR. TURNER: But as to Kamisiyah, there's

10 a 25-kilometer downwind footprint.

11 MS. COPELAND: Right.

12 MR. TURNER: And it depends upon where the

13 troops were.

14 MS. COPELAND: Right. That's correct.

15 MR. TURNER: Is that correct?

16 MS. COPELAND: That's correct.

17 MS. COPELAND: Thank you.

18 DR. LASHOF: Thank you, Jim. Tom?

19 MAJOR CROSS: Yeah. Have you taken this

20 downwind footprint and put it on an overlay of known

21 troop locations to see where troops were?

22 MS. COPELAND: We've given to the DOD team


1 for them to do that.


3 DR. TAYLOR: Do we have that information

4 yet, or will DOD be able to address that?

5 DR. LASHOF: We'll be asking DOD that

6 question.

7 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

8 DR. LASHOF: Who will be following very

9 shortly. I guess the only other question, oh, go

10 ahead, John, I'm sorry.

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Just a brief question

12 on the assumption as to the 15-meter height, average

13 height of, of the cloud. That seems low to me. Can

14 you justify that?

15 MR. MC NALLY: Justify it basically two

16 ways. Going back to the M55 rocket tests, the U.S.

17 tests of similar rocket. They actually had a downwind

18 grid, a vertical grid to measure the central height of

19 the cloud. From that test, it looked like 15 meters

20 was the height of the cloud, mean height of the cloud

21 for all of those tests.

22 The higher the cloud goes, and the second


1 reason is, the higher the cloud goes, the lower the

2 ground contamination level. So by taking a

3 conservative low height of release, we were --

4 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: The, the lower the

5 contamination level, but the, the longer the

6 footprint, presumably.

7 MR. MC NALLY: Well, not necessarily. It

8 will get there quicker certainly because the wind

9 speeds at altitude are higher. But that doesn't

10 necessarily guaranty that the cloud, clouds go

11 further. In fact, we have looked in our, in our

12 modeling at not only the 15-meter heights that you saw

13 here, but we did 150 meters and 1,500 meters. And

14 what we found in the cases are that the levels were

15 lower for the higher altitude releases. And the

16 actual downwind hazard was the highest for the 15-

17 meter release.

18 DR. LASHOF: All right.

19 MAJOR KNOX: I'd like to ask, are you

20 going to be doing modeling on the new information that

21 UNSCOM gave us yesterday?

22 MS. COPELAND: On, on the munitions in, in


1 the bunker?

2 MAJOR KNOX: Right.

3 MS. COPELAND: Yes. If we get some more

4 information on how many and DOD is looking into that.

5 So when we get more information that we can actually

6 model, because it's, there's 300-and-some munitions

7 that are not accounted for. And so we like to have

8 some sort of handle on the amount to model. But when

9 we get that information, we will.

10 MAJOR KNOX: So at this time, we're, we

11 still have an incomplete report?

12 MS. COPELAND: We have a complete report

13 for now, but we may be adding to it.

14 MAJOR KNOX: Based on the data that you

15 have. You have a complete report.

16 MS. COPELAND: Yeah.

17 MAJOR KNOX: Okay.

18 DR. LASHOF: Which does bring me to the

19 final question, I think, I don't think there are

20 others.

21 This was a special task force set up to,

22 with this charge, to reinvestigate all this. What is


1 the life of the task force, I was under the impression

2 you were going to wrap it soon?

3 MS. COPELAND: Right.

4 DR. LASHOF: And wondering if you'll have

5 the time to do all of this?

6 MS. COPELAND: Well, we had two missions.

7 One, we had a special task force put together to

8 review all the intelligence documents and declassify

9 those documents which have pertinence to the issue.

10 That part of it we have wrapped up and we have closed

11 down the task force.

12 However, the analytic effort, the second

13 part, we are continuing and I will still be the focal

14 point on that, along with the analyst doing it. And

15 they weren't in the task force, they were doing their

16 work at their desk. And they will continue that part

17 as this information comes.

18 We will provide that final report, though,

19 as we have it now, to get that information out, and

20 then add to it as we get more information. As I said,

21 we'll continue looking at it as information becomes

22 available and continue to provide the information to


1 DOD and have the analysts available to do the work.

2 DR. LASHOF: Very good. Thank you very

3 much. Any more questions? Thank you again.

4 At this point, Mr. Brian Martin will come

5 forward and as I understand, you are formerly with the

6 37th Engineering Battalion and have the videotape that

7 we've just discussed a little bit and has been

8 verified to be a tape of our destroying the munitions

9 at 37th.

10 Mr. Martin.

11 MR. MARTIN: Thank you, members, is this

12 one.

13 DR. LASHOF: Should be. Go on, yeah, it's

14 on.

15 MR. MARTIN: Thank you, members of the

16 Committee for giving me the opportunity, opportunity

17 to tell you the whole truth and the real facts of what

18 really happened in March 1991 before, during, and

19 after the detonation and destruction of the Iraqi

20 bunkers at the Kamisiyah depot by the 37th Engineer

21 Battalion by someone who was actually there.

22 Before I begin my comments, I would like


1 to say, in the last few weeks, I have talked with the

2 battalion's former commander, the Battalion Command

3 Sergeant Major, and the Battalion former executive

4 officer, the three highest ranking members of our

5 battalion, to fine tune any facts that I needed for my

6 statement today.

7 Attachment A includes the battalion's

8 operation log from just before H hour to the

9 destruction of the bunkers. Nowhere in these logs

10 will you read in these logs that NBC precautions were

11 taken or chemical detectors were employed. Or for

12 that matter, notation for teams searching for

13 chemicals.

14 Attachment B is part of my personal diary

15 describing the events that took place from March 3rd,

16 1991 to March 8th, 1991. I am not here to embarrass

17 any government agency or department. I am here to set

18 a terribly distorted record straight.

19 My name is Brian Martin, I'm a 33-year-

20 old, I am 33 years old and permanently disabled by VA

21 standards. I was a soldier assigned to the 37th

22 Engineer Battalion at Fort Bragg from May 1988 to


1 December 1991.

2 In October 1990, our Battalion deployed to

3 Saudi Arabia. It returned April 7th, 1991.

4 I am also one of the essentials that moved

5 into northern Iraq during the cease fire to destroy

6 the ammunitions and bunkers near An Nasiriyah, known

7 as the Kamisiyah depot.

8 One more very important item I would like

9 to add for anyone questioning my knowledge of these

10 incidents and how I know what I know, is that I was

11 also the Battalion Commander's driver and aid during

12 Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, giving me

13 the security clearance to know what the Commander knew

14 at all times, ie: orders, missions, passwords,

15 frequencies, et cetera. We were together 24 hours a

16 day, 7 days a week.

17 On March 3rd, 1991, during the cease fire,

18 the Commander received orders to take an attachment of

19 12 Bravo combat engineers and other needed troops from

20 the battalion to the Kamisiyah depot and send the

21 nonessentials to the rear and Rafa. Approximately 150

22 soldiers entered the bunker area to place the


1 explosive and charges. Our battalion ran low on C-4

2 explosives to accomplish this mission, but thanks to

3 pure dumb luck, a tractor-trailer was nearby filled

4 with Russian C-3 explosives. We confiscated the C-3

5 and used it to destroy the 100 bunkers in the depot

6 and 43 warehouses nearby filled with ammunition.

7 Some members of the units returned to the

8 3-mile safe zones during the preparations of the

9 bunkers. Several member of our battalion entered the

10 bunkers with a video camera, taking turns filming

11 different things. We found Jordanian, Russian,

12 Italian, Netherlands, and more, but most surprising

13 was tons of American ammunition in these bunkers.

14 From 155 millimeter rounds to individually vacuum

15 packed shotgun shells made by Winchester.

16 To my knowledge, where I saw it, at no

17 time whatsoever were any of our M-8 chemical alarms

18 deployed for use to search for chemicals. There were

19 no chemical teams that searched the bunkers at any

20 time that we, before or after we exploded them. There

21 was never an order given or carried out to deploy our

22 alarms.


1 I have heard from a few other members of

2 the battalion who did hear an alarm go off and did go

3 to MOP 4 for just a few minutes, but again, they were

4 not in the same area of the 3-mile safe zone, as I

5 was.

6 There is, this is by no fault of the

7 commanders. He had no clue to the existence of

8 chemicals either. Our safety was first, foremost, and

9 always to him. Had we known, things would've been

10 much different then and today for many of us. This I

11 testify to you in good conscious about these facts.

12 This videotape has many surprising

13 important pieces to it. There are so many different

14 incidents that can dispute what the Assistant

15 Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. Steven

16 Joseph, who has briefed the press about most recently,

17 his sworn statement to Congressman Shay's Human

18 Resource Committee.

19 Upon reviewing this videotape, you will

20 see how large and how many bunkers there are. You

21 will see the American soldiers from the 37th Engineer

22 Battalion entered, on top of, around, and inside a few


1 of these bunkers. You will see all the different

2 types of ammunition that we saw and how many different

3 countries had exported ammunition to Iraq, to include

4 the United States.

5 You will see some of the Russian C-3 and

6 our C-4 used to detonate the bunkers. You will see

7 the way we moved back three miles in anticipation of

8 the explosion. You will see the actual explosion and

9 then witness the rockets and live rounds raining down

10 on us from the explosions.

11 You will also see soldiers jumping and

12 running for cover when we began getting rained on by

13 the ammunition from the bunkers. You will hear near

14 the end of the tape, Charlie Company's Commander tell

15 his first sergeant and one of the platoon leaders,

16 this never happened, we're at peace, we're not even

17 here.

18 You can also see the large black and gray

19 clouds blowing over our heads, covering the sky in

20 this videotape. The one bunker that the Air Force,

21 you will also see the one bunker that the Air Force

22 did hit from the air, only caved in the roof, not


1 destroying the ammunition inside.

2 What you won't see in this tape, is not

3 one soldier was carrying a chemical alarm, much less

4 an M256 kit when entering the bunkers. You won't see

5 any chemical teams of any nature searching the bunkers

6 or looking for chemicals. You won't see at any time

7 that any of us have on our chemical gear, MOP 4 level.

8 You will not see a clear blue sky 20

9 minutes into the detonation because of the clouds of

10 smoke raising into the air over our heads. At that

11 point, the Lieutenant that's holding the camera, he

12 even makes the comment, the wind is blowing the wrong

13 way, as it blows in a southwest direction towards us.

14 This videotape clearly shows the

15 destruction of 33 or so bunkers at one time. What was

16 supposed to be a simple one-day destruction mission

17 had turned into a lengthy task because of the hot

18 rounds flying up all over the area.

19 Members of the 307th 82nd Airborne was

20 about 10 miles away and reported incoming in their

21 area, causing them to move back from their mission at

22 Toleo Airfield. This is in the operation log that


1 I've included.

2 The Commander was in a helicopter overhead

3 looking for damage assessment when we ourselves were

4 ordered back 10 miles after our battalion XO found a

5 safe area for us to move to.

6 Ladies and gentlemen, this turned into an

7 extremely dangerous mission. We chased hundreds of

8 Iraqis out of the bunkers to keep them from stealing

9 ammo to fight Saddam's Republican Guard, just minutes

10 before the detonation. PSYOPS was screaming from the

11 helicopter in Arabic, warning of the upcoming

12 explosions also.

13 I'd like to compare it throwing a lit

14 match into a box of Roman candles and bottle rockets.

15 It took five more days before it was safe enough for

16 our battalion to enter into the Kamisiyah depot again

17 to blow the remaining 70 or so bunkers.

18 Since I have returned Stateside after that

19 mission, I have long suffered from illnesses. Acute

20 or chronic, call it what you want. I still suffer and

21 still do today. Or I have suffered and still do

22 today. I was medically diagnosed by the Persian Gulf


1 Referral Center in Washington D.C. by Dr. Frances

2 Murphy in December of 1993 with multiple chemical

3 sensitivity; decreased uptake in the fusion of the

4 temple lobe with scarring due to chemical exposure;

5 inflammatory bowel disease with scarring of the colon

6 and stomach, also due to chemical exposure; Reiter's

7 syndrome; chronic fatigue syndrome, but yet I'm an

8 insomniac; and since that time, I have been diagnosed

9 with abnormal semen with high PH alkaline levels and

10 abnormally high platelets around my blood cells. I

11 have just recently begun testing for Lupus and they

12 think that I'm in the early stages of Alzheimer's. I

13 have a lower back condition now and will soon be

14 fitted for a hearing aid to use at night to drown out

15 the ringing in my ears from tinnitus.

16 I would like to add for the record that at

17 no time did anyone from the 37th Engineering Battalion

18 know what was in those bunkers. We were combat

19 engineers. I was just a motor transport operator, not

20 a chemical expert. We were good soldiers that went

21 into an area to do a mission that was ordered by pay-

22 grades higher than ours. We knew nothing and we are


1 innocent victims of circumstances.

2 In light of the surprisingly newfound

3 honesty from the Pentagon, my hope is that they will

4 also come forward, admitting the many other Desert

5 Storm veterans' experiences that may be attributing to

6 their's and their families health problems.

7 This was not the only area of bunkers in

8 the theater. The Pentagon has said that there was ten

9 more bunker areas. This is a gross underestimate of

10 the truth once again. There were hundreds of bunker

11 areas, both in Iraq and Kuwait. Ask any of us that

12 were there.

13 In conclusion, I would like to say the

14 Pentagon admitted that they new about this information

15 in October of '91. The United Nations told them of it

16 again in 1995. Since that time they have continuously

17 lied and denied the truth about our exposures and in

18 fact lied and denied about chemicals even being

19 present on the battlefield.

20 Now I ask all information be declassified

21 and brought to the table and those who have perjured

22 themselves and are responsible for hiding information


1 from you, me, the press, and the American people,

2 should be dealt with accordingly with the harshest

3 criminal punishment allowed by the laws of this land.

4 Too many Persian Gulf veterans have died

5 and are still dying. Too many family members are

6 suffering their own unrecognized hell and way too many

7 babies have been born deformed to take this evidence

8 in proof of a continuous cover-up by the DOD lightly.

9 All I ask is that for once, since we

10 Desert Storm veterans have come home, since any

11 veterans have come home, please do what's right by us.

12 Thank you.

13 DR. LASHOF: Do you want to show the

14 videotape at this point?

15 MR. MARTIN: Yes, ma'am. Right now what

16 you're seeing is just before the detonation, there's

17 a few of our vehicles, that's Charlie Company right

18 there. There's one of the lieutenants from the LE, or

19 light equipment platoon walking by. What you see on

20 top of the trucks are soldiers.

21 As soon as the detonation starts, I think

22 we have to go a little bit further, but as soon as the


1 detonation starts, you'll see a hand point into the

2 air and that's when the rockets started coming in on

3 us. You will see those, those little figures on top

4 of those trucks jumping down and running for cover.

5 I got to apologize for the quality of the

6 tape. The person that has the original, the only way

7 we were allowed to make a copy was to set up a camera

8 in front of the T.V.

9 At one point during the cook-offs,

10 Sergeant First Class Hollister, who was the operation

11 sergeant for Charlie Company, was sitting in his

12 humvee and a rocket came underneath his humvee, spun

13 around and shot back out across the canal, landing in

14 the bank of the canal and exploding.

15 Okay. There, he's pointing at a rocket.

16 If there was a much more clearer view, you'd see, you

17 can see dogs running, you would see a, an orange glare

18 shoot across the screen and that was a rocket that

19 shot right across the front of us.

20 These people will start, will start

21 running, I guaranty it.

22 There, you would've seen that if this was


1 a clear image, but there was a rocket shooting that

2 way up over our head.

3 You can see a man hunkered over in the

4 front of the vehicle to the left right there. Okay,

5 see him getting down from the truck? That's because

6 they're coming in on us. They're coming behind us,

7 they're coming under our vehicles, they're landing in

8 front of us. They're shooting in front of us, they're

9 shooting to the right side and to the left side of us.

10 That was when Major Randy Reggins, the

11 Battalion Executive Officer, him and his driver,

12 decided to go look for a safe area for us to go to

13 because the Commander was in a helicopter flying

14 overhead.

15 You won't see anybody in MOP 4, you won't

16 see any, any chemical precautions whatsoever. There's

17 a few running to their truck.

18 I personally climbed under my own, my own

19 humvee. I was reading a letter that my wife wrote me

20 and when the rounds started coming in, I climbed

21 underneath my humvee.

22 If we watched this whole videotape, those


1 clouds right there that you see will come over the top

2 of us. And if the battery wouldn't have gone dead,

3 you would've seen that the whole area that we were in

4 was engulfed in smoke.

5 DR. TAYLOR: The winds there again, Brian,

6 are which direction? Southwest did you say?

7 MR. MARTIN: Yeah. Southwest. We came

8 into this area from the south. We moved back to the

9 south.

10 Now, this is actual footage, this is not

11 a model. This is not a, this is not a project by a,

12 by a government entity. This is live footage from the

13 cease fire on March 4th, 1991. This is the truth

14 right here. Actual real evidence. That, that wind is

15 not blowing to the north.

16 We were spread out, oh, it's hard to say,

17 but the 150, there wasn't 3 or 400 of us up there in

18 this area at this time, there was only about 150 to

19 160 of us. And our vehicles, you can see how they

20 were spread out around the whole area.

21 To the left is when, to the left is where

22 most of the troops were engulfed by the smoke.


1 You can still see people hunkered down.

2 But we moved back, we moved back 12 miles. Because if

3 you look on, if you go to attachment A, page 4/5, down

4 in March '91, let's see, 041550, the fourth from the,

5 one, two, three, four, five from the bottom. It says

6 that we moved out of bivouac site due to the danger of

7 cook-offs.

8 On the next page, the second from the top,

9 discussion with the ASP was put on hold until the 82nd

10 Airborne Division clears area due to collateral

11 damage. They were in Toleo Airfield with a tox set-

12 up. They asked us to not detonate anymore until they

13 could get the hell out of the area because incoming

14 was coming in on them, 10 to 12 miles away.

15 And those are the operation logs from,

16 like I said, the time that started the ground war

17 until the end of the bunker detonations.

18 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Thank you very much.

19 Are there questions of Mr. Martin?

20 DR. TAYLOR: The others that served with

21 you in your battalion, how many of them have come down

22 with illnesses similar to what you're experiencing?


1 MR. MARTIN: The Battalion Commander

2 himself is experiencing lung difficulties, he has to

3 breath with an inhaler now. There's Sergeant Tullius

4 and another sergeant down in Texas who bleed from the,

5 from the, I don't know if, I don't want to embarrass

6 them, but they bleed from the penis and the rectum.

7 They are very ill.

8 There's, the individuals that I have

9 talked to since the, the June 21st press release have

10 had a lot of problems. I mean, it's well documented

11 that they were receiving disability also.

12 And, no, I have chemical injuries. But

13 they're not compensable under the VA standards because

14 there's no diagnostic codes for chemical injury. And,

15 you know, I don't think I would have these diagnosis,

16 diagnoses if it wasn't for some sort of chemical

17 exposure.

18 I have testified in front of congressional

19 committee and senate committees, house committees,

20 NIH, everyone of my testimonies, if anybody wanted to

21 go back through them. I say when I was in the Gulf I

22 was sick, I showed, I had the runny eyes, the burning


1 eyes, the runny nose, the diarrhea, the stomach

2 problems. I came home with those problems. On April

3 8th I was rushed to Wilmette Community Hospital on

4 Fort Bragg with two I.V.s in my arms. This was a

5 every-day occurrence. Every time I would try to do a

6 company run for PT, I was constantly being taken to

7 the hospital. And all they could tell me was I had

8 some sort of stomach viral infection that they knew

9 nothing about. And that's when I decided it's time

10 for me to get out of the Army.

11 DR. TAYLOR: You also mentioned that there

12 were, there was a troop 12 miles away from where you

13 were, do you know or are you aware of any other troops

14 nearby?

15 MR. MARTIN: Well, I've been trying to

16 find out before this hearing. I was trying to find

17 out as many units in the area as I can. I know that

18 the 307th was there, from the 82nd, and I know that

19 there was a transportation unit, the 6-something, I

20 just don't remember all of it.

21 Mr. Albruck yesterday, his, his account of

22 what happened wasn't quite accurate. There was, there


1 was no trailers brought in of explosives and he was

2 clear out of the area during the detonation. Him and

3 a few people came in to shoo the Shiites out of the

4 area before we came in. So I don't know if Troy

5 Albruck was still there or not. I just know that by

6 the time we got there, his nine-man unit was way gone.

7 MS. NISHIMI: That's something that staff

8 was looking for.

9 Brian, if I could, I just, I believe you

10 said that there were no detectors used during the pre-

11 demolition and, and during the demolition, is that

12 correct?

13 MR. MARTIN: Yes, ma'am.

14 MS. NISHIMI: Then can you comment on

15 DOD's assertion that in fact during the demolition,

16 alarms, detectors were used and that in fact, on one

17 occasion alarm went off but then was judged to be

18 false because it wasn't confirmed?

19 MR. MARTIN: My personal opinion of why

20 they said that or what I know about the actual war?

21 MS. NISHIMI: What, just comment on that.

22 MR. MARTIN: I, I don't know. I, there


1 was none.

2 MS. NISHIMI: Could there have been

3 detectors used and not to your knowledge, by other

4 units?

5 MR. MARTIN: We didn't use any of them,

6 even during the ground war. It went so fast that we

7 never pulled out an MA chemical alarm. Not at all.

8 And then when we were set up there, Sergeant Tullius

9 down in Texas, he told me personally that when he was

10 about a mile and-a-half away, driving to the 3-mile

11 zone, he held a MA chemical detector out the window,

12 out of the window, and it started sounding, and he put

13 his mask on. He said but as soon as he got to the 3-

14 mile zone and saw that nobody else had it on, he took

15 it off. Now, that was his word, I don't know, I have

16 no knowledge of that. If anybody heard an alarm, I

17 didn't. And I was right there in the middle of

18 everything. So, you know, I don't know why they would

19 say that. I have no clue. Because it didn't happen.

20 In the videotape, you will see a few

21 bunkers that we went into. The reason that we did not

22 go in to all 100 bunkers is because most of them had


1 live mines in the doorways. And we just wasn't even

2 going to deal with just blowing those to go in the

3 bunkers, we decided to blow them all and not even go

4 through that many of them. I mean, we got a pretty

5 good assessment of what was in them from the few that

6 we went through.

7 And so therefore, no chemical teams went

8 through there. There was no chemical teams attached

9 to us. There was two men from EOD that didn't even

10 look like soldiers, they had their shirts unbuttoned,

11 their shirts were untucked. They came driving through

12 in a Chevy pick-up truck, and they looked around, came

13 back to the Commander, and said blow it. I mean, that

14 was it. That was the extent of any kind of

15 precautions that was taken.

16 DR. LASHOF: Pardon me. When you said you

17 became ill while you were in the Gulf.

18 MR. MARTIN: Yes, ma'am.

19 DR. LASHOF: When did, how long after the

20 episode and did you have any acute symptoms while you

21 were watching?

22 MR. MARTIN: Ma'am, I'm on record as


1 saying that I got sick after I started taking the

2 pills. I started having a lot of problems after I

3 started taking the pill.

4 I'm not saying that I was, that these

5 clouds made me ill. I'm not saying that by far. The

6 whole six months was a bad idea. I mean, everything

7 was wrong about that deployment. The diesel fuel in

8 our kerosene heaters because there was no kerosene.

9 I mean, the whole thing was just, was just backwards.

10 And, you know, it could've added on to it.

11 I don't know. I don't know. I'm not a medical person

12 so I can't tell. I just know that I was sick after I

13 started taking those pills. I remain sick through

14 this mission right here and then when I came home I

15 was still sick. And in 1993 when Dr. Murphy examined

16 me, this is what, this is her diagnosis of my

17 conditions.

18 DR. LASHOF: Okay. But at the actual time

19 of the fumes and the blowing up of the bunker, you had

20 no specific, no acute symptoms at that moment?

21 MR. MARTIN: Just, no, not that I can

22 think of.


1 DR. LASHOF: Okay.

2 MR. MARTIN: No, honestly I don't.

3 DR. LASHOF: Do you know whether any of

4 the group, of your group of the troops that were

5 there, did any of them complain of very acute

6 symptoms? Immediate symptoms.

7 MR. MARTIN: There was some slight

8 vomiting going on, but we didn't know if it was

9 because it was, you know, the nasty food, or, you

10 know, the area was just filthy. Our biggest danger at

11 that time that we thought was the animals. Because

12 they were trying to attack us, they were so hungry.

13 And I thought my first casualty is going to be a dog

14 or something.

15 And, so I, you know, I don't know. There

16 was a few people that were getting sick, but right now

17 at that point we were doing different things. You

18 know, some were eating, some were doing this or

19 whatever, until our attention was gotten by the cook-

20 offs.

21 DR. LASHOF: All right. Thank you.

22 MR. TURNER: If I could just do two kind


1 of housekeeping things. Where did you get the

2 videotape?

3 MR. MARTIN: I, I got it from the

4 battalion. There was several of us that held the

5 camera making the tapes. The one with the original,

6 Captain Huber, he was the Company Commander for

7 Charlie Company. The only reason that quality is that

8 poor is he was scared to death that something would

9 happen to that tape because he was trying to make a

10 history for the battalion, of what, what we did.

11 MR. TURNER: So it's Captain Huber's?

12 MR. MARTIN: Well, it's Major Huber now,

13 he is an instructor at West Point, soon to be at

14 Leavenworth.

15 MR. TURNER: And you made reference to two

16 documents that you attached to your statement that

17 related to cook-offs and a log. Where, where did you

18 get those from?

19 MR. MARTIN: I got these from the

20 Battalion Executive Officer, Major Randy Reggins, who

21 now resides in Phoenix, Arizona, he's retired. There

22 was supposed to be a statement attached to it saying


1 that, you know, yeah, though I was not in the chain of

2 command, I was in the circle of command and knew what

3 was going on at all times. He just didn't get it to

4 me in time.

5 But he did get me these logs, he faxed me

6 these. You can see the date on it. And the Kinkos in

7 Mesa, Arizona where he faxed them to me from.

8 DR. LASHOF: John?

9 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Your report seems

10 inconsistent with the CIA modeling in two crucial

11 respects. One, the direction of the wind and the

12 other is the apparent height of the plume. Can I ask

13 Rich, if he's still here in the back, to comment on

14 that? Because you claimed, in fact, your modeling was

15 consistent with the video.

16 DR. LASHOF: Richard, if you could come

17 forward, I think we'd like to clarify the differences.

18 MR. MC NALLY: Well, I'm not quite sure

19 about the inconsistency with the height of the clouds.

20 But I can talk about the wind direction.

21 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It looks a lot higher

22 than 15 meters to me.


1 MR. MC NALLY: Oh, absolutely. And that's

2 what we said. We said the cloud went all the way up

3 to 800, 1,200 meters.


5 MR. MC NALLY: We used the 15-meter height

6 because that was the worse case height for ground

7 contamination pattern. And was the same for that

8 case. We looked at 150 meters and 1,500 meter heights

9 of cloud, mean cloud height. So we covered that

10 entire period.

11 From the weather, from modeling of cloud

12 rods, we know that that cloud probably rose to the top

13 of the convective boundary layer, which on that day

14 was between 800 and 1,200 meters. So that's how we

15 understand the height of the cloud to be. And from

16 our ability to extract metrics from the video, it

17 looks to us as if the cloud gets to 800 to 1,200

18 meters by the 30-minute point. Which again is

19 consistent with what we know from modeling and from

20 the physics.

21 Wind direction, our examination of that

22 video is consistent with winds blowing to the


1 northwest with, excuse me, blowing to the northeast to

2 east, with camera position northeast of the location

3 of the bunkers. And based on sun angles, very

4 detailed analysis of the video, we believe that that's

5 what we see in the video.

6 DR. CAPLAN: What about the rounds landing

7 10 miles away?

8 MR. MC NALLY: Even in the portrayal of

9 the video today, I didn't see missiles flying off. It

10 is entirely possible, these rockets have a range of 18

11 kilometers. It depends on exactly what their angle is

12 when the rocket motor gets ignited and it very, is

13 possible that there could be an explosion which tilts

14 it up and goes out.

15 What we know from the detailed

16 examinations of the M55s, the U.S. trials, the

17 furthest that the rockets went were two kilometers.

18 In the modeling, one of the things that we

19 did do was look at what would happen if we increased

20 the radius at which the rockets could fly out. What

21 we found out was if we increased that radius beyond

22 two kilometers, that solid pattern that we see with


1 few perturbations starts to have separate individual

2 rocket footprints that show up and that central area

3 starts to shrink.

4 So for the central area of hazard, we

5 chose, we chose that in addition to that being the

6 maximal range observed in the M55 trials, where 1,850

7 rockets were set off.

8 DR. CAPLAN: But it's consistent that a

9 rocket could have had that --

10 MR. MC NALLY: It is entirely possible

11 that it could have been a rocket or it could have been

12 some other piece of ordinance that was ejected. We

13 can't, I wouldn't begin to argue that it didn't happen

14 and things weren't flying out. I just don't know what

15 it was and I don't know what the pattern was. It is

16 possible and we have modeled individual rocket

17 footprints and certainly if we knew where the impact

18 pattern was of those rockets, we could add to our

19 current footprint with the rocket patterns for the

20 individual rockets. Which are, which are much smaller

21 than the hazards from the bunker and the 106 rockets

22 that we did let fly out. Essentially the level to the


1 general population limit that we see for an individual

2 rocket is, in on the order of, just under a kilometer

3 and-a-half.

4 DR. TAYLOR: How is your modeling

5 conducted? Because oftentimes in a workplace setting,

6 we do modeling versus the actual workplace on looking

7 at hazards and how they're dispersed or how employees

8 are exposed. It's a lot different from being in the,

9 in a sort of, a modeled environment that's more

10 controlled.

11 So can you explain the difference in your

12 modeling versus what, he has actually on videotape?

13 I'm just curious, how is your modeling done? Is it in

14 the lab?

15 MR. MC NALLY: Well, we do our computer

16 modeling.

17 DR. TAYLOR: It's computer modeling.

18 MR. MC NALLY: On, on computers. We use

19 essentially several different models. We use a model

20 called Omega, which was developed for Defense Nuclear

21 Agency to do wind field projections, that ingest the

22 global optimization, interpellation, gridded data,


1 produced by the National Center for Atmospheric

2 Research, as well as the local observations from all

3 the reporting stations.

4 DR. TAYLOR: What is accuracy, is there

5 any comparison on how accurate your modeling is to the

6 actual setting? Or do you know if there is a 50

7 percent accuracy, 60 percent, 70 percent?

8 MR. MC NALLY: We're, we're in the

9 processing of validating.

10 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

11 MR. MC NALLY: Okay? Results today show

12 us that, in validating a weather model is a very

13 interesting phenomena. I won't go into all the

14 details, but essentially one of the key things, the

15 two key techniques that we use. One is comparing to

16 known situations, for instance, a tracer release

17 somewhere on a particular day.

18 And the other thing that we do oftentimes,

19 is run continuously predictions at a site, for which

20 there are observations coming in.

21 We are doing both with the atmospheric

22 modeling. What we found in our site trials, both in


1 Florida and White Sands, New Mexico, is we have very

2 good ability to predict wind directions.

3 DR. TAYLOR: What's that? What's the --

4 MR. MC NALLY: We are within the standard

5 deviation of the variation of the wind directions that

6 we'd expect in a situation. The wind is always,

7 always changing with time. And essentially one of the

8 standard measures that I often quote is in some

9 detailed analysis of wind variation at Porten Down in

10 the United Kingdom, where a lot of chemical tests are

11 done, is they've found that you reach standard

12 deviation in measuring the wind direction, if you

13 measure simultaneously 50 meters apart, or at the same

14 location 15 seconds apart.

15 So while the wind is varying a lot,

16 there's normally an average direction that the wind

17 keeps varying around. And it's the kind of thing that

18 you'll see if you look at a flag on a flagpole, for

19 instance. It will rotate around a little but during

20 time and you can actually take statistics of that

21 variation.

22 So when we go and look at our predictions


1 at a particular place and time, we look to see whether

2 or not we are predicting within, within that kind of

3 variation, is one of the measures of the accuracy.

4 And we've been able to do that on a

5 repeated basis. Both in time duration changes and in

6 different tests.

7 We predicted the transport in Florida of

8 tracer release on Orlando and in the summertime where

9 there was land/sea breeze changes and a big vertical

10 movement in the atmosphere, to within one kilometer at

11 20, 20 miles off shore. Which was released in

12 Orlando. So that was where we ended our tracking and

13 that was the largest area, error that we had in that

14 particular case.

15 MR. TURNER: But so, so the Committee

16 understands, this is not the kind of a model that is

17 statistically validated, where you can say to a 99

18 percent degree statistically rigorous. This is

19 probablistically born out. This is the state of the

20 art, but it is not that kind of a probablistic, yes,

21 we can say to a 99.9 percent level of certainty that

22 this is what happened. It's not that kind of model,


1 is it?

2 MR. MC NALLY: That's correct. Okay. The

3 other, the other recent, we have been using Omega to

4 predict the wind fields for the dipole orbit tests

5 conducted out at White Sands by DNA. These are tests

6 of different ways to impact bunkers. And looking at

7 the release from a collateral effects problem.

8 They've been concentrating on biological stimulants.

9 Essentially in those tests, where a number

10 of different models were used, the Omega results are

11 the only ones that track cloud off, off, off of White

12 Sands.

13 MR. MARTIN: Can I, can I ask him a

14 question real fast?

15 DR. LASHOF: Sure.

16 MR. MARTIN: Where were you March 4th,

17 1991?

18 MR. MC NALLY: March 4th, 1991, I was in

19 the basement of a defense nuclear agency doing clean

20 up on the --

21 MR. MARTIN: I was standing there watching

22 the clouds come over my head. I don't know what you


1 were doing in Florida and all that, but I was there.

2 I watched it.

3 MR. MC NALLY: Defense Nuclear Agency

4 isn't in Florida, sir.

5 MR. MARTIN: I lived through it.

6 DR. LASHOF: Let us agree that you

7 disagree somewhat on the wind direction at this point

8 and what the videotape, your interpretation of the

9 wind in the videotape and your interpretation of the

10 wind in the videotape.

11 The difference between the two of you on

12 the wind direction, how significant is that in

13 relation to what number of troops or what the

14 footprint would've been?

15 MR. MC NALLY: Well, I, the footprint is

16 going to go with the wind direction.

17 DR. LASHOF: Right.

18 MR. MC NALLY: I can't assess, I don't

19 know where the troops were. Obviously, if it were

20 true that the, that the ground level cloud was passing

21 over Mr. Martin's position, then he would be in the

22 likely hazard zone for that particular release.


1 MS. NISHIMI: Let me just clarify, the

2 footprint that was 25 kilometers, correct?

3 MR. MC NALLY: That's correct.

4 MS. NISHIMI: Is that 25 kilometers

5 around?

6 MR. MC NALLY: No. It was very

7 asymmetric.

8 MS. NISHIMI: It was asymmetric.

9 MR. MC NALLY: It was 25 kilometers

10 downwind.

11 MS. NISHIMI: What was the narrowest

12 distance?

13 MR. MC NALLY: It was roughly 4

14 kilometers.

15 MS. NISHIMI: 4 kilometers?

16 MR. MC NALLY: 4 to 6 kilometers wide at

17 its widest point.

18 DR. LASHOF: The issue of the quality of

19 this video, Brian, you indicated that it's not

20 completely clear and certainly for my eyes, I wouldn't

21 be able to tell much about directions and so on from

22 it.


1 Is the original a clearer one and --

2 MR. MARTIN: Ma'am, if I can find Major

3 Huber before the DOD does, I will get you a crystal

4 clear copy.

5 DR. LASHOF: No, what I want to know is,

6 the DOD, has DOD been in touch with him and seen the

7 original tape, do you know?

8 MS. NISHIMI: Well, that's a question that

9 we should ask DOD, not Mr. Martin or Mr. McNally.

10 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. Okay. We will be

11 asking DOD what efforts they've made to see the

12 original tape.

13 Are there any other questions? None.

14 Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Martin.

15 MR. MARTIN: Ma'am, I'd like to say one

16 thing, as a doctor yourself, the Pentagon knew about

17 this in 1991, if they would be in this condition now?

18 Would my family be hurting like this?

19 DR. LASHOF: I can't answer that, I

20 haven't examined you.

21 MR. MARTIN: Okay.

22 DR. LASHOF: We are not going in to the


1 personal medical records, that's a privacy issue

2 between you and your physician.

3 MR. MARTIN: I don't understand why they

4 let a human being suffer for this long if they knew

5 the truth. Thank you.

6 DR. LASHOF: Colonel Koenigsburg, Lt. Col.

7 Martin, welcome back. Glad to have you here again.


9 Koenigsburg, I'm the Director of the Persian Gulf

10 Illness Investigation Team for the Department of

11 Defense. Is that coming through?

12 DR. LASHOF: It doesn't seem to be. Bring

13 it closer to you. Can you bring his mic up? Okay.

14 We'd like you to summarize in five

15 minutes. We've got lots of questions for you.

16 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: We turned in a

17 report to you that was written and you asked that we

18 summarize this and that's what we intend to do.

19 The international community, through the

20 United Nations, has established protocol for

21 determination of chemical weapons used. These

22 criteria contain a detailed written record of the


1 conditions at this site, physical evidence from this

2 site, such as weapon fragments, soil, water,

3 vegetation, or human/animal tissue samples. A record

4 of the chain of custody during transportation of

5 evidence and multiple analysis to include examination

6 of neutral third parties.

7 Our approach to examining the chemical

8 agent detections reported during the war basically

9 followed the same process. We have found no evidence

10 that would allow us to assess the validity of any of

11 the reported detections. That is not to say the

12 detections are not valid. It's just simply to say

13 that we've not been able to find corroborating

14 evidence such as physical samples.

15 Lt. Col. Martin will address several

16 specific aspects that you requested.

17 LT. COL. MARTIN: Your Committee has asked

18 that we provide our evaluation of reported chemical

19 agent detections by U.S. forces using the 256 kit and

20 our review of fox reconnaissance vehicle, chemical

21 agent rejections during the Gulf War.

22 The M256 kit is used primarily to identify


1 whether chemical agent is present, after a chemical

2 alarm is sounded or a chemical attack is suspected and

3 to determine the type of chemical agent present. It

4 is used after troops have already taken appropriate

5 protection measures by going to MOP4. The kit is used

6 by unit commanders to assist in determining whether

7 and when it's safe to use chemical protective posture.

8 Since there are a number of substances in

9 addition to chemical agents that can cause positive

10 responses, there is no way to determine the validity

11 of a particular M256 kit by itself. The kit creates

12 no permanent record and the only records available are

13 unit log entries resulting from reports of tests

14 performed.

15 The evaluation of reports, of individual

16 256 kits detections that we have carried out thus far,

17 there's been no physical evidence, no weapons

18 fragments, no sample tests, et cetera, that would

19 allow us to corroborate reported M256 kit detections.

20 We plan to look at the totality of

21 reported 256 kit results to see whether any patterns

22 emerge.


1 I will now discuss our review of fox

2 vehicle detections. Primary detection in the fox

3 vehicle is the MM1 mass spectrometer, which is unique

4 to the fox vehicle. It is designed to detect the

5 presence of liquid contamination on the ground. When

6 the MM1 detects contamination, it alerts the crew, and

7 if prompted, will provide a spectral analysis record

8 of the contamination, if enough of the contaminate is

9 present.

10 This record of tape can later be analyzed

11 by experts to validate the detection. Because the fox

12 vehicle was introduced to the services just prior to

13 the ground offensive, there were no standardized

14 procedures in place to allow for the chain of custody

15 and forwarding of the MM1 tapes produced by the fox

16 vehicle computer.

17 Consequently, even though several

18 witnesses have stated that tapes were generated after

19 a detection, only a relatively few tapes were actually

20 received for further analysis.

21 In 1993, at the request of the Office of

22 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, a panel of chemical


1 experts were convened, including participants from the

2 United States Army Chemical School, the Chemical and

3 Biological Defense Command, and other U.S. Army and

4 industry mass spectrometry experts to review the

5 surviving fox tapes.

6 The tapes were incomplete and the panel

7 was unable to perform a comprehensive evaluation. The

8 Board's findings were published in a memo to the

9 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staffs for Operations

10 and Plans. To quote the memo, "Based on this

11 evaluation, we cannot confirm any of the reported

12 chemical warfare agent detections from the information

13 supplied, nor can we deny with 100 percent certainty,

14 that chemical warfare agents was detected by the MM1.

15 We firmly believe that all the reported detections are

16 false alarms caused by interference from air

17 contaminations, from air contaminated by oil well

18 fires and burning vehicles instructors."

19 Since 1993, since the 1993 review, no new

20 MM1 tapes have been provided to CBD Com for analysis.

21 Most of the tapes originally sent lacked crucial

22 information, such as precise location, identification


1 of the crew and operator, vehicle, and vehicle

2 identification number, which would assist us in

3 matching a specific incident with a specific tape.

4 I would now like to report to you the

5 results of our investigation to this point of

6 Kamisiyah bunker demolition operations, where a

7 bunker, bunker number 73, containing chemical

8 munitions, was destroyed in early March of 1991.

9 Although Kamisiyah was never designated as

10 a chemical production or storage facility target by

11 coalition forces, a small number of bunkers were

12 destroyed during the air war, but not bunker 73. In

13 early March, 1991, after the Gulf War cease fire, the

14 37th Engineer Battalion, as well as the company from

15 the 307th Engineer Battalion, both supporting the 82nd

16 Airborne Division, moved in the vicinity of Kamisiyah

17 with a mission to destroy the bunkers and their

18 contents prior to moving back to Saudi Arabia for

19 redeployment.

20 Officers of the 37th Engineer Battalion

21 reported that there were approximately 150 troops

22 involved in the actual demolition. During the period


1 3-10 March 1991, a systematic destruction of the

2 Kamisiyah bunkers was conducted.

3 Explosive Ordinance Disposal, EOD unit

4 personnel supporting the, supported the engineers

5 during this operation. In interviews, the EOD

6 personnel stated that they were aware that they might

7 encounter chemical munitions in any of the demolition

8 missions and were looking for them. The EOD personnel

9 accompanying the engineer teams examining each bunker

10 prior to setting the demolition charges did not

11 identify any chemical munitions.

12 This does not preclude the possibility

13 that chemical munitions were present. Operational

14 records, intelligence information, personal interviews

15 indicate that about 3 p.m. on 4 March 1991,

16 approximately 38 bunkers were destroyed, one of which

17 was bunker 73, now identified as containing chemical

18 munitions.

19 According to the Company Commander, the

20 destruction of these 38 bunkers is the same explosion

21 portrayed in the videotape recently obtained from a

22 37th Engineer Battalion soldier. During the short


1 time portrayed on the videotape, the cloud appeared to

2 be traveling in an easterly or a northeasterly

3 direction, away from the troops observing the

4 explosion.

5 Personal log kept by one of the company

6 commanders, as well as interviews with several army

7 personnel involved in the mission, indicate that one

8 chemical agent alarm alerted some time during this

9 demolition process and the unit increased their MOP

10 level. None of the other MA alarms in the area

11 alerted. Subsequent 256 kit tests conducted by each

12 of the battalion subordinate units were negative for

13 chemical agents. The units subsequently went back to

14 MOP level 0.

15 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: We have no evidence

16 at this time of low level exposure to chemical agents.

17 The next step is to evaluate whether there is some

18 unique pattern of illness in the personnel located in

19 the area around Kamisiyah during the time this mission

20 was performed.

21 An initial review of medical reports and

22 interviews with medical officers responsible for the


1 care of troops in this area has revealed no immediate

2 health problems were associated with the mission.

3 To determine if service members in

4 proximity to the site have presented with long-term

5 clinical findings distinct from other Gulf War

6 veterans, a very preliminary examination of the

7 comprehensive clinical evaluation program results were

8 initiated. An initial review of the data by the CCP

9 staff does not show either a significantly increased

10 rate of those seeking evaluation through the CCP, or

11 significant difference in the symptoms for diagnosis

12 of these individuals when compared to the overall CCP

13 participants. Let me stress, these are initial

14 preliminary results.

15 The DOD will continue to refine troop

16 locations and examine the clinical data in more

17 detail. We are working with the Department of

18 Veteran's Affairs to obtain more comprehensive and

19 complete assessments of the clinical results in the

20 troops who were located in the area of the ammunition

21 storage site.

22 A program is also being initiated to


1 contact all personnel in this population to determine

2 their health status and to encourage participation in

3 the health assessment program of either the DOD or the

4 VA.

5 In addition, as was mentioned yesterday,

6 Dr. Josephs asked that $3-5 million of research money

7 is being allocated to further explore the possible

8 effects of low level chemical agent exposure.

9 That's our summary.

10 DR. LASHOF: Thank you very much. Are

11 there questions from the panel?

12 MS. NISHIMI: Maybe I can just start off

13 then. Colonel Koenigsburg, at the October 19, '95

14 meeting that the Committee had, we followed-up in

15 writing with you to ask you about some of the

16 incidents you had under investigation and in your

17 response to us, Kamisiyah was one of those incidents

18 that PGIT had started to investigate.

19 At that time, had PGIT interviewed any of

20 the parties who were involved?


22 MS. NISHIMI: When did PGIT first contact


1 the Commander of the, Mr. Martin's unit, Lt. Col.

2 Robert Holcombe?

3 LT. COL. MARTIN: That was a week ago.

4 MS. NISHIMI: So that would be after the

5 Pentagon held its press briefing.

6 Could you explain to me why this sort of

7 basic, it seems to me, investigatory thread,

8 interviewing the person in charge, wasn't conducted

9 until after the Pentagon's --

10 LT. COL. MARTIN: Well, we tried to get in

11 touch with him before the announcement, but had a lot

12 of difficulty finding him. He was in South America.

13 MS. NISHIMI: How, I mean, you tried to

14 get in touch with you before. But this was on your

15 radar screen in October 1995, why hadn't you begun

16 down that path back then?

17 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: In October '95 when

18 the CIA first alerted us to the fact that the U.N.

19 findings at Kamisiyah, there was a lot of question

20 about how, what the problem really was here. As you

21 heard from the U.N. and you heard from the CIA, most

22 of the initial reporting was that this was not, there


1 was not a lot of credence put in what the Iraqis were

2 saying.

3 So we opened a case file on this, we

4 discussed this with the people in CIA, we did go out

5 and find out from the ESG database what units were in

6 the general area and started to get some background

7 material for this.

8 We went to the Intel community, discussed

9 this rather thoroughly, not only with CIA, but within

10 the Department of Defense, and the feeling was that

11 unless there was more evidence, there sure, it did not

12 appear to be, a good legitimate reason to believe what

13 the Iraqis were saying.

14 MS. NISHIMI: But my interpretation --

15 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: It was not put on

16 the, it was not put on the front burner at that point.

17 It was, we had opened a case file, we did not know at

18 that time which unit had actually done the

19 destruction, we didn't know much of that until March.

20 In the March time frame, and I think Colonel Martin

21 can talk more to that.

22 DR. LASHOF: That's in '95 you're talking


1 about now.

2 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: '96. March of '96.

3 DR. LASHOF: '96. I'd like to go back to

4 '92. If UNSCOM said in '92 that it was, that there

5 were likely chemical weapons in the pit area and then

6 later in bunker 73, but in --

7 MS. NISHIMI: In '91.

8 DR. LASHOF: In '91 rather, and in '92

9 they both said that there were chemical weapons in

10 those areas and that was reported and it was on the

11 public record.

12 In view of everything that was happening,

13 you know the veterans and the complaints about low

14 level, why at that point weren't you alerted to go

15 back and look and try to figure out what had happened

16 when they had detonated bunker 73?

17 MS. NISHIMI: This is regardless of the

18 fact that you believed Iraq was lying or not. UNSCOM

19 said there were chemical munitions there.


21 that there were chemical weapons in the pit.

22 DR. LASHOF: Right.



2 determine that there were chemical weapons in the

3 bunker. And the statement at that time, I assume, and

4 obviously we weren't in existence at that time, but I

5 would assume that some of the thinking was along the

6 lines, that the Iraqis were saying that the bunker was

7 what destroyed by U.S. troops, not the pit. And that

8 still wasn't very clear until very recently that

9 maybe, you know, we did destroy some weapons in the

10 pit.

11 But as UNSCOM told you, the only thing

12 they said was we destroyed the bunker, they thought we

13 had maybe destroyed the bunker. When they came back

14 the bunker was destroyed. The chemical weapons were

15 not determined at that point to be in the bunker,

16 either in '91 or '92. So I don't think that it made

17 anybody alert too much.

18 Plus, in the fact of the '92/'92 time

19 frame, the emphasis as was mentioned by CIA, was on

20 finding weapons and had nothing to do with looking for

21 Gulf War illnesses at that point. It was all looking

22 for, are we able to find everything that they say that


1 they had.

2 DR. LASHOF: Yeah, that certainly was the

3 charge to CIA and would not have expected CIA to

4 worry. But by then I would have thought that DOD was

5 more alert to trying to figure out what chemical

6 weapons might have gone off unintentionally and so on.

7 I mean, we've all agreed that the Iraqis didn't use

8 chemical weapons, but, but that they had them, we all

9 knew and certainly knew then. And a question of low

10 level release.

11 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Right. And if you

12 look at the time frame of that, we also had reports

13 all through that period of time, that no one had been,

14 had shown any signs or symptoms of chemical exposure.

15 So there was nothing to really give them a hint at

16 that time. I would imagine, to go looking too deeply

17 into that particular report.

18 MS. NISHIMI: Who in October and November

19 in DOD knew about the possible chemical agents,

20 exposures, based on UNSCOM's --

21 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Our whole focus has

22 been to look for and see if we can help in some way to


1 find the causes of illness in these veterans. We have

2 not looked into who knew what, that is something that

3 is within the Department of Defense and it's something

4 that's not been within our task to look at.

5 MS. NISHIMI: Is the Department looking at

6 that question?


8 MS. NISHIMI: Would it be reasonable to

9 assume that the Defense Intelligence Agency knew of

10 this information?

11 MR. WALLNER: I think I can answer that

12 better than Colonel Koenigsburg. I'm Paul Wallner,

13 Staff Director of the Senior Level Oversight Panel for

14 Dr. White.

15 Officials in DIA and the Atomic Energy

16 Directorate of the Department of Defense were aware of

17 the report as far back as '94, perhaps even earlier

18 than that. They were certainly aware of the report by

19 the time it was made public this past June.

20 Again, to reemphasize, in the early years,

21 there was only that one report and I must add

22 furthermore that the intelligence community did not


1 identify Kamisiyah as a suspected chemical target or

2 for bombing. It was not on any list.

3 MS. NISHIMI: So, no one in DOD knew that

4 UNSCOM reported both, not a single report, in 1991 and

5 in 1992, that they found chemical munitions at

6 Kamisiyah?

7 MR. WALLNER: We, we knew that they found

8 chemical weapons at Kamisiyah. Yes, that was known.

9 That report was known by those officials. But that

10 was not at the bunker. They didn't, as Colonel

11 Koenigsburg had said, they didn't identify the

12 chemical weapons at the bunker, confirm them, until

13 May of 1996.

14 MR. TURNER: There's a big difference

15 between confirming and identifying, Mr. Wallner.

16 MR. WALLNER: That's correct.

17 MR. TURNER: This is a February 19th, 1992

18 Royder's Newswire Report that I'm reading from.

19 MR. WALLNER: Um-hm.

20 MR. TURNER: "U.N. officials in Bahrain

21 said the chemical destruction team would visit a

22 damaged bunker used to store rockets filled with the


1 nerve agent sarin at Kamisiyah."

2 Now that is in February of 1992, Royder's

3 is publishing this fact. And you're saying the DIA

4 didn't know it?

5 MR. WALLNER: DI, DIA did know the report,

6 they didn't have confirmation thereof. They were

7 aware of the UNSCOM report, they were probably aware

8 of the Royder's report.

9 MR. TURNER: Did they do anything to

10 investigate it? To pursue it further?

11 MR. WALLNER: They did not do anything at

12 that point in time to refer to it because it was not

13 on the target list, there was no other reporting

14 suggesting that Kamisiyah was a chemical weapons

15 facility at that time.

16 DR. TAYLOR: But given the information you

17 had, you just think that because you didn't have

18 anything to confirm, that there were any reports of

19 chemical weapons in the bunker?

20 MR. WALLNER: That's right.

21 DR. TAYLOR: And that you didn't

22 investigate further. Period.


1 MR. WALLNER: We didn't investigate

2 further. And because of the long history of the

3 Iraqis using deception to hide what they were really

4 doing with their weapons to mask destruction from not

5 only the United States, but the U.N. as well.

6 DR. TAYLOR: But you knew that they were

7 in the pit?

8 MR. WALLNER: Pardon me?

9 DR. TAYLOR: You knew that they were

10 reported in the pit?

11 MR. WALLNER: That's right. They were

12 confirmed to be in the pit and that was substantiated

13 by the U.N. We had no reason to disbelieve that.

14 DR. LASHOF: Oh, Art.

15 DR. CAPLAN: One of the things that's come

16 up is the claim that we're focusing here on this

17 bunker, and what was there and who knew when to try

18 and investigate it, but it's also been said that there

19 were many, many other bunkers all around. Do we have

20 any reason to think that there may have been other

21 storage areas not on lists or anywhere else that could

22 have been destroyed or cleaned up by our troops that


1 we haven't heard about yet? I mean, Mr. Martin said

2 that he thought there were hundreds of smaller storage

3 places and facilities. Any comment on what else might

4 have been there that we might now know about?

5 LT. COL. MARTIN: There could have

6 possibly been hundreds of isolated bunkers throughout.

7 We know of, I'm aware of four large ammunition

8 complexes. One in Kuwait and three in Iraq in the

9 same vicinity of Kamisiyah. And as far as we know, we

10 have no evidence that there was any chemical munitions

11 in those large ammunition complexes. Or we haven't

12 heard of anything in an isolated bunker.

13 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think one of the

14 keys to this is yes, there were bunkers out there.

15 When they went through, they found bunkers, a lot of

16 them were exploded, nothing was ever done to check and

17 see what was in the bunkers at the time when they were

18 exploded. And there would be no way to go back, they

19 were on the run. What we've heard is, is that a lot

20 of times, they'd go by a bunker, somebody would say

21 that's it, the commander would say blow that thing up,

22 they'd blow it and keep on going. And that's the


1 extent of it.

2 DR. CAPLAN: Do we have any intelligence

3 basis to know about storage deployment? You know, we

4 heard earlier that special groups would come down to

5 man chemical weapons. Were they deployed, do we know?

6 From the Iraqi side, aside from what they tell us or

7 say? Do we know that some of the units were out in

8 the field?

9 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: They never, they've

10 never found any, either U.N. or anybody has ever found

11 anything to confirm that those rockets ever got any

12 further than these storage depots, during the time

13 that we were there. There was some deployment before,

14 I think was mentioned by CIA, there was indications

15 that they might have been deployed and pulled back,

16 but nobody's ever seen a chemical mine, chemical

17 weapon, outside of these particular bunkers.

18 And as far as the CIA has said, as they

19 told you, there were only a couple of them that they

20 can confirm where there chemical weapons in it.

21 Now, there were a lot of these, the

22 bunkers and other places that were found in Kuwait


1 were not even destroyed by our troops. They were

2 destroyed by a private company that was called in

3 after the war to destroy them. And we've spoken to

4 the people that were part of that demolition process

5 and they say that they never found anything in the,

6 the weapons that they destroyed in Kuwait that would

7 indicate to them that there were chemicals, mines,

8 rockets, bombs, anything.

9 So, you know, it's a question, we don't

10 have an answer. Could there have been something out

11 there? If you look at the way they deployed these

12 things, they were very specific with them and I think,

13 you know, what the CIA told you this morning is

14 exactly what our knowledge of it has been. Is they

15 had a team that took those munitions. And actually to

16 go even one step further, they were probably the ones

17 that shot it off. The people who normally would work

18 the rocket launchers would step back, these people

19 would arm the weapon, shoot it off, and then go back

20 to where they were.

21 So they, even though they didn't mark

22 them, they had a pretty good idea where all their


1 chemical weapons were. They had a good system for

2 them.

3 DR. LARSON: So you now had an opportunity

4 to speak with, is it Major Reggins?


6 DR. LARSON: Okay. And also, did you

7 speak with CSM David Andrews?


9 DR. LARSON: And with Lt. Col. Commander

10 Holgrum? And have you spoken with Mr. Martin?


12 DR. LARSON: And you've had opportunity to

13 review a good, the videotape?


15 DR. TAYLOR: I think there's some

16 confusion with Jimmy Martin and the other Martin.

17 DR. LASHOF: You mean Brian Martin.

18 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: We know who she's

19 talking about.

20 DR. TAYLOR: Okay. So you have spoken

21 with him?

22 DR. LARSON: Yeah, Mr. Martin.


1 MR. MARTIN: Ma'am, if I can say, Jimmy

2 Martin approached me at SHAYS hearings in civilian

3 clothes and asked me for the videotape. I requested

4 that Colonel Koenigsburg file a FOYA with me for the

5 videotape. At the time of the FOYA request, I

6 couldn't find it, it was in my mother's, I had forgot

7 it was in her security box in the bank.

8 But Jimmy Martin has talked with me, but

9 not in depth about these bunkers or about that

10 videotape. There basically was, we want those tapes.

11 And, you know, maybe if they would've said please,

12 they would've got them, I don't know.

13 DR. LARSON: My question is, what is your

14 interpretation of those tapes and your interviews?

15 LT. COL. MARTIN: Do you have a specific

16 question about any part of it?

17 DR. LARSON: Well, for example, the wind?

18 And some of the things that we've heard that are

19 confusing.

20 LT. COL. MARTIN: I think if you closely

21 review the videotape, you can see that the shadows

22 that the people are casting as they're facing the


1 explosion, are falling to their front left. And it

2 happened at 2 in the afternoon; therefore they had to

3 have been standing north, northwest of the site.

4 We've confirmed that with several of the

5 company commanders who were there, who actually

6 pointed out on a map where their location was where

7 they observed the explosions. So that, that fact

8 we're pretty firm about.

9 DR. LARSON: Okay. And the other question

10 is, as I understood what you said, they, they were

11 informed that there was a possibility of chemical

12 agents there and, no? What did you say about the use

13 of protective gear?

14 LT. COL. MARTIN: The EOD personnel who

15 were there were aware that they could encounter

16 chemical munitions as they were going through because

17 --

18 DR. LARSON: I believe that's what you

19 said.

20 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Anywhere, anywhere.

21 It was not for this site.

22 DR. LARSON: Okay.


1 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: They were told that

2 there were no chemical weapons at that site, as

3 Mr. Martin has said.

4 DR. LARSON: Okay.

5 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: But they were told

6 that in all their destruction procedures, be careful,

7 because we don't know where chemical weapons are

8 located. So this was a general statement in terms of

9 being aware of it.

10 But every information that was given to

11 the troops and everything they knew, there was nothing

12 there.

13 MS. NISHIMI: Who told them that there

14 weren't any chemical weapons at the site?


16 intelligence assessment, I assume.

17 DR. TAYLOR: The other question I had was

18 about the M256 kits. You mentioned that they were

19 using those kits and there's a discrepancy here on

20 whether the kits were actually used at this particular

21 site or not.

22 LT. COL. MARTIN: When they moved back


1 after they set the charges and you saw, at the time of

2 the explosion in the videotape, all the company

3 commanders that we talked to said they basically moved

4 back in their area and got in a, they had different,

5 they occupied different sectors of a, like a circle.

6 And then each, each company commander said they had an

7 operational MA alarm mounted on their, their vehicles.

8 One of the company commander's alarms alerted at that

9 time. And they did a 256 kit, you know, they

10 increased their protective posture, did a 256 kit,

11 found out it was negative, and then reduced their

12 posture. That occurred, that occurred at the

13 observation site.

14 DR. TAYLOR: At the observation site?

15 LT. COL. MARTIN: Yes.

16 MR. TURNER: How far away was that?

17 LT. COL. MARTIN: Anywhere from 3 to 4

18 kilometers.

19 MR. TURNER: Thank you.

20 MAJOR CROSS: And which unit was that that

21 donned protective gear?

22 LT. COL. MARTIN: That was the elements


1 that were there with the 37th Engineers.

2 MS. NISHIMI: And how long between the

3 alarm going off and the confirmatory test?

4 LT. COL. MARTIN: It takes about 20

5 minutes to do the test.

6 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: They start the test

7 immediately, what he's saying is. But it takes time

8 to do it.

9 I think the thing we need to point out is,

10 we've talked to over 30 people that were there at that

11 site when this went off. Out of that group, about two

12 dozen confirmed the fact that an alarm did go off.

13 Some of them went into full MOP gear, some of them

14 said they got their masks on and started doing the 256

15 kits immediately. There were a number of 256 kits

16 done at that site because each platoon has their own

17 256 kits and they, everyone that we've talked to so

18 far says, that heard the alarm, said that somebody did

19 a 256 kit and that it came up negative and they went

20 back to their normal MOP status.

21 DR. CAPLAN: Just a point of information

22 on the videotape.



2 DR. CAPLAN: My guesstimate is we're

3 looking at, I don't know, 40 men maybe around 4 or 5

4 vehicles and so on and there's deployed out here about

5 150 total. So how far away are all these guys all

6 dressed up in MOP gear from the people we saw on the

7 tape who didn't have anything? I mean, I got this

8 impression of a bunch people in MOP gear two yards

9 away from 40 guys who aren't.

10 LT. COL. MARTIN: Since the videotape

11 didn't cover the entire time, it may not have occurred

12 at that point. I think if we were to see the whole

13 thing, we might have been able to.

14 DR. LASHOF: In terms of following up and

15 looking at the people that might've been in that area,

16 at our main meeting, you mentioned 3 to 4,000 troops

17 in that area.

18 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Depends how big a

19 circle that you draw around this. What we've tried to

20 do now, one of the big problems we have in finding out

21 who was actually there is that we know what units were

22 there, but we don't know which people were there. And


1 if you take the 37th as an example, the 37th may have

2 500, 600 people in it. They didn't take everyone up

3 to the site with them. And then when they got to the

4 site, even of the people they took up with them, we've

5 been told by the sergeant that a lot of these folks

6 were sent back because they were deemed not to be

7 necessary. They figured they've got, they're going to

8 be blowing up this dump, they don't want to have any

9 more people than they have to to be there. And so it

10 cut down to the 150.

11 Now, determining which 150 were really

12 there becomes a big problem. Because in like our

13 initial studies that we did with the CCP data, that

14 was a broad net coverage. I mean, we threw it out

15 over all of the 82nd Airborne, because they were all

16 over that area. We don't know which ones were close

17 enough to have really been involved in this. And it

18 presents a problem now. How do you go out and how far

19 do you go out to get the people?

20 I think the initial sweep that they're

21 trying to do right now is to take the 37th, the 307th,

22 the 2 EOD units that were up there. There's also a


1 fire unit, there's one firetruck that was with them,

2 that came from, from a, either a National Guard or a

3 Reserve unit. We're still trying to track these

4 people down. And there's about eight people in there.

5 If, if they can go out and cast the net to

6 all of the particular units that were right there at

7 the site and ask who was actually there at the time

8 the explosion occurred. Not when they did the initial

9 look-see at the site, when they first rolled in, but

10 who was there on the 4th of, when this occurred and on

11 the subsequent explosion, I guess, on the 10th, which

12 had nothing to do with this particular bunker, but

13 mainly it will be geared to the 4th.

14 And what they're hoping is that they can

15 get to these folks and say, all right, how many of you

16 are sick and if you are sick, have you been into, to

17 the CCP or the VA, and if you hadn't, here's a place

18 to call, here's how to get into it. And they would

19 like to put a few questions in there.

20 They've been trying to decide whether this

21 would be done telephonically or would it be done

22 through some type of communication, written


1 communication. I think the decision has been made to

2 go with a written communication.

3 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Thank you very much.

4 John?

5 MS. NISHIMI: Just, can I just follow-up

6 on the numbers thing, I'm sorry, John.

7 DR. LASHOF: Oh, sure. Go ahead.

8 MS. NISHIMI: It strikes me that the most

9 reasonable thing for DOD to do right now, or certainly

10 in the long run, is to address the issue of 3,000 to

11 4,000 troops, assume that you want to inform the

12 maximum number of people, who may have possible been

13 exposed.

14 And can you assure the members of this

15 Committee that in fact DOD intends to follow-up with

16 the 82nd Airborne and the largest number of

17 individuals?

18 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Well, I've told you

19 what they decided to do so far. I don't know whether

20 they have any other plans to go, through the net

21 further out. I think their initial look was to do

22 this. Because if, if these people were there, they


1 should be the ones that would be the most effected.

2 Some of this, some, a lot of the things in

3 this does not make a lot of sense. Because if you

4 talk about the wind direction coming back on the

5 troops, then they should've been in a circle, or zone,

6 where they would've been very sick. And yet they

7 weren't.

8 So if you look at this, where do you throw

9 the net? And if you look at the fact that the wind

10 could've gone in a bunch of different directions. I

11 think right now their thought was to hit these people

12 that were the closest to it and say, all right, we

13 need to look and see if there's a difference in these

14 people from everybody else in the Persian Gulf that,

15 that had illnesses. If it's the same illnesses then,

16 you know --

17 MS. NISHIMI: I understand that the

18 initial cast is properly smaller.


20 MS. NISHIMI: But it would seem to me that

21 it is a reasonable thing for the DOD to inform the

22 maximum number of individuals within the potential


1 footprint. And that would include the 3,000 to 4,000

2 individuals that Colonel Martin initially discussed at

3 our May meeting. And I would like some assurance that

4 DOD is going to consider that.

5 DR. LASHOF: How many are in the group

6 that you are setting --

7 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: There's probably

8 around 1,100 people. If you take, because we have to

9 go to the entire 307th and the 37th. Although they

10 may be able to cut some of this down because the

11 307th, as far as we know, there was only one company

12 that went, Alpha Company.

13 So what they may be able to do is cut out

14 some of the other 307th because they were not in that

15 area. So they may be able to get it down to a smaller

16 group than that 1,100.

17 DR. LASHOF: As far as you know, at the

18 time of the detonation, there were no reports of acute

19 illness among any of the group?

20 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: We, we looked at the

21 logs of the medical unit that covered these folks. We

22 also talked to the corpsmen that were taking care of


1 these people and we talked to the doctor that was

2 responsible for that area. We talked to the battalion

3 surgeon, the company surgeon, et cetera. They have

4 all assured us, and what we saw in the logs, which was

5 interesting looking at the logs, because prior to the

6 ground war there were a lot of people coming in the

7 clinic for things. Once the ground war started, the

8 number of visits to the clinic, everybody was too busy

9 to worry about coming in the clinic and there were

10 very few visits, it suddenly dropped off and what

11 you're talking about is anywhere from like five to

12 eight clinic visits a day of anybody going in there

13 and they were just for standard things, there was

14 nothing that even would be suspicious of chemical-type

15 problems.

16 If people had problems and didn't, did not

17 come to the clinic, then obviously there would be no

18 way that we'd know about it.

19 DR. LASHOF: Yeah, sure. But if there

20 were acute massive things, they would've been in.

21 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: One would assume.

22 DR. LASHOF: All right. Thanks. John?



2 responsibility, or the mission of the U.N. team to do

3 a, essentially an audit, isn't it? On all the

4 chemical agent that was produced?

5 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: That's correct.

6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: And then the number

7 of actual munitions that were filled and distributed.

8 Do you have any idea how, how that audit

9 is going? Does anyone have a fair sense of, of where

10 everything must have been? Or is it completely open-

11 ended at this point?

12 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think that the

13 comments that you got yesterday were extremely

14 interesting from the U.N. team. And I, I was very

15 interested in Igor Mitrohkin's assessment. But I

16 think his, to me, his closing comment in some of this

17 is that he's still not convinced, either about this

18 particular site or in general of what's going on.

19 There's, there's a lot, there's been a lot

20 of game-playing with this. And --

21 MS. NISHIMI: No, he didn't say he wasn't

22 convinced. He said he could not make an assessment


1 one way or the other.

2 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: No, he said, he made

3 a comment, I think you have to go back over your

4 thing, at least if I heard it correctly, there was one

5 short statement that he made that may have gone by, if

6 you, if we look at the transcript, maybe it will show

7 up there. But it was along the lines that he

8 personally it not totally convinced about what the

9 Iraqis are telling you on this particular site.

10 MS. NISHIMI: So then you're saying, you

11 still question whether or not that --

12 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: No. I'm not saying

13 that. We're just saying, I think DOD's position at

14 this point is that there is enough, there's enough

15 here to start taking action. And it isn't a matter,

16 we may never know 100 percent for sure what really

17 happened at this particular site.

18 But for the purposes of trying to get to

19 the bottom of it, the assumption has to be made that

20 we need to go into this further, we need to go ahead

21 and take a look at these individuals and see if there

22 is something we can show that's different about the


1 people who were located in this area and if we can tie

2 together anything that would show this could, that

3 their problems are coming from a low level chemical

4 exposure.

5 MS. NISHIMI: I'm sorry, but I find there

6 to be a huge difference between DOD assuming something

7 happened and DOD acknowledging that something

8 happened. So does DOD assume that there were chemical

9 munitions in bunker 73? Or do they acknowledge that

10 there were.

11 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think the only

12 thing we can acknowledge at this point is that there

13 were weapons in bunker 73. The question is, the same

14 thing the U.N. told you, is can they, can they

15 acknowledge that the weapons were there at the time

16 that the U.S. troops were there and I don't think

17 anybody can acknowledge or do that, we don't know that

18 for sure.

19 But I don't think that's, I don't think

20 that's a key point here anymore. I think the key

21 point is, are we going to do something about it? And

22 as we've shown you, we are going to do something about


1 it.

2 DR. LASHOF: John?

3 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Let me follow-up once

4 more on the audit question. I'm curious as to whether

5 one can tell anything by, by difference. That is, if

6 you, if you knew the total amount of agent that was

7 produced and had counted the number of rounds in

8 various sites, you might be able to say that sets, for

9 example, in upper bound, on the number of rounds that

10 might be unaccounted for. Is, is that possible? Are

11 we anywhere near that?

12 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: My understanding is

13 no and I think one of the things you heard yesterday

14 contributes to it. When they went to the pit area and

15 did not find all the weapons that were there, they

16 told the Iraqis to dig them out of the rest of that

17 mound, and then they left. And the Iraqis brought

18 these out.

19 The other thing is that there were a lot

20 of these rounds that the Iraqis said that either they

21 destroyed personally, or somebody else destroyed,

22 that's where some of the question has come in from the


1 Intel community. Because it would be very nice to

2 say, we had 1,000 rockets here, but you all blew them

3 up. Then you take the 1,000 rockets and bury them

4 somewhere else and the U.N. doesn't know and they

5 think the 1,000 rockets were destroyed. That's,

6 that's been some of the question with the U.N. from

7 the very beginning. Which is why they were not very

8 firm in their report, either in '91 or '92, about the

9 bunker. Because they couldn't be sure.

10 And plus, if you looked at the pictures

11 they had of the bunker, they couldn't really go in

12 there, they were afraid, as he mentioned to you, to go

13 down in the pit, count weapons, or to actually do a

14 lot of testing. And to see if there were, there were

15 plastic parts. Because they were afraid that there

16 was still live ammunition and that it was, it had only

17 been four or five months after the war ended and they

18 were somewhat concerned. And rightfully so.

19 In fact, they didn't take the whole team

20 up there. They took two people from the team, the

21 rest of the team stayed away from it and two people

22 went up and took a look at it, came back, and said,


1 you know, what they did, as they reported.

2 DR. LASHOF: Can you clarify for me, the

3 basis on which the decisions were made to tell the

4 troops, or not just to tell the troops, obviously the

5 commanding officers believed at the time that they

6 went into to blow up bunker 73 that there were no

7 chemical weapons there.

8 What was the basis? I mean, how did one

9 decide to blow up something on the assumption that

10 there were no chemical weapons there. What was, what

11 kind of investigation was done beforehand?

12 LT. COL. MARTIN: Before they actually

13 went in? The 37th went in?

14 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. I mean, you said, you

15 know, that basically the commanders were told there

16 weren't any chemical weapons, go on ahead and blow it

17 up. And I just want to know no what basis they came

18 to that conclusion?

19 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Assessments were

20 made.

21 DR. LASHOF: Assessment.

22 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Assessments are made


1 in the field, preliminary by the Intel community on

2 where they think things are located. The information

3 we had on Iraq and where they stored a lot of their

4 munitions and how they did it was not as extensive as

5 one would like and, and Intel is not a precise

6 science. It has never been purported to be a precise

7 science.

8 So if you're asking about what happened

9 before, we had some indicators that were being used by

10 the intelligence community to pick out sites that we

11 thought might contain chemical weapons. And that's

12 where some of the difference in numbers of sites

13 becomes a little bit hairy in here because of the fact

14 that some of this is, is based on the just the fact,

15 could there have been something there? And so they

16 identified, if there was the slightest hint in the

17 Intel world that there was munitions at a site, it was

18 identified as a target and that was what was used for

19 bombing purposes.

20 This particular site, we never had any

21 indications from the Intel community before the war,

22 or during the war, that this was a chemical site.


1 Now, as far as what happened when they

2 went in there, I think Colonel Martin can address that

3 better than I.

4 LT. COL. MARTIN: No, I would just, I

5 would just add that there were groups that went in

6 there prior to their, first it was occupied by a

7 force. And then, you know, recon teams went in the

8 area. And they did not notice anything or showed any

9 symptoms of any leakage or anything like that. So

10 that further added to the fact that they didn't --

11 DR. LASHOF: What did they go in with?

12 What degree of effort are made to determine what's in

13 a pit or a bunker before you decide to blow it up,

14 other than Intel information?

15 LT. COL. MARTIN: The only thing that we

16 know that they had with them, EOD personnel either

17 went through before or accompanied the teams as they

18 went through the site.

19 MAJOR CROSS: Colonel Martin, let me ask

20 you this. You're a member of the chemical corp, do

21 you know if there were any members of chemical corp

22 personnel that went with the 37th that may have been


1 there, who may have seen chemical weapons?

2 LT. COL. MARTIN: Well, let me answer the

3 first part first. Yes, there was a, there were

4 chemical specialists who were there at the site.


6 LT. COL. MARTIN: None of them identified

7 any chemical munitions there.

8 DR. TAYLOR: And that goes back to what we

9 heard earlier, you can identify them if they're in

10 missiles.

11 LT. COL. MARTIN: That's correct.

12 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: That's correct.

13 DR. TAYLOR: There's nothing to determine

14 which ones aren't and which ones are.


16 said, it doesn't rule, the fact that they didn't see

17 anything doesn't rule it out.

18 DR. TAYLOR: Right.

19 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. I was going to say,

20 what did a chemical specialist look for?

21 DR. TAYLOR: Right. In that kind of

22 observation?


1 DR. LASHOF: Unidentified --

2 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: They were told, they

3 were told to look for certain things on the weapons.

4 As it turns out, most of the weapons did not have what

5 we thought they might have to, in the way of mark --

6 on them.

7 MAJOR CROSS: In your, in your

8 information, do they go into each bunker with a

9 chemical agent monitor, or do they just drive through

10 the compound with a vehicle that had a chemical agent

11 monitor? An M8A1 on it.

12 LT. COL. MARTIN: The only thing that we

13 can confirm is that there were actually, they had a

14 chemical alarm mounted on a vehicle in the area of the

15 bunkers. At the time they were rigging the --

16 MR. TURNER: But your current information

17 is they did not go through and do a chem sweep of each

18 bunker before they blew it?

19 LT. COL. MARTIN: We have one account of

20 that happening, but we haven't been able to, that

21 hasn't been corroborated by any other witness.

22 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: And that was from


1 the person that should have been doing it and told us

2 that he, that they did do some of these things, but

3 we, in going back, we haven't found anyone else that

4 can come up and corroborate what he said.

5 But there were, to back-up what Colonel

6 Martin said, the commanders, two of the three company

7 commanders said that when they went into the area,

8 they took vehicles that had an M8A1 alarm on the front

9 of their, their humvee, that they were turned on.

10 The other commander could not be sure that

11 his was turned on when he went into the site, but he

12 says it was definitely turned on during the time when

13 the detonations went off because it was his alarm that

14 went off, during the detonations.

15 MR. TURNER: But, just so the relevance on

16 the limitations of that are understood, you're not

17 going to detect anything with an alarm unless you got

18 a leaker or some other agent out there on the site?

19 Is that correct?

20 LT. COL. MARTIN: Yes.

21 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: But the thing that

22 hasn't been mentioned and it's interesting because


1 it's not been really gone into much, there were better

2 ones all over the site. From the minute they got

3 there, there were people going into the bunkers, in

4 and out of the bunkers, because they were stealing

5 things.

6 So there were people walking around this

7 site the entire time while they were doing it and one

8 of the problems they had, as was mentioned with the

9 PSYOPS teams and the other, was running these people

10 off so they could do the demolition.

11 DR. LASHOF: Now, as I understood from

12 UNSCOM's testimony, that when you looked at the

13 rocket, you couldn't tell from the outside, it was

14 only after it was blown up and you could see what was

15 inside, what the shells were inside.


17 DR. LASHOF: Is there any other way, I

18 mean, if you faced this in the future, if you're going

19 to go in and blow up weapons that aren't marked, and

20 you don't know whether there are chemicals in there or

21 not, is there any way to detect before you blow up?

22 So we learn something for the future?


1 LT. COL. MARTIN: I don't know if, you

2 know, if there's a way, unless you have sophisticated

3 equipment out there to, to look at it. Although I'm

4 sure that after this event, there's an awareness,

5 that's a possibility.

6 DR. LASHOF: We're going to try to figure

7 out some way.

8 MR. WALLNER: And try to make some

9 improvements in the, in the detection devices as well,

10 Dr. Lashof. That's on the agenda to do.

11 DR. LASHOF: Art?

12 DR. CAPLAN: We've been done the road in

13 an earlier hearing about what DOD and you gentlemen

14 are trying to do in terms of confirming and

15 acknowledging what was there and I actually understand

16 the need for taking a tough attitude and a hard stance

17 about the presence of weapons in the bunker and what

18 really can be known, as opposed to presume and so on.

19 But I do want to reiterate, I think it would be

20 important, this group, our Committee, what Ms. Nishimi

21 said, and that is, to also know, assuming some dispute

22 about wind patterns, some dispute about where


1 ordinance might have flown and so on. To have a

2 footprint that was at least a, ran a spectrum from the

3 conservative to the most general assumption. Because

4 what you need to show in terms of finding out

5 factually what was there and who knew and could

6 anybody ever know, whether it was, what was in bunker

7 73 and who blew it up, may not be the same as what the

8 veterans need in terms of presumptions or assumptions

9 about their illnesses.

10 And so, again, it would be very important

11 for us to at least see who was where, overlapping

12 that, obviously the medical correlations will be

13 important and so on, but I would urge you to give that

14 strong attention because in some sense some of the

15 dispute here is, I fear for purposes of different

16 standards. What you want to establish what could be

17 known and what the veterans want to establish in terms

18 of trying to appeal or presume that maybe they were

19 exposed to something could be two different things.

20 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think what you're

21 saying is exactly true and I think this is one of the

22 problems and why the veterans in many cases have not


1 understand, have not understood what we're trying to

2 do as well. We're not connected in any way to the

3 compensation, to the treatment, to any of the rest of

4 it.

5 And I think the philosophy in what's done

6 there should be addressed in these channels. Our role

7 has been to try and see if we can definitely nail down

8 anything that would help these people to do their job

9 better. It shouldn't preclude them from doing their

10 job.

11 DR. CAPLAN: And I'm slowly being educated

12 as to what --

13 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Right. And I think

14 that's a lot of people --

15 DR. CAPLAN: What leads you on, but I just

16 appeal to you to give us the, even though it may be

17 disputed and even though it may not establish who was

18 what where when something blew up and how far

19 ordinance might have flown and so on. If you give us

20 at least the generous estimates and acknowledge them

21 as such, that much being acknowledged.

22 That may then carry us forward to a point


1 where we can say, well, if Mr. Martin thinks that he

2 is was in an area where there might've been chemical

3 weapons and maybe that's enough for the VA to go

4 forward and finally say, all right, he's got the

5 illnesses, he's got presence in a place where there's

6 a lot of stuff leaking and stuff was blown up and we

7 can't establish what really happened there, maybe we

8 never will, but at least we've got presumptive

9 evidence that may carry him forward.

10 It seems to me, pounding back and forth

11 between what the military needs to show in terms of

12 being sure that this happened on this date in a

13 standard of evidence there versus what a veteran may

14 need to be able to show to the VA.

15 I was much taken yesterday when somebody

16 said, if your ulcer starts during service, it's going

17 to be service related later and yet we are treating

18 with this less, in some sense generosity or tolerance,

19 the exposure to chemical, low level chemical things,

20 we might have, if you just said, God, I had a stomach

21 ache before I, when I was active, and hell, a year

22 later I've got an ulcer, it's service related. I


1 mean, really?

2 But if we're going to that little evidence

3 then all that may be needed here is to be able to set

4 up a presumption of who might have been exposed or

5 then maybe the compensation and benefits area can be

6 hashed out using different standards than you would

7 use to say what we know on the battlefield on that

8 date in July when the bunker was blown.

9 DR. TAYLOR: I, I have, I just have one

10 other question, too. Getting back to some of the

11 missiles or the ammunition that's not accounted for.

12 I guess the question that I have, given that we have

13 not, we're not certain the Iraqis tell us the whole

14 truth and I doubt if they would, do we have any idea

15 of where these other chemical weapons are located or

16 where they are, since they're unaccounted for at all?

17 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: Are you talking

18 about Kamisiyah or in general?

19 DR. TAYLOR: In general.

20 MR. WALLNER: We had identified a number

21 of suspected chemical weapon storage sites prior to

22 the war. They were bombed. Most of them were bombed,


1 with varying degrees of success. The U.N. has visited

2 some of those and had found, I think only in a few

3 cases, evidence of chemical weapons being there.

4 The real answer to the question is we

5 don't know. They, they could have been moved to other

6 locations that we have yet to find, we had to go with

7 the information that was available at that point in

8 time. It's possible they could be at other locations.

9 LT. COL. MARTIN: I think the key is, is

10 one of the things the U.N. told you, is that what they

11 have found and what the Iraqis have admitted to, and

12 I think is reasonable. They knew we were coming for

13 a long time before we came with our bombers and our

14 troops. So they had plenty of times, plenty of time

15 to disperse these weapons. They dispersed them, put

16 them out in the desert, they mentioned to you they

17 took them out of the bunkers, and put them in open

18 storage so we wouldn't know where they were.

19 I think the, if you look at the 155

20 millimeter Howitzer munitions that were found at, just

21 outside of Kamisiyah, it gives you a good idea because

22 what they did was put a tarp over them that was a


1 color of the sand. And unless, you know, from an

2 airplane or anything else, you didn't see them. And

3 we've had no estimates from anybody that went into,

4 with the 37th to do this, that they even ever saw

5 these things. They were sitting five kilometers away

6 in the middle of the desert and nobody knew they were

7 there. How many other places did they put things and

8 what did they do with the rest of their weapons, we

9 will never know.

10 And even then, we still don't have, you're

11 making it sound like we have an actual accurate number

12 of how many weapons they had, we don't. All we have

13 is what they tell us they had, and maybe some

14 estimates based, as --

15 DR. TAYLOR: I think I heard it, I maybe

16 heard wrong, from the CIA, that there were several

17 that were unaccounted for.

18 LT. COL. MARTIN: They were talking at

19 Kamisiyah, if you took the full 2,000-and-some that

20 they said they brought down, that not all of them are

21 accounted for, and that was at Kamisiyah. But the

22 U.N. told you that they didn't take out all the


1 weapons, they left and then the people, the Iraqis

2 went in and took that hillside apart, found a bunch of

3 other weapons, never really said, you know, exactly

4 what they destroyed, we have no way of knowing.

5 So to say with any certainty is very

6 difficult. So I think what Rich McNally did was he

7 tried to take a worse case estimate and put that

8 amount of munitions into the bunker to, to do it. And

9 I think that's the way to go with it.

10 MR. TURNER: If I could just do two last

11 little housekeeping things again.

12 DR. LASHOF: Yes, sure.

13 MR. TURNER: On Kamisiyah, have your

14 interviews corroborated accounts that munitions and

15 other debris were falling several kilometers outside

16 the demolition site, Colonel Martin?

17 LT. COL. MARTIN: Yes, there were a few,

18 several of the witnesses have said that they, that

19 cooked-off rounds fell in their area and also reports

20 from the 82nd, Elements of the 82nd Airborne, that

21 they had fallen in their areas also.

22 MR. TURNER: Could, how far away was that?


1 Could you give us some order, I mean?

2 LT. COL. MARTIN: About five miles, I

3 believe.

4 MR. TURNER: Okay. And on this new

5 information that came out yesterday about the

6 possibility, or the allegation, I guess is the way to

7 frame it, that troops, our troops had destroyed, in

8 addition to the material in the bunker, also some of

9 the sarin rockets that were in the pit area.

10 Have you investigated or interviewed

11 anybody from the units on that topic?

12 LT. COL. MARTIN: Yes, that's been one of

13 the questions we've asked everybody. And we found out

14 from a couple of people, to include Colonel Holcumb,

15 Battalion Commander, his S-3, actually his S-3

16 stumbled across a site which was in the same vicinity

17 shown on the map, where the pit area was, where there

18 was long things found in boxes and some of them were

19 dug into the side. And he said that they set charges

20 on those and on the 10th, on the day of the final

21 explosion --

22 MR. TURNER: So it was on the second set


1 of explosions that that was blown?

2 LT. COL. MARTIN: Yes. Yes.

3 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: The last set, not

4 the second. The last set, not the second.

5 LT. COL. MARTIN: Colonel Holcumb seems to

6 also remember the pit, I believe also the XO also had

7 heard of it, even though he wasn't there.

8 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think one of the

9 keys, too to this was that they were at the end of

10 their mission, they did not have enough explosives,

11 they did not go digging around in the pit, they just

12 blew what was on the surface that they could get rid

13 of and they made no attempt to blow the entire pit up.

14 And one of the things that's looked a

15 little suspicious or funny and that's why there's a

16 lot of things in here that are kind of unusual,

17 pictures by U.S. people that were on the U.N. team

18 showing this area do not show a lot of blown-up

19 rockets of any kind in the pit. All you see are some

20 materials, some broken materials, but none of it has

21 burns on it, none of it looks like an explosion. We

22 don't, we've not been able to figure out why it looks


1 like it does, since they did put explosives in the

2 pit.

3 MR. TURNER: But in your interviews, did

4 anybody do a count of the material that was in the

5 pit?


7 LT. COL. MARTIN: No. No. The, and given

8 the information I got, it sounded like it was very

9 hastily done, they were getting out the next day, as

10 a matter of fact, they were well, they didn't even

11 observe the explosions in the last day, they heard the

12 explosion so they knew it went off and then started

13 heading south.

14 So, it sounds, I'm pretty sure that they

15 did blow what we think is the pit.

16 MS. NISHIMI: I just have one last

17 question unrelated to Kamisiyah. But at the main

18 meeting, we discussed the issue of standards and

19 criteria for PGIT in conducting its investigation.

20 And at that time in fact, you were unable to

21 articulate a set of criteria, in fact, you said that

22 there were no set criteria.


1 But in today's testimony, you describe a

2 U.N. developed process and you say that PGIT does

3 conduct its investigation in a similar manner. I want

4 to know what changed between May and now?

5 COLONEL KOENIGSBURG: I think, number one

6 was the questions you all asked, certainly to give you

7 credit of what we were using. We were using criteria

8 and we sat down at that point to say, we need to get

9 this a little more refined. And we did.

10 And I think one of the things we have

11 found as we go on more and more to a lot of these

12 detections is, that some of the things that we were

13 looking for originally, if you sit down and think

14 about it, we couldn't prove it. We had to find some

15 set of criteria that would say, this would be proofs

16 positive.

17 So initially, where we started out and

18 said, okay, if you have two detections from two

19 different types of detectors, then this surely is very

20 suspicious and maybe we can accept this as being the

21 final answer.

22 Well, the more we looked into it and went


1 back and discussed with the people that are

2 responsible for these detectors, we find out that a

3 lot of the same contaminants that will give you a

4 false positive in one will give you the same false

5 positive in another. And therefore, we had to sit

6 back and say, all right, well, if that's not proof,

7 what is the real proof? We looked, we told you in the

8 beginning, at the meeting, that we looked at each

9 instance in its entirety. And that's what we've done.

10 And in the beginning, we were saying,

11 okay, we'll take two of them, and if two of them come

12 in, that looks awful suspicious. But then when you go

13 looking at the rest of the records on that and look at

14 it in its totality, as we said we were doing, you

15 couldn't prove anything. Could you really say that it

16 was a chemical that had been there or was it smoke or

17 something else that had set off both say, an M8-A1 and

18 a 256 kit? And we said, well, no, you can't prove it

19 by that. So then what are the criteria that we used?

20 They're not, what we're giving you now is

21 not that dissimilar than what we gave you originally,

22 it's just put in a little more finite detail. Because


1 we were saying the same things, we just hadn't put it

2 into this kind of definitive chart, matrix, whatever

3 you want to call it, that would say, all right, does

4 this have this, this, this, and this.

5 And I think certainly your questions and

6 answers at your meeting has helped us to focus on some

7 of this as we've gone. It's been a factor as well as

8 others.

9 DR. LASHOF: Well, with that pleasant

10 note, I think congratulations to both sides. Unless

11 there are more questions, I think we'll take our

12 break. Thank you very much.

13 Let's limit it to about 10 minutes, we're

14 20 minutes behind schedule.

15 (Whereupon a short break was

16 taken.)

17 DR. LASHOF: I think we'll resume and the,

18 at least the Committee members, what we're planning to

19 do for most of the rest of the day, is to look at the

20 number of the risk factors that have been put forward

21 and its possible cause of the Gulf War illness. And

22 many of which, and there's a great deal of research


1 being funded to further explore.

2 The staff have been working extremely hard

3 over the last seven months on looking on any number of

4 issues, but certainly all of the prominent risk

5 factors have consumed significant amount of time and

6 staff work as they've interviewed people, researched

7 the literature, and considered everything we've heard

8 at the hearings, but also many much, a great deal of

9 other investigative work that they've done between our

10 meetings. And I personally want to congratulate the

11 staff and thank them for the work they've done.

12 I think the material we have in our

13 briefing book on each of these risk factors are really

14 excellent and I'm learning more than I thought I'd

15 ever learn about a number of subjects that I didn't

16 know much about before.

17 So I want to thank all of you for the work

18 you've done and we'll proceed to go through these and

19 I think what we're planning to do is take each one up,

20 ask the staff to give us a relatively brief summary of

21 their basic data that they've looked at and

22 conclusions that they've reached, some of the


1 recommendations that they think the Committee should

2 consider. And we'll take them one by one and discuss

3 each of them and this will be, form the basis of one

4 section of course, of our final report, which you all

5 know is due in about five months.

6 So we're going to start with, pardon?

7 SPEAKER: Holly is going to start.

8 DR. LASHOF: Holly, you want to start off

9 by saying some general things before we go to each

10 individual risk factor. Okay. Thank you, Holly.

11 MS. GWIN: The overhead shows you what the

12 Committee's mandate is. Miles, if you'll give me the

13 next slide.

14 We're going to make some recommendations

15 to you today about conclusions we've reached on a

16 number of risk factors. Obviously Gulf War

17 participants experienced possibly a wide range of risk

18 factor exposures. Staff have had to be somewhat

19 selective in the topics dealt with comprehensively, so

20 we've taken additional guidance from previous work,

21 both lay and scientific on these issues and the

22 overhead provides some examples. Next slide, please.


1 Memos on the nine risk factors staff are

2 prepared to discuss today are under Tab J in your

3 briefing books. Staff will deal with another

4 principal risk factor, stress, in September, following

5 a panel meeting that we're currently scheduled to have

6 on that topic July 23rd in Cincinnati and will be

7 chaired by David Hamburg. Next slide.

8 I'm going to provide a brief overview of

9 how the analysis were prepared. Staff relied

10 principally on the three types of sources that you see

11 on the overhead. We found this method provided a

12 broad base of information on every topic. Staff had

13 access to laboratory toxicology data, animal data, and

14 human data, primarily from occupational settings.

15 In fact, however, these sources represent

16 the limits on staff's research. Conclusions presented

17 for your consideration today will not reflect health

18 effects that are not reported in these types of

19 sources. Next slide.

20 The staff analysis follow a standard

21 format. Each provides information on reported

22 exposures in the Gulf, but because of sparse data,


1 staff are not able to be conclusive about whether

2 exposures actually occurred. Each analysis reports on

3 known health effects of the risk factor, the search

4 for information extended to all organ systems and to

5 cancer and non-cancer inpoints.

6 Staff have evaluated the adequacy of the

7 data, including descriptions of ongoing research, and

8 finally, staff are prepared to make recommendations to

9 you about conclusions about the role of the risk

10 factor in producing Gulf War veterans' illnesses.

11 And these conclusions are based on a

12 comparison of the known health effects with the

13 symptoms reported by Gulf War veterans.

14 I want to say a word or two about

15 terminology. Staff looked at a range of exposure

16 scenarios, all the way from high dose acute exposure,

17 all the way to low level exposure and from single

18 event to multiple event, to continuing or chronic

19 exposure. Staff also considered a range of health

20 effects, short-term effects, those symptoms likely to

21 appear immediately following exposure, and for Gulf

22 War veterans, could have been picked up in the theater


1 of operations. All the way to long-term effects,

2 meaning for Gulf War veterans, post-war effects,

3 symptoms that would not be likely to appear until

4 after service members left the Gulf and might persist

5 for some period. Next slide.

6 When staff refer to symptoms reported by

7 Gulf War veterans, the sources are data from the DOD's

8 comprehensive clinical evaluation program, the CCEP,

9 and VA's Persian Gulf Health Registry.

10 And then finally I want to put a caveat in

11 before Mark Brown starts the briefing on pesticides.

12 Today's discussion is limited to a discussion of the

13 evaluation of the role of these identified risk

14 factors in producing Gulf War veterans' illnesses.

15 This is just the beginning of the Committee's risk

16 factors in Gulf War veterans' illnesses. Even where

17 a staff analysis leads to a conclusion that it is

18 unlikely that a risk factor for the symptoms that are

19 reported by Gulf War veterans, it should not be

20 interpreted as a conclusion that Gulf War veterans are

21 not ill and it should not be interpreted that a

22 recommendation that the search for causes be ended.


1 So if you don't have any questions on the

2 overview, we're ready for Mark's presentation on

3 pesticides.

4 DR. LASHOF: Well, before we go to Mark,

5 does the Committee have any questions for Holly about

6 the process that the staff have used, the basis of

7 their work?

8 DR. LARSON: Not really a question, but a

9 comment. I hope as some point we will be prepared to

10 make some comments about possible combinations or, I

11 think it's along the lines of what you were saying,

12 Holly, that there are illnesses, acknowledging those,

13 and that we may make recommendations about individual

14 risk factors, we don't want to make the same mistake

15 of communicating, treating people symptom by symptom.

16 And somehow, while we can look at risk

17 factors one at a time, one of the complaints we've

18 heard is, okay, but you're not seeing the picture

19 here. I don't know if I'm making sense. But we don't

20 want to give the impression that we're doing the same

21 thing that's been done to the vets, and that is,

22 you've got a headache, you know, see a neurologist or


1 take an aspirin. You've got a rash, go to the

2 dermatologist and, you know, this and that and that.

3 MS. GWIN: You will hear on several of the

4 presentations today a discussion of synergism,

5 combinations of different risk factors.

6 DR. LARSON: Thanks. I think I was just

7 talking about the tone of the report, too.

8 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. That's a question of

9 somehow, I don't know how, but it's further

10 downstream, I think, when we hear the rest of the risk

11 factors and everything else, is to try to talk about

12 the totality of the experiences and how the totality

13 of the experience can be different than if one has an

14 individual isolated experience. And I think that's

15 something we'll have to explore as we go along.

16 Okay. With that, Mark, you're going to

17 start with pesticides.

18 MR. BROWN: I have the first transparency.

19 This is a list of the pesticides that the Department

20 of Defense shipped to the Gulf War to protect U.S.

21 troops against pests, insects, and against the

22 diseases that some insects can carry.


1 And staff have determined through

2 discussions with the Environmental Protection Agency

3 and the Food and Drug Administration that all of these

4 pesticides are commonly used, commonly, they are

5 approved for common use in the United States by our

6 civilian population. And I have listed on the right-

7 hand side, this pointer doesn't really show up very

8 well, but you can see on the right-hand side, some

9 examples of products that contain these pesticides.

10 All of these products should be familiar to at least

11 most of us. They may occur in our homes, they are

12 available in our grocery stores.

13 So staff focused on, as Holly mentioned,

14 we looked at the immediate toxic effects of exposure

15 to high levels of these pesticides, as well as long-

16 term effects from exposure to any levels, by reviewing

17 scientific literature and having briefing and talking

18 to other toxicologists and experts.

19 For example, the third material down,

20 DEET, is a commonly used insect repellent, mosquito

21 repellent, it occurs in products like OFF and Cutter's

22 brand. It was used, for use by the Gulf War troops


1 to, for protection against insects, biting insects.

2 Perhaps the best way to evaluate the safety of this

3 material is to consider the fact that it's been used

4 by millions of Americans and probably hundreds of

5 millions applications since it was first introduced in

6 the, approximately four decades ago, with few reports

7 of incidents of ill effects.

8 Another chemical that was used, pesticide

9 that was used by Gulf War participants, Gulf War

10 soldiers, was permethrin in a spray can to, this was

11 designed to spray a uniform for protection against

12 again, biting insects. Permethrin has very, very low

13 immediate toxicity. It's very difficult to cause

14 toxic effects in a mammal directly. Nevertheless,

15 there is some data from the Environmental Protection

16 Agency and others that have considered the possibility

17 of this material being a long, a carcinogen in at

18 least laboratory animals.

19 Nevertheless, in risk assessments carried

20 out by EPA and others, considering the possibility of

21 lifetime exposure, that is to say exposure, using

22 permethrin during the entire life a human being, the


1 risks of, long-term risks of cancer of this material

2 have been considered negligible. And it's considered

3 safe for common, general use in the United States.

4 Perhaps the most toxic type of pesticide,

5 both in terms of its immediate effects and in terms of

6 what we know about long-term health effects, the most

7 class, the most toxic class of pesticides on this list

8 are the organophosphorus agents. These include

9 materials like chloropryifos, diazinon, dichlorovos,

10 malathion. And so I'm going to spend the remainder of

11 my talk talking about what we know about the immediate

12 and long-term health effects of exposure to these,

13 this class of materials.

14 Could I have the next transparency?

15 What I tried to show on this transparency

16 is the effects we know about a different exposures to

17 organophosphorus pesticides. We know at, with

18 increasing exposure, we know at very high exposure

19 levels to these agents, they can cause death and in

20 fact every year in this country there are a number of

21 deaths reported, particularly from occupational

22 exposures to these materials, and particular farm


1 workers and applicators.

2 However, we also know at somewhat lower

3 exposures that there, that these lower exposures can

4 lead to very severe symptoms that include convulsions,

5 neuromuscular blockage, profuse airway obstruction,

6 and apnea, which means the temporary cessation of

7 breathing. These effects are quite dramatic and

8 usually they would result in the hospitalization of an

9 individual who suffered from them.

10 Researchers have followed the long-term

11 consequences of people who survived symptoms such as

12 these, looking for what type of effects individuals

13 may suffer for the long term. By long term, I mean

14 lasting a year of more following exposure and have

15 found a variety of effects, using, of lasting effects.

16 Using neuropsychological tests, researchers have shown

17 effects on intellectual functioning, academic skills,

18 abstraction, and flexibility of thinking, and simple

19 motor skills.

20 To illustrate what these, what type, what

21 these effects are, one researcher for instance found

22 an apparent lowering in intelligence, in I.Q., in a


1 group that had experienced these effects, compared to

2 a control group.

3 At lower exposures, at still lower

4 exposures, there are a variety of symptoms that are

5 associated, some of which we've heard about in the

6 discussion of the nature of a plume from an explosion

7 from a chemical weapon depot, for instance. These

8 include miosis, which is narrowing of the eye, of the

9 pupil of the eye, and a variety of much, nonspecific

10 symptoms that appear at lower exposures.

11 Now, the interesting point is that

12 researchers looking at individuals who have survived

13 exposures leading to these lower level symptoms, using

14 the same neuropsychological tests that they were able

15 to pick up effects at higher level of exposures, were

16 unable to find those effects in these individuals

17 showing low level, these low level poisoning symptoms.

18 So just to conclude with a couple of

19 points that I want to make. First of all, the only

20 long-term effects that staff have been able to find

21 from exposure to pesticides, organophosphorus

22 pesticides, are these neuropsychological tests that


1 I've just discussed.

2 Second, these effects only occur as a

3 consequence of severe poisoning. The type of

4 poisoning that would result in probably

5 hospitalization.

6 Thirdly, we know from discussions, from

7 discussions and testimony to the Committee, some

8 panels have heard in Committee briefings, that medical

9 surveillance conducted, and monitoring of surveillance

10 conducted primarily by the Department of the Army

11 during the Gulf War, reported no cases of individuals

12 presenting with these types of severe poisoning

13 symptoms.

14 With that in mind, I'd like to make a

15 recommendation as a possible conclusion that would

16 come out of the points that I just made. And that is

17 that staff recommend that the Committee conclude that

18 exposure to any single pesticide or combination of

19 pesticides, during the Gulf War is unlikely to be

20 responsible for symptoms reported by Gulf War veterans

21 today.

22 I'll take any questions.


1 DR. LASHOF: Go ahead, Elaine.

2 DR. LARSON: Just for completeness, there

3 were no exposures at higher levels than normal. Like

4 you say, obviously the stuff we use at home we use in

5 a certain form at a certain dosage and they weren't

6 unusual dosages or anything?

7 MR. BROWN: Well, it's a, it's an

8 interesting point because actually the only

9 pesticides, the pesticides that I had listed there are

10 available to any of us. We could go buy them today.

11 DR. LARSON: Right.

12 MR. BROWN: The Department of Defense has

13 a somewhat tighter policy than that. The only

14 pesticides that were given out for free use, that is

15 for use by any Gulf War participant, were the mosquito

16 repellent DEET, in the form of Cutter's brand

17 repellant, you know, the type of material many of us

18 are familiar with. And the permethrin, which was

19 designed to, as I described, to be sprayed on

20 uniforms. These were given out more or less freely.

21 The other pesticides on that list were all

22 supposed to be used according to DOD policy, only by


1 specially trained personnel.

2 Does that get at your question in terms of

3 possible --

4 DR. LARSON: My question is, were they

5 used by personnel in any massive, getting rid of the

6 rats or something?

7 MR. BROWN: Oh, yes. Well, we, there's at

8 least some information about the use of, there's a

9 mosquito abatement program, we know that some of these

10 pesticides were used and we know at least anecdotally

11 that troops used at least DEET and permethrin. We

12 know exactly what pesticides were shipped to the Gulf

13 and how much.

14 Unfortunately, as our interim report kind

15 of summarizes, we have very few records, or maybe no

16 records, about how they, how these materials were

17 actually used once they got to the Gulf. Department

18 of Defense just didn't keep that kind of record.

19 DR. LARSON: I'm just asking for the sake

20 of completeness, so we can wipe it off the list.

21 DR. TAYLOR: I guess the other question I

22 had was going back to what we heard in one of the


1 testimonies. I'm not sure when, maybe last year

2 sometime, regarding the use of lindane in spraying the

3 Iraqi troops. Were those, was that in a large enough

4 quantity as well as were the persons who were spraying

5 it wearing protective clothing or do we have any

6 information regarding how our troops are trained in

7 the proper use of any of these pesticides?

8 MR. BROWN: We have pretty good

9 information about how the Department of Defense set up

10 a policy for pesticide use. They have training

11 manuals and training programs that they implement for

12 the use of all of their pesticides. As I mentioned,

13 they have specially trained pesticide applicators,

14 which would be roughly comparable to hiring, you know,

15 your Orkin man to come around to your house.

16 Unfortunately, we don't really have good

17 records about how these policies were actually

18 implemented in the field. Look, let me just add,

19 though, looking at the policies themselves, they look

20 pretty good. I mean, they look, you know, they are,

21 they use, they have concerns for safety, the safety of

22 applicators. They have concerns for the types of


1 pesticides they use, they only use approved pesticides

2 that are commonly, approved for common use

3 domestically. They, they look like good policies.

4 Unfortunately we can't make that last leap

5 and evaluate, did they actually do that. The records

6 for that aren't there.

7 DR. TAYLOR: The second question I had,

8 going back to their organophosphorus pesticides. I've

9 heard of or read somewhere of a link to reproductive

10 health or problems associated with reproductive

11 health. Did you find any information in the

12 literature to find that any of these pesticides are

13 linked to hazards associated with reproduction?

14 MR. BROWN: Well all of these pesticides,

15 I should add, have gone through EPA's review process

16 where they review them for a variety inpoints,

17 including reproductive, reproductive toxicity and

18 environmental effects, cancer.

19 DR. TAYLOR: But in large quantities, you

20 know, huge doses, for instance farm workers using them

21 in the field.

22 MR. BROWN: Sure.


1 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

2 MR. BROWN: Well, I that think the way I

3 would answer it is maybe something like this, I think

4 that there is some data about some pesticides having

5 a variety of health problems, either cancer or

6 reproductive effects and so forth. These pesticides

7 are not in that class.

8 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

9 MR. BROWN: Secondly, in terms of

10 reproductive problems, the issue would be, the

11 reproductive problems that would be normally

12 associated with pesticides in general, not, not these,

13 but just in general, would be problems that might be

14 experienced by say a farm worker who might have

15 reproductive problems during the period of his or her

16 exposure, not years later or months later.

17 Does that answer your question?

18 DR. TAYLOR: Kind of.

19 DR. LASHOF: The other question I had,

20 Mark, and I'm not, it was in the newspaper and I don't

21 remember what chemicals, but it was a report of a new

22 finding of very massive synergism. You know, there's


1 been a lot of talk about the combination of different

2 drugs and we deal with it in relation to pesticides

3 and pryidostigmine bromide, but aside from that type

4 of thing, but just the use of several different

5 pesticides, whether in combination, there's a

6 synergistic effect and I don't remember which

7 chemicals, it was just a very recent report of a

8 preliminary study. It showed a 1,000-fold increase in

9 toxicity when two were put together.

10 MR. BROWN: Does this have anything to do

11 with hormonal effects? Environmental hormonal

12 effects?

13 Well, to answer your question,

14 organophosphorus pesticides are synergized by a number

15 of different agents. They, in fact, they synergise

16 each other, so if somebody were exposed to one, it

17 could synergise exposure to another.

18 Nevertheless, it wouldn't change the basic

19 issue here. That is, the, I'm showing that the

20 horizontal arrow is showing the effects at different

21 exposure levels. Okay? If you gave an additional

22 material, a second pesticide for instance, which


1 synergized these effects, it wouldn't change the basic

2 argument. It would shift, it would shift where those

3 effects would occur, downward, to say, say convulsions

4 for instance for severe poisoning might occur at lower

5 exposure, if you had a case where you had a co-

6 exposure to a material that synergized it. Okay?

7 But it wouldn't change the basic

8 arguments. You'd still, you might be able to induce

9 that whole train of effects, both immediate and long-

10 lasting effects. But you'd still expect the long-

11 lasting effects to occur as a consequence of the

12 extreme immediate effects that I have listed there.

13 In other words, I guess --

14 DR. LASHOF: Yeah, I know what you're

15 saying.

16 MR. BROWN: The synergism would increase -

17 -

18 DR. LASHOF: I'm just wondering whether

19 there have been any studies that actually support that

20 when you, whether, if you combine something, you might

21 end up not getting the acute effects, but could get

22 some of the long-term effects that you ordinarily


1 would see. It's hypothetically possible or not.

2 MR. BROWN: Hypothetically it's possible,

3 but there's no information in the literature that

4 wouldn't suggest that that occurs.

5 What you'd be talking about is, what

6 you're talking about really is the possibility of an

7 unrecognized effect. As Holly pointed out, the

8 effects that haven't appeared in the literature,

9 haven't been documented in the literature, such as

10 what you're describing, we can't really say yes or no

11 about that.

12 But just to reemphasize this, there's

13 nothing in the literature that would suggest that you

14 could induce these more long-lasting effects through

15 the use of some synergism, which without seeing them

16 as a consequence --

17 DR. LASHOF: Is there anything in the

18 literature that studied that specifically?

19 MR. BROWN: Yes. People have looked at

20 combinations of pesticides, sure.

21 DR. LASHOF: Okay. That's all I want to

22 know. John, yes, please.


1 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In your written

2 summary, you say that lindane reasonably can be

3 anticipated to be a carcinogen. Is that known or not

4 known?

5 MR. BROWN: That rather wishy-washy

6 language is literally taken out of EPA and IRA type of

7 language where they summarize all the animal data and

8 lindane is, the data supporting the carcinogenicity of

9 lindane is purely animal, rodent data, animal studies.

10 It appears that in very high doses it can cause liver

11 cancer in some strains of laboratory mammals.

12 Therefore, the Environmental Protection Agency and

13 some other regulatory agencies have taken the position

14 that it can be anticipated, reasonably anticipated to

15 be a human carcinogen. There is, however, no data

16 showing human carcinogenicity with this compound,

17 although that's not uncommon.

18 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: You may remember in

19 one of our very first public reports, the, a wife of

20 then deceased officer who served in the Gulf claimed

21 that he had been involved in treating Iraqi prisoners

22 with heavy doses of what she called benzine. I think


1 with, it's lindane, sometimes hexochlorobenzine, it's

2 called.

3 MR. BROWN: That's right.

4 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: And so it seems to me

5 that, because of that particular report, being as

6 careful as you can with this is important.

7 MR. BROWN: I agree. We try to choose our

8 language carefully. I would only point out that it's

9 thought to be liver carcinogen, not a pancreatic

10 carcinogen. And it only has a latency period of

11 decades.


13 DR. TAYLOR: And the other thing we have

14 to take in consideration, that it seemed to be more

15 immediate in her case with the person developing a

16 disease, and with cancer, the long term, it would take

17 longer for the cancer to show up from exposure. It

18 would also depend on what they're wearing at the time,

19 the exposure, how long, and that kind of thing.

20 DR. LASHOF: Can I ask the Committee if

21 anyone has any reservations about the recommendation

22 that we conclude that it is unlikely that health


1 effects reported today are a result of exposure to

2 pesticides?

3 Okay. Unless we change our mind by the

4 final report, we can expect that that will be a

5 conclusion in our final report.

6 Mark, it's you again.

7 MR. BROWN: It's me again.

8 DR. LASHOF: Yes, Don, first.

9 ADMIRAL CUSTIS: Have we not considered

10 adding something along this line to the, to the end of

11 that statement of recommendation, research in pursuit

12 of possibility deleterious effects in such combination

13 is still underway.

14 DR. TAYLOR: Or somewhere.

15 MS. GWIN: We discuss in, let me just

16 answer, if I can.

17 DR. LASHOF: Sure.

18 MS. GWIN: We discuss synergisms in more

19 completeness in the context of the pyridostigmine

20 bromide risk factor, insofar as looking at

21 recommendations on research.

22 The approach for this particular meeting


1 was not to also simultaneously evaluate the Federal

2 Government's entire research profile, vis a vis these

3 risk factors. The goal here was to look at the

4 possible health effects of the risk factors. And then

5 we fully intend to analyze the research portfolio as

6 you suggested, but that would be something we would

7 take up in September or October with you.

8 DR. LASHOF: Okay.

9 MR. BROWN: Next I'm going to talk about

10 chemical weapons issues.

11 DR. LASHOF: Oh, chemical weapons.

12 MR. BROWN: I'm sorry? At the outset of

13 the Gulf War, U.S. military planners were concerned

14 about possible Iraqi use of two different classes of

15 chemical weapon agents against U.S. troops. And these

16 were the mustard agents, the so-called blister agents

17 that cause a skin blistering effect, and the

18 organophosphorus nerve agents, which cause the type of

19 nerve toxic effects that I discussed for

20 organophosphorus pesticides earlier.

21 With the mustard agents, staff had

22 considerable amount of data available to evaluate


1 long-term health effects of exposure to these agents.

2 This comes largely from actual human exposure data, in

3 particular to troops exposed to mustard agent during

4 the first World War, particularly British troops that

5 were exposed and there are a lot of epidemiologic

6 studies on these people. The bottom line is with

7 mustard exposure, there is pretty good epidemiologic

8 data showing that there is an increased risk of lung

9 cancer to survivors to a mustard gas attack.

10 With the nerve agents, staff also had a

11 large amount of literature to review, that on the non-

12 lethal effects of organophosphorus nerve agents, this

13 includes the agents sarin and soman and some of the

14 others we've heard about.

15 This data, we found more than 80 papers on

16 such effects, not only on laboratory animals, rats,

17 and mice, and primates, but also data from human

18 volunteers done in this country and others in the

19 1950's and '60's.

20 In addition, we evaluated the literature

21 on the organophosphorus pesticides that I discussed

22 earlier on the basis that these materials are close


1 analogues of the nerve agents. They differ only in

2 the concentration required to cause effect. Could I

3 have the first transparency?

4 This transparency is really just a repeat

5 of the earlier transparency I showed in the effect of

6 organophosphorus nerve agents. Again, at very high

7 exposure, these agents are designed to be lethal and

8 incapacitating, they can cause death. At lower

9 concentrations, they can cause a variety of severe

10 symptoms, convulsions and so forth. These have been

11 shown at least in the case of pesticides to lead to

12 certain lasting effects, the neuropsychological

13 effects that I discussed earlier.

14 Again, at lower exposure levels to the

15 organophosphorus nerve agents, we, I have listed some

16 more minor effects, miosis and some other non,

17 nonspecific effects. Again, researchers looking, at

18 least in the case of pesticides, at these materials,

19 do not, cannot pick up the same neurological long

20 term, neuropsychological long term health

21 consequences.

22 I just want to add one interesting point,


1 that there are some ongoing studies in the Department

2 of Defense and in the VA, using these standardized

3 neuropsychological tests, looking for these types of

4 effects in Gulf War veterans. The only study that's

5 been completed, there are a number of studies done at

6 the hazard, the Environmental Hazard Centers, the

7 three Environmental Hazard Centers that are doing

8 this. The only study that is completed so far that we

9 actually have any data that we can discuss now, is a

10 study conducted by the Birmingham VA, where they

11 looked at about 100 veterans, Gulf War veterans, who

12 believed their health had been affected, possibly by

13 exposure to organophosphorus nerve agents.

14 Using these neuropsychological tests,

15 these researchers were unable to demonstrate these

16 effects in that particular population.

17 The other point I want to make is that,

18 again as I mentioned, medical monitoring and

19 surveillance conducted primarily by the Department of

20 the Army during the Gulf War located no individuals

21 reporting, presenting with the severe symptoms that I

22 have listed there, convulsions and so forth.


1 So with this in mind, staff would like to

2 make the following recommendations as far as

3 conclusions based on these points:

4 First of all, if ongoing investigations

5 identify U.S. service personnel who were exposed to

6 chemical agents during the Gulf War, then that

7 population should be screened for the known health

8 effects from such exposures and they should be

9 monitored for other health effects that might develop

10 in the coming decades, even though we don't know what

11 those effects might necessarily be.

12 Secondly, nevertheless, at this time,

13 staff recommend that the Committee conclude that

14 exposure to chemical weapon agents during the Gulf War

15 is unlikely to be responsible for symptoms reported by

16 Gulf War veterans today.

17 The third point, Department of Defense

18 should or could plan for further research on the

19 effects of low level exposure to nerve agents based on

20 studies of selected targeted populations. Such

21 populations could include any U.S. service personnel

22 who are determined to have been exposed during the


1 Gulf War, that I just mentioned.

2 Secondly, civilians exposed to the

3 chemical weapon agent sarin during the 1995 terrorist

4 attack on the Tokyo subway. This could be a well-

5 characterized population to look at perhaps.

6 And thirdly and perhaps the best

7 population to study are cases of U.S. workers

8 occupationally exposed to pesticides during their

9 work. This data tends to get well recorded in various

10 health registries supported by various state

11 governments.

12 Finally, as for mustard agents, as part of

13 its ongoing mortality registry, the Department of

14 Veteran Affairs should monitor increased rates of lung

15 cancer in Gulf War veterans during the coming decades.

16 That concludes my recommendations,

17 suggested recommendations. I'll take any questions.

18 DR. TAYLOR: I just have one question, I

19 know I don't have the updated one that's there. But

20 what about the co-exposures, the possible

21 pyridostigmine bromide tablets could increase the

22 toxicity of chemicals?


1 MR. BROWN: Well, we're going to discuss

2 that a little bit more in a moment.

3 DR. LASHOF: That's a separate staff

4 briefing.

5 DR. TAYLOR: That's a separate? Okay.

6 MR. BROWN: But just to make the same

7 point that I made with Joyce is, the similar question

8 that Dr. Lashof asked, and that is, if you added a

9 synergist that increased these effects, for instance,

10 PB does appear to have some effect on the acute

11 effects, the immediate toxicity of these agents. You

12 would expect, it would just move where those effects

13 occurred. It would tend to push them down. Okay?

14 It's not that you would expect different effects, or

15 somehow new types of effects that haven't been

16 previously seen, it would just shift where those

17 effects would occur and it wouldn't change the basic

18 argument that I think I'm trying to make here.

19 DR. LASHOF: Well, I'm not sure about that

20 with pyridostigmine bromide because there it's being

21 used to block some of these effects and so it could

22 block the acute effect and yet still contribute in


1 some way to the other. Because that would be the

2 whole theory by which, but let's, let's differ it

3 until we hear everything on pyridostigmine bromide.

4 MR. BROWN: I just want to point out

5 something, that pyridostigmine bromide does not

6 decrease the acute toxicity of sarin.

7 DR. LASHOF: No, yeah.

8 MR. BROWN: It must be used with atropine

9 and 2-pam.

10 DR. LASHOF: Right.

11 MR. BROWN: In other words, it's not

12 considered prophylactic on its own.

13 DR. LASHOF: Right.

14 MR. BROWN: It wouldn't be protective on

15 its own.

16 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Well, we're defer that

17 till we get to the pyridostigmine bromide discussion

18 because it's very complicated. Pardon?

19 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It blocks the same

20 receptor site.

21 DR. LASHOF: Yeah, yeah. Further

22 questions for Mark about chemicals?


1 DR. CAPLAN: Are we convinced that we know

2 enough about genetic variability with respect to

3 symptoms and exposures, to say, that's the list or

4 that's the profile?

5 MR. BROWN: Well, we, of course we know

6 about, there is some genetic variability in

7 sensitivity to s-trait inhibitors. Nevertheless, this

8 is a recognized effect that's been known about for

9 some time and I think at least, I guess maybe the best

10 way, one of the best ways I can answer that is at

11 least in the example of organophosphorus pesticide,

12 where we have applicators who, where we have a

13 population of thousands of individuals who were

14 exposed for their professional lifetimes to these

15 agents. This hasn't been an issue in at least that

16 population.

17 On the other hand, could there be some

18 group that has an unusual sensitivity to these, to

19 these agents, that would show some unexpected effect?

20 It's hard to rule that out.

21 DR. CAPLAN: So that might be one area

22 where I might want to see us qualify or say something.


1 Because there has been a suggestion that sub-

2 populations or certain hypersensitivities might be

3 there biological and so on, not that I believe it, but

4 it's unknown.

5 DR. LASHOF: John?

6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Has your list of

7 lasting effects actually been observed for any of the

8 nerve agents?

9 MR. BROWN: No. Well, let me think about

10 things.

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: There's been no

12 exposure documented at sufficient level to keep

13 advised on such a thing.

14 MR. BROWN: There have a number of cases,

15 there's been no, the really good epidemiologic

16 investigations on these effects are, have been done

17 with pesticide exposures. Because that's where you

18 have the numbers to look at and you have the good

19 characterization of exposure.

20 Nevertheless, there have been some case

21 studies of individuals who have been accidentally,

22 occupationally exposed for instance, during the


1 manufacture of chemical weapon agents. And in at

2 least these case studies, they report these types of

3 symptoms.

4 These are, again, these are examples of

5 people who are severely poisoned, who, who, you know,

6 got close to perhaps dying from these exposures.

7 DR. LARSON: Joyce, we're recommending

8 monitoring and screening for troops exposed to low

9 levels of OP nerve agents, but we're having a heck of

10 a time finding out if there was any and where it was.

11 So, now this doesn't have anything to do

12 with this recommendation, but somewhere we need to

13 make a recommendation that those people be identified.

14 DR. LASHOF: Yeah.

15 DR. LARSON: You can't screen and monitor

16 them until you admit that it happened and, you know.

17 SPEAKER: That there were some people.

18 MR. BROWN: You got to locate them first.

19 DR. LARSON: So somewhere, this assumes

20 that we know whose people are when in fact we're

21 having a very hard time finding out who they are.

22 MS. NISHIMI: Right. This recommendation


1 would be in tandem with the Committee's work in other

2 areas.

3 DR. LARSON: Sure, thanks.

4 MS. NISHIMI: And it would be something we

5 fully intend to explore.

6 DR. LASHOF: Yeah, generally we have to

7 realize we're doing this piecemeal.

8 DR. LARSON: Sure.

9 DR. LASHOF: But piecemeal is not the way

10 it's going to be finally done.

11 Let me ask you again, Mark, about, you

12 mentioned that there were some human experiments with

13 the nerve agents in the '50's or '60's?

14 MR. BROWN: Yes.

15 DR. LASHOF: Is that correct?

16 MR. BROWN: There's a number, quite a

17 number of studies that came out of the Department of

18 Defense, Department of the Army, done in Edgewood and

19 Aberdeen in Maryland. Primarily, I think they were

20 done to evaluate the different treatments, safety

21 treatments, preventives, and also the effect, just in

22 a military sense, the effect of what would happen in


1 a military situation on exposure.

2 DR. LASHOF: What happened to those

3 people? I mean, what degree of exposure did they get?

4 Did we lose anybody in this experiment?

5 DR. TAYLOR: How were they selected?

6 MR. BROWN: Well I don't know that

7 exactly. I can say that there are a couple of

8 National Academy, three actually, National Academy of

9 Sciences studies, reports, looking, in fact, I think

10 Phil Landrigan was on one of the committees. Looking

11 at this data, and these publications exist where they

12 evaluated the long-term health consequences to these,

13 to these military volunteers.

14 And to make a long story short, they

15 didn't find, in the case of chemical weapon agents,

16 nerve agents, they really, they decided that there

17 were no long term lasting effects. There are some

18 problem with that experiment, these experiments

19 though, there weren't particular good records kept of

20 the doses that were used, sometimes people were

21 exposed to a combination of things. The experiments

22 were designed to give data about long-term health


1 consequences.

2 Nevertheless, the National Academy of

3 Science's studies that we reviewed as part of this

4 process concluded that probably there were no long-

5 term health consequences to that population.

6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I think it's worth

7 noting that there was extensive testing in the U.K. as

8 well.

9 DR. LASHOF: I'm sorry?

10 DR. TAYLOR: I'm sorry, John?

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In the U.K. with

12 human volunteers.

13 DR. LASHOF: Oh, really?

14 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: At Port and Down.

15 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Does anybody have any

16 reservations about the recommendations that Mark has

17 just presented to us? I guess not. We have time to

18 do one more before break. Let's move on. Joan?

19 MS. PORTER: Overhead?

20 MS. NISHIMI: Joan, you're going to need

21 to pull it up a little bit and speak up, thanks.

22 MS. PORTER: I'm going to speaking about


1 pyridostigmine bromide.

2 DR. LASHOF: We wanted to get to that

3 really.

4 MS. PORTER: In the Gulf War, the

5 Department of Defense sought to protect troops from

6 possible adverse health effects from any exposures to

7 chemical and biological warfare by providing them with

8 certain drug and vaccine products. Pyridostigmine

9 bromide, PB, is a pretreatment to be used in

10 combination with atropine and pralodoxine chloride,

11 that's 2-PAM-chloride, in the event of exposure to

12 nerve agents.

13 All U.S. troops received blister packs of

14 PB in the Gulf War. The PB pills were supposed to be

15 taken on the unit commander's order. DOD estimates

16 that approximately 250,000 personnel took at least

17 some PB in the Gulf War theater of operations.

18 PB has been used safely since 1955 by

19 persons with myasthenia gravis and at 7 to 17 times

20 higher doses than those taken in the Gulf War.

21 Past experience with the use of this drug

22 indicated that there would be some initial unpleasant


1 side effects, such as abdominal cramps, nausea,

2 diarrhea, for example, and indeed these occurred on a

3 transient basis in the Gulf War with PB use. The side

4 effects were rarely so debilitating as to require

5 medical order for discontinuance of use and side

6 effects abated when those who took PB adjusted to use

7 or when PB was discontinued.

8 May I have the next overhead? Thank you.

9 Some investigators have raised possible

10 concern about adverse health effects from PB use in

11 interaction with DEET and permethrin, insecticides

12 used in the theater of operations, or in conjunction

13 with several other stress or environmental exposures.

14 Other concerns are that a small number of

15 persons with genetic predispositions to sensitivities

16 to drugs such as PB might have long-term health

17 problems.

18 May I have the next overhead, please?

19 To date, studies have been inconclusive as

20 to their applicability to humans and have in some

21 cases involved animal models such as cockroaches,

22 chickens, and rats, given high doses of various types


1 of exposures incompatible with what Gulf War

2 participants would've encountered. At least three

3 studies have been conducted, one on cockroaches by Dr.

4 Moss when he was at the Department of Agriculture, a

5 second in chickens by Dr. Abou-donia of Duke

6 University, and a third in rats by the U.S. Army.

7 All three studies came to the same

8 conclusion. That is, enhanced toxic effects were

9 observed when these compounds are given in

10 combinations, at high doses, in some cases tens to

11 thousands or more times the amount that would have

12 been used in the Gulf War.

13 In all these studies, DEET and permethrin

14 were given by animals by routes of administration not

15 used by service personnel in the Gulf. In the

16 chicken, DEET and permethrin were given by injection

17 under the skin, for example.

18 The timing and use of these compounds

19 indicates a low probability that significant numbers

20 of troops were exposed to large doses of any of these

21 compounds and an even lower chance that service

22 personnel were exposed to large doses in combination.


1 The Department of Defense and the

2 Department of Veteran's Affairs, do continue to

3 support studies of effects of PB in their research

4 portfolios. For example, one project DOD awarded this

5 spring will examine the effects of pyridostigmine in

6 rats with genetic differences in culinogeric

7 sensitivity.

8 Another project will examine

9 neurobehavioral and immunological toxicity of

10 pyridostigmine, permethrin, and DEET in male and

11 female rats.

12 Numerous studies were conducted before the

13 war and since in both animals and humans that address

14 these safety and efficacy of PB.

15 Both DOD and VA are supporting additional

16 research on PB and PB in combination in interaction

17 with other exposures.

18 Synergism studies to date are based on

19 hypothesis and designs that will not provide immediate

20 definitive information about a correct connection

21 between PB use and long-term adverse health effects in

22 human.


1 In conclusion, Committee staff recommend

2 that the Committee conclude that it is unlikely that

3 health effects currently reported by some Gulf War

4 veterans result from exposure to PB. Additional

5 research to examine genetic susceptibility and/or

6 synergistic effects related to PB and other risk

7 factors is underway.

8 Whether more or different approaches are

9 warranted and should be funded is an open question,

10 but staff recommend that the Committee reach no

11 conclusion in this regard until it evaluates the

12 entire Federal research portfolio.

13 Questions?

14 DR. LASHOF: Thank you, Joan. One

15 question about the research that has been done on

16 pyridostigmine bromide and DEET and permethrin.

17 Certainly the Abou-donia study sacrificed the animals

18 just at the end of the administration.

19 MS. PORTER: Yes.

20 DR. LASHOF: So that there was no period

21 of time where he watched the animals after having

22 treated them, stopped it, and then waited a period of


1 time to then look at the effects, is that correct?

2 MS. PORTER: That's my understanding, yes.

3 So there was no, no chance to observe any long-term

4 effects of possibility of recovery.

5 DR. LASHOF: Of recovery. So what he does

6 report essentially are acute effects?

7 MS. PORTER: Yes.

8 DR. LASHOF: Resulting from the immediate

9 effects.

10 MS. PORTER: Immediate effects.

11 DR. LASHOF: I think we need to deal with

12 that in the write-up when we describe these studies

13 and what we learn from them.

14 What about the others? You mentioned two

15 other studies, the cockroaches and one of the others.

16 MS. PORTER: Study in rats.

17 DR. LASHOF: Were they also that acute

18 situation or did any of these studies give them the

19 two drugs and then wait and then examine the animals?

20 MS. PORTER: I believe both studies

21 observed, as did the Abou-donia study, that the short-

22 term immediate effects. The study performed by the


1 Department of the Army in rats was done by Gavage at

2 high doses as well. And the study, studies done by

3 Dr. Moss involved administration of several different

4 pesticides and PB and other chemicals in combination.

5 But they were observing short-term effects.

6 DR. LASHOF: Short term. So when we look

7 at the future research, research that would really

8 mimic what happened in the Gulf, certainly is

9 something that would need to be done.

10 But obviously at this point it would seem

11 unlikely that if you can't demonstrate much in the way

12 of acute, that you're not going to demonstrate the

13 other. But where there has been some minor findings

14 in the acute, doesn't really tell us much at all about

15 what happens after you stop and wait months and months

16 later. And so that research has yet to be done.

17 Any other questions? John?

18 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: What is the situation

19 with regard to FDA approval for this particular

20 indication?

21 MS. PORTER: For pyridostigmine bromide?



1 MS. PORTER: As we heard at our May 1st

2 and 2nd meeting, the Department of Defense and the

3 Food and Drug Administration continued to consult

4 about the kinds of studies that need to be done to see

5 if PB can be approved for the military use.

6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Would that be a

7 useful recommendation that, that is that continued

8 effort toward getting the full FDA approval for this

9 use be carried out?

10 DR. TAYLOR: I think that would have to

11 wait until after the research is done first. Right?

12 Or are we recommending that they use it --

13 DR. LARSON: Not really. Because the

14 approval process requires the research and the data.

15 So it would make sense to make a recommendation that

16 the FDA approval for this use be pursued.

17 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It's a, it's a tricky

18 problem because one has typically to deal with both

19 the safety and efficacy. And I don't know you deal

20 with efficacy in a clinical trial.

21 MS. PORTER: Yes, as we noted before, I

22 think that it is challenging to devise studies that


1 can be done in an ethical fashion to produce a

2 definitive, a result about efficacy. But the plans

3 and data are being assembled and NDA has been

4 submitted by the Department of Defense to FDA to

5 consider the approval.

6 DR. LASHOF: They have filed for, to get

7 approval.

8 MS. PORTER: Yes.

9 DR. LASHOF: Without trying to do some,

10 and I guess you'd have to request approval without

11 trying to do some, and I guess you'd have to request

12 approval without the usual, some of the usual

13 requirements on efficacy.

14 MS. NISHIMI: It's a negotiation between

15 the DOD and FDA on what the appropriate experiments

16 are and so-called surrogate endpoints to be used in

17 evaluating.

18 DR. TAYLOR: So do they have those yet?

19 MS. NISHIMI: That's a negotiation between

20 the person filing the NDA and the FDA and that's what

21 they're looking at right now.

22 DR. LASHOF: Well, we can re-visit this


1 closer to the time the report gets put to bed and see

2 what comment we want to make about the FDA process.

3 It's something we should continue to monitor and hold

4 our decision about what recommendation until then.

5 Other concerns? Other suggestions about

6 recommendations? Any reservations? Art?

7 DR. CAPLAN: Can we say more about the

8 long-term follow-up in that myasthenia gravis

9 population with the high doses? I mean, that really

10 was the reason that they put it out on the

11 battlefield, they felt they had clinical experience

12 with it.

13 But have those people been followed long

14 term?

15 MS. PORTER: Yes. It's been, PB has been

16 licensed for use for persons who have myasthenia

17 gravis since 1955 and it's been, been used safely in

18 that regard. And as pointed out, at doses that are

19 considerably higher than those used in the Gulf War

20 and for periods of time that are considerably longer

21 than those used in the Gulf War.

22 DR. LASHOF: It's a lifetime use, once


1 they start.

2 MS. PORTER: Yes.

3 DR. LASHOF: Any other questions? Any

4 other concerns? Any other recommendations? If not,

5 I told you staff, you did a great job. I think we can

6 take our lunch break at this point and we will resume

7 at 1:15.

8 (Whereupon a recess was taken.)
















1 A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N

2 (1:21 p.m.)

3 DR. LASHOF: We're minus a couple members,

4 but I think they'll be along very quickly.

5 And we're up to the infectious disease

6 issues and Kelley Brix. Kelley, you want to walk us

7 through where you stand with the infectious disease

8 issues?

9 MS. BRIX: Today I'd like to provide an

10 assessment in endemic infectious diseases as a

11 potential risk factor during the Gulf War. I'll be

12 covering four topics. The first one is some

13 background information on the types of infectious

14 disease which were prevalent in the Gulf War region.

15 The second topic will cover the infectious

16 diseases which were diagnoses amongst military

17 personnel during the war.

18 The third topic is the infectious diseases

19 that have been diagnosed amongst veterans since

20 they've returned home.

21 The final topic will be to draw some

22 conclusions.


1 Can I have the first slide, please? I

2 have it already.

3 On the basis of experience with infectious

4 disease amongst military personnel during World War

5 II, U.S. troops stationed in the Persian Gulf were

6 expected to be at especially high risk for a number of

7 diseases. These include shigella, which can cause

8 diarrhea; malaria; sandfly fever; and cutaneous

9 leishmaniasis.

10 Could I have the next slide, please?

11 In fact, there were no deaths due to

12 infectious disease reported in U.S. troops during the

13 war and infectious diseases were not a major cause of

14 illness or lost work time. This has been attributed

15 to a number of preventive medicine efforts that were

16 taken to minimize several risks. These include

17 arthropod-born diseases, these are flies and

18 mosquitos; venomous and biting insects; food-born

19 illnesses; water-born illnesses; and respiratory

20 infections.

21 Could I have the next slide, please?

22 During the war, the incidents of specific


1 infectious diseases was generally lower than expected.

2 In theater, the most frequently reported infectious

3 diseases were generally mild cases of short-term

4 diarrhea and upper respiratory infections, such as

5 colds or flu. Neither of these would be likely to

6 lead to long-term consequences. The data suggests

7 that no route of infectious disease was common, other

8 than the ingestion of tainted food or water.

9 Military personnel were evaluated for

10 several arthropod-born diseases, including malaria,

11 sandfly fever, and leishmaniasis. Seven cases where

12 malaria were diagnosed, no outbreak of sandfly fever

13 was observed. There were a total of 12 cases of

14 viscetropic leishmaniasis and 20 cases of cutaneous

15 leishmaniasis diagnosed amongst U.S. troops. These

16 two types of leishmaniasis are the only endemic

17 infectious disease that were symptomatic and were not

18 diagnosed for as long as a few months after the troops

19 returned home.

20 The cutaneous form causes a characteristic

21 skin rash, which is ulcerative or nodular, it can

22 persist for more than a year if it's not treated.


1 Viscetropic leishmaniasis is not

2 considered to be a cause of widespread illness, even

3 though it can sometimes be difficult to confirm the

4 diagnosis. This is because all the individuals that

5 had the viscetropic form, except for one, had

6 characteristic objective signs of the disease, and

7 these included high fever, enlarged lymph nodes,

8 enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen. Leishmaniasis is

9 transmitted by insect bites and there is no evidence

10 of person-to-person transmission.

11 Can I have the next slide, please?

12 There are three types of clinical data

13 that are available on the types of infectious disease

14 diagnosed amongst veterans since their return home.

15 These are the results of the CCEP, the results of the

16 Persian Gulf Registry, and the results of the VA's

17 mortality study. Today I'll be focusing on the

18 results of the CCEP.

19 Infectious disease have not been a

20 frequent cause of serious illness in the majority of

21 the CCEP population of 18,075 veterans. Most of the

22 infectious diseases that have been seen have been


1 relatively minor conditions. A total of 9 percent,

2 excuse me, of the veterans, or 1,627, have had a

3 primary or secondary diagnosis of infectious disease.

4 Of these, 1,050 have been fungal infections. Skin

5 infections due to fungi, which are common in the U.S.

6 are by far the most prevalent type of infectious

7 disease. A common example of this would be athlete's

8 foot.

9 The second most common general category

10 infectious disease has been viral hepatitis. There

11 have been 103 cases of hepatitis B or hepatitis C

12 infections, these are also common in the general U.S.

13 population and more than 50 percent of these

14 infections are asymptomatic. Sexually transmitted

15 diseases have been rare in the CCEP population.

16 Can I have the next slide, please?

17 Among 332 spouses of veterans who have

18 been evaluated in the CCEP, a total of 23 individuals

19 have a primary or secondary diagnosis of infectious

20 disease. These have included fungal skin infections,

21 vaginal yeast infections, warts, and one case of

22 tuberculosis. All of these are known to be common in


1 the general U.S. population.

2 There have been 191 children of veterans

3 who have been evaluated in the CCEP. And 17 of them

4 have had a primary or secondary diagnosis of a

5 infectious disease. These have included upper

6 respiratory infections, such as colds, ear aches,

7 fungal skin infections, and chronic pneumonia. All

8 of these are common childhood infectious diseases in

9 the U.S. population, with the exception of chronic

10 pneumonia.

11 I'd like to note that this is based on a

12 relatively small number of individuals who have

13 spouses and children. The VA has recently started a

14 program to evaluate spouses and children, which will

15 provide more data on their health problems.

16 Next slide, please.

17 Several conclusions can be drawn from the

18 CCEP data. First, a variety of organ systems have

19 been affected by infectious disease in Gulf War

20 veterans without any observable patterns. The great

21 majority of these infectious diseases are relatively

22 minor conditions which would not explain serious


1 persistent systemic complaints.

2 To date, few veterans have demonstrated

3 the classical objective, physical and laboratory

4 abnormalities that would indicate a chronic infectious

5 process, such as documented fever, elevated white

6 blood cell count, enlarged lymph nodes, enlarged

7 liver, or enlarged spleen.

8 On the basis of current clinical evidence,

9 it is unlikely that veterans have infections that have

10 invaded the systematic diagnostic efforts which have

11 been mandated in the two registry exams.

12 In conclusion, the staff recommend that

13 the Committee conclude that it is unlikely that

14 infectious diseases endemic to the Persian Gulf region

15 are associated with long-term health effects in Gulf

16 War veterans, except in a small finite number of

17 individuals.

18 Now, I'd like to take some questions,

19 please.

20 DR. LASHOF: You comment in your

21 organized, in your more detailed material for us, what

22 we do and don't know about microplasma, since that's


1 been the major infectious disease that has been put

2 forward as a hypothesis. Would you say a little bit

3 more about where we stand and what we do and don't

4 know in that regard?

5 MS. BRIX: First of all, there are a

6 number of microplasmas that can infect humans. The

7 one type of microplasma that has been suggested as a

8 possible etiology in some Gulf War veterans is the

9 type called microplasma fermenten incognitus strain.

10 This can infect humans and in fact has been shown to

11 cause disease in AIDS patients. It is not at all

12 common to note, to have been shown to cause other

13 kinds of serious diseases in patients who do not have

14 AIDS.

15 So far, there have not been any controlled

16 studies of microplasma in Gulf War veterans. There

17 have been no instances where there's been any studies

18 published where Gulf War veterans who were ill and

19 Gulf War veterans who were healthy were compared on

20 their, on their rates of microplasma infection.

21 There are two projects that are starting,

22 or are ongoing that will be looking at this question.


1 The BAA is funding a project which will be looking at

2 the prevalence of microplasma incognitus in Gulf War

3 veterans. In addition to that, there is an ongoing

4 project that has already started that is at Walter

5 Reed Hospital and that's being done by Dr. Chung and

6 Dr. Wo and they are looking at the rates of

7 microplasma in both ill and healthy Gulf War veterans.

8 MS. NISHIMI: I just want to clarify, I

9 believe under the BAA, they are intending to fund, but

10 that's still being negotiated, is that not correct?

11 MS. BRIX: That's my understanding, but I

12 think it's likely it will be funded.

13 MS. NISHIMI: No. But we don't have

14 specific details on that because it is a contract

15 that's still be negotiated.

16 MS. BRIX: That's right.

17 MS. NISHIMI: I think that's important for

18 the Committee to realize.

19 DR. LARSON: A couple of follow-up things

20 on that. Who is funding the Walter Reed study?

21 MS. BRIX: I think it's being internally

22 funded by Walter Reed research funds.


1 DR. LARSON: Okay. And what's the status,

2 how far along is that?

3 MS. BRIX: I believe it's just been going

4 for a few months.

5 DR. LARSON: Okay. And you, you also note

6 that Dr. Nicolson has been sent some blinded blood

7 samples to test and has, CDC has been trying to

8 collaborate with him on some studies. What's the

9 status of that since our last meeting in San Antonio?

10 MS. BRIX: The CDC asked Dr. Nicolson if

11 he would collaborate with them. It was almost a year

12 ago, in July or August of 1995. They offered to send

13 him some blood samples to test.

14 DR. LARSON: Okay.

15 MS. BRIX: But he has not accepted them

16 yet. He has verbally expressed interest in

17 collaborating with the CDC, but so far he has not

18 started to do that. So right now the collaboration

19 has not started or taken place.

20 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? Is that it?

21 Marguerite?

22 MAJOR KNOX: Kelley, you said that we had


1 103 cases of hepatitis B?

2 MS. BRIX: Yes, that's right.

3 MAJOR KNOX: Were those individuals not

4 vaccinated prior to the Gulf War?

5 MS. BRIX: Actually I should take a step

6 back. There were 103 cases of hepatitis B or

7 hepatitis C. The majority of those, most of those

8 people, were hepatitis C infections for which there is

9 no vaccination. I'd have to look in my paper, there's

10 something like 37 cases of hepatitis B. Vaccination

11 is only really given to people who are healthcare

12 workers. The general population is, is not usually

13 given the hepatitis B vaccination.

14 MAJOR KNOX: But isn't that one of the

15 vaccinations that you receive if you're going abroad?

16 MS. BRIX: Not that I'm aware of. I don't

17 think it's on the list that I have seen.

18 MAJOR KNOX: Okay.

19 MS. BRIX: They have recently added the

20 hepatitis A immunization, since that's become

21 available. But I'm not sure that the average

22 serviceman gets the hepatitis B vaccination.


1 MAJOR KNOX: That's something we just look

2 into right now.

3 DR. LASHOF: They do get gama-globulin,

4 but the ability of gama-globulin to protect against

5 hepatitis B is probably not very great.

6 MS. BRIX: Right. Right.

7 DR. LASHOF: But I'm glad to hear they're

8 now getting hepatitis A instead of just continuing

9 with gama-globulin.

10 MS. BRIX: They've added that, they've

11 added that since it's become available.

12 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? I think

13 then if there are no further questions and any problem

14 with recommendation as stated in your paper? If not,

15 I think we can move on to the next one. If I look at

16 my paper, I'll even know who is next. Mark, back to

17 you for biological warfare weapons.

18 MR. BROWN: Biological weapons now. From

19 the beginning of the Gulf War, U.S. military planners

20 were concerned about the possibility that Iraq could

21 use a number of biological weapon agents against our

22 troops, against U.S. troops. And two of the most


1 commonly developed, weaponized biological agents of

2 concern, were anthrax, which is a bacterial disease,

3 and botulinum toxin, which is not, botulinum toxin is

4 not a disease per say, it's a highly poisonous protein

5 produced by a bacteria.

6 And I've listed here some of the types of

7 symptoms that these agents cause with the idea of

8 emphasizing the very serious nature of these agents.

9 They are designed to be lethal incapacitating agents.

10 They cause, the symptoms that you see described there

11 are quite serious, severe and life threatening. And

12 just to make the obvious point, they, people who

13 suffer from those types of symptoms, from exposure to

14 those agents, the results are almost always fatal

15 within a few days if left untreated.

16 In terms of what happens to people who are

17 exposed to less, lesser amounts of these agents, that

18 is to say amounts that don't cause these very severe

19 symptoms that I've described, that I've illustrated

20 here.

21 In the case of anthrax, people have

22 estimated, just to base on animal data, that exposure


1 inhalation, which is the route of inoculation, but

2 from the that causes this disease, inhalation of as

3 few as nine spores can lead to death in some

4 individuals, some humans.

5 In the case of botulinum toxin, people who

6 are exposed for some reason to lesser amounts than

7 would cause those type of effects probably would have

8 no long-term health consequences.

9 In fact, staff have determined that the

10 Food and Drug Administration has licensed botulinum

11 toxin at doses, obviously much lower than would lead

12 to these lethal effects, for certain therapeutic uses,

13 for the treatment of certain diseases in humans. The

14 only long-term consequence from these low level

15 exposures appear to be, in some instances, patients

16 show a slight immune reaction and a desensitization.

17 And again, the case of anthrax, it's an all or nothing

18 effect, if you don't get enough to show these severe

19 symptoms, then as far as we know, there are no health

20 effects.

21 Can I have the next transparency?

22 After the Gulf War was over,


1 investigations by the United Nations Special

2 Commission on Iraq, UNSCOM, found an additional

3 biological weapon agent that wasn't anticipated, and

4 that's aflatoxin. So we also took a look of what

5 would be the effects of exposure to U.S. troops, U.S.

6 personnel to this agent.

7 We have quite a bit of information about

8 aflatoxin as a public health concern. It's usually a

9 public health concern in the context of a contaminant,

10 it's a fungal metabolite produced by fungal that gets

11 into stored grain products that are improperly stored

12 that get wet, for instance.

13 And there is an issue that with humans,

14 there, it's pretty clear that exposure to low levels

15 of aflatoxin can lead to liver cancer in the decades

16 following exposure.

17 But there is some data as well that staff

18 came across about the effects of very high exposure to

19 these agents. These instances are usually in the form

20 of case reports or group populations, particularly in

21 developing countries who for one reason or another ate

22 food products that were highly contaminated with the


1 aflatoxin, with the fungus and the aflatoxin products.

2 And in these case studies, they report immediate toxic

3 effects, including some of the symptoms I have listed

4 there and at very high exposure, these materials lead

5 to, apparently cause death from massive liver damage.

6 With these observations, I'd like to try

7 a few recommendations, staff recommendations.

8 First, staff recommend that the Committee

9 conclude that exposure to biological weapon agents

10 during the Gulf War is unlikely to be responsible for

11 symptoms reported by Gulf War veterans today.

12 Secondly, in the case of aflatoxin, if

13 ongoing investigations identify any Gulf War veterans

14 who were exposed to this agent during the Gulf War,

15 then it might be appropriate to monitor that

16 population for increased rates of liver cancer in the

17 coming decades.

18 I'll answer any questions.

19 DR. LASHOF: As far as the second

20 recommendation goes, if ongoing investigations, now,

21 what investigations are ongoing that would relate to

22 exposure to aflatoxin? Do you know of any? Do we


1 have any idea as to how the troops might have been

2 exposed to aflatoxin?

3 MR. BROWN: I guess PGIT, you never know,

4 they might find something. And UNSCOM, UNSCOM is also

5 investigating, continues to investigate weapons of

6 mass destruction that Iraq had.

7 I suppose it's conceivable and this is the

8 thought that led to this conclusion, it's conceivable

9 that evidence could surface which we don't have now

10 indicating that biological, exposure to biological

11 weapon agents. If for instance, it turned out that a

12 bunker that was destroyed, not bunker 73, but if a

13 bunker was destroyed that turned out to have

14 biological weapon agents, at this point I want to

15 emphasize, we have no information to suggest that any

16 troops were even exposed to aflatoxin.

17 DR. LASHOF: Do we have much information

18 about how much aflatoxin they had and where it was

19 deployed, and you know, what has UNSCOM told us about

20 the deployment of aflatoxin?

21 MR. BROWN: My understanding is that we

22 have an amount, there's a, I forget what the exact


1 figure is, but an amount of aflatoxin that was

2 discovered. And Iraq had aflatoxin in weaponized

3 forms actually, in some kind of, I'm not exactly

4 familiar with how these weapons work precisely, but in

5 some form that was suitable for mounting on a bomb or

6 a missile.

7 DR. LASHOF: Similar, I would assume then,

8 to how they, the rockets that had nerve gas in it?

9 MR. BROWN: Quite likely.

10 DR. LASHOF: I think it would be similar

11 with that.

12 MR. BROWN: Yes, that's my assumption.

13 DR. LASHOF: John?

14 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Aflatoxin seems like

15 such an unlikely choice, is there information on acute

16 toxicity?

17 MR. BROWN: Well, I'm sorry, yes, the case

18 studies that I was referring to are, have to do with

19 acute toxicity. That is to say, immediate toxic

20 effects that show up, you know, you know, within hours

21 of exposure. And it can lead to severe poisoning and

22 even death.


1 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But at very high

2 concentrations, I presume?

3 MR. BROWN: Not necessarily. The, the, it

4 turns out that there is a tremendous range of

5 sensitivities in different animal species. Some

6 animals, including some avian species, some birds, are

7 quite sensitive to the lethal effects of aflatoxin.

8 I don't know, we could not find any

9 references to human toxicity values, acute toxicity

10 values for these agents. So in a sense, we can only

11 speculate that that was their, that that was the

12 intention.

13 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It seems like such an

14 unlikely agent that anyone reading the report will

15 likely demand some evidence or data. So I think

16 referencing this one carefully is important.

17 MR. BROWN: Unfortunately, the data on

18 acute toxicity is, is somewhat limited because of the,

19 when these studies were done, they were done by a

20 medical public health people in developing countries,

21 looking at populations that had eaten, that were

22 determined to have eaten a lot of contaminated food,


1 food contaminated with the fungus that produces this

2 poison.

3 And we don't really have any, it's not a

4 good way to accumulate exposure data to determine what

5 the actual effective dose, say, of this particular

6 chemical might be.

7 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But, but also the

8 data that suggests the Iraqis were, intended to use

9 this as a biological weapon.

10 MS. NISHIMI: But that's data from UNSCOM

11 and that, we --

12 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: That seems secure?

13 MS. NISHIMI: We talked about that in the

14 interim report, I mean.

15 MR. BROWN: Yes. The data that, we can

16 speculate about exactly what the Iraqis had in mind.

17 I'm speculating that they were looking at the acute

18 lethal effects.

19 But it's certain that Iraq had these

20 materials developed. That seems to be solid UNSCOM --

21 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: The U.N. literally

22 recovered --


1 MR. BROWN: My understanding, yes, that's

2 my understanding. They actually recovered --

3 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Munitions containing

4 aflatoxin?

5 MR. BROWN: Yes.

6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: So they literally

7 produced kilogram quantities?

8 MR. BROWN: Yes.

9 DR. LASHOF: Any other questions?

10 Comments? Any problem with the recommendation in this

11 regard? I think that one's pretty solid. Okay.

12 Joan, you're going to talk about the

13 vaccines, is that correct?

14 MS. PORTER: I'm going to talk about

15 botulinum toxoid vaccine and anthrax vaccine.

16 In the Gulf War, the Department of Defense

17 sought to protect troops from possible adverse health

18 effects from any exposures to biological warfare by

19 providing them with vaccine products.

20 Two vaccines used in the Gulf War were

21 botulinum toxoid, BT vaccine, and anthrax vaccine.

22 DOD estimates that approximately 8,000 military


1 personnel received at least one dose of the BT vaccine

2 during the Gulf War and about 150,000 received the

3 anthrax vaccine.

4 The BT vaccine had been used safely since

5 1971, as accepted prophylaxis for industry and

6 laboratory workers who are at risk of exposure to the

7 deadly botulinum toxins. And before Gulf War, over

8 10,000 inoculations had been given.

9 May I have the next overhead, please?

10 Information available at the time of the

11 Gulf War indicated that individuals could experience

12 side effects associated with vaccination,

13 predominantly at the injection site. Such local

14 effects included pain, tenderness, swelling, redness,

15 and itching. Systemic reaction such as fever,

16 tiredness, headache and/or muscle pain could also

17 occur. Rarely, a lump developed at the injection site

18 that generally went away within several weeks.

19 The rate of adverse reactions during the

20 Gulf War closely paralleled the percentages and type

21 documented prior to the war. These types of adverse

22 reactions associated with BT vaccine are also seen


1 with other licensed toxoid vaccines such as diphtheria

2 and tetanus toxoids.

3 Since 1971, the anthrax vaccine has been

4 routinely used in at-risk populations such as

5 laboratory personnel, who worked with bacillus

6 anthraxus, employees in textile mills where imported

7 goat hair is processed, and veterinarians who come in

8 contact with infected animals.

9 Information available at the time of the

10 Gulf War indicated that up to 6 percent of the

11 recipients will experience mild discomfort at the

12 inoculation site for up to 72 hours. Less than 1

13 percent will have more severe local reactions,

14 potentially limiting the use of the arm for one to two

15 days. Systemic reactions, for example fever, malaise,

16 are uncommon. There have been no long-term adverse

17 consequences demonstrated. During the Gulf War, there

18 was one known hospitalization for a vaccination site

19 infection.

20 There are some well characterized short-

21 term health effects of BT vaccine and anthrax vaccine,

22 but there is no convincing theoretical or empirical


1 evidence that the use of these vaccines in the Gulf

2 War resulted in long-term health problems.

3 Staff recommend that the Committee

4 conclude that there is sufficient information

5 available today to make a determination that there are

6 no likely long-term health effects from potential

7 exposure to BT and/or anthrax vaccines used during the

8 Gulf War.

9 Questions?

10 DR. LASHOF: Couple questions. Botulinum

11 toxoid now has been used in some 10,000 people so

12 there seems to be adequate information on its safety.

13 MS. PORTER: That's 10,000 doses, and that

14 was prior to Gulf War.

15 DR. LASHOF: Prior to Gulf War?

16 MS. PORTER: Yes.

17 DR. LASHOF: So there were lots more since

18 Gulf War?

19 MS. PORTER: Yes.

20 DR. LASHOF: But it is still an

21 investigational vaccine, that is it's not licensed?

22 MS. PORTER: It is not yet licensed, but


1 DOD is pursuing licensure for the BT vaccine.

2 DR. LASHOF: That, that was my question,

3 good. Okay. Let's keep a track on --

4 MS. PORTER: It's a priority for DOD to

5 have this particular vaccine licensed.

6 DR. LASHOF: Okay. The question

7 concerning possible contamination of these vaccines.

8 You want to comment further on that and do we want to

9 make any recommendation regarding any of the issues

10 around the so-called theory that the vaccines might

11 have been contaminated with microplasma?

12 MS. PORTER: At our May 1st and 2nd

13 meeting, this question came up with some presentations

14 that were made by Dr. Anna Whitaker Johnson. And

15 since that time we've tried to follow-up a little bit

16 to have further information on possible contamination.

17 That really does not seem possible for several

18 reasons.

19 With the anthrax vaccine, for example, the

20 microplasma is a very finicky type of organism, and

21 the media which are used to grow anthrax vaccines are

22 not really compatible with microplasma.


1 Also, there is a sterilization process

2 wherein steam is used, which would kill the

3 microplasma, if any were there, and in the final

4 stages of preparation, formaldehyde, a very small

5 amount of formaldehyde is used, which would also not

6 permit any microplasma to grow.

7 Now with the BT vaccine, the way it is

8 prepared is slightly different from the anthrax

9 vaccine, but there is used in this vaccine thimerosal,

10 which is an antibacterial, which would make it not

11 possible for microplasma to be in these vaccines.

12 DR. LASHOF: Would it not be appropriate

13 for us to make a recommendation concerning, -- that we

14 also find it unlikely that illness could be used to

15 contaminated vaccines?

16 MS. PORTER: You mean make a finding?

17 DR. LASHOF: A finding.

18 MS. PORTER: A finding.

19 DR. LASHOF: Finding, not a

20 recommendation, a finding.

21 MS. PORTER: That seems warranted to me.

22 If the Committee thinks that is appropriate.


1 DR. LARSON: Just a point of clarification

2 about that. In a lot of products, formaldehyde and

3 thimerosal are used to inhibit growth, but not at

4 levels that will kill. What was the percentage of

5 these agents in the preparation, was it enough to kill

6 the microplasma?

7 MS. PORTER: My understanding is that it

8 was. I don't have the exact percentages, but we can

9 find that for you.

10 DR. LARSON: Because, you know, in an

11 analogous way, outbreaks have occurred from soap,

12 liquid soap with antibacterial agents in it

13 contaminated with microorganisms.

14 So, I just want to make, when you say

15 there's an antibacterial product and that microplasma

16 doesn't have a cell wall, so it's a little, it's

17 killed a little bit differently than other bacteria,

18 it's not killed the same way, let's just be sure that

19 the agents there could, would kill the microplasmas.

20 MS. PORTER: We can revisit that by --

21 DR. LARSON: And if that's the case, than

22 I would feel comfortable, but not unless we're sure.


1 MS. PORTER: So your question is, the

2 amount of thimerosal that is present?

3 DR. LARSON: Yeah.

4 MS. PORTER: In the BT vaccine preparation

5 and if that is sufficient to kill any microplasma.

6 DR. LARSON: And also the mechanism of, I

7 mean, and I don't know, you know more about

8 formaldehyde, does it, a little tiny bit will do it?

9 I don't know what percent is needed to kill.

10 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It seems to me the

11 point is that you're trying to differentiate a spore

12 from a bacteria. And the spore is, is very resistent.

13 So I think it could go to --

14 MS. PORTER: No, the microplasma isn't

15 spores.

16 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: No, but the anthrax

17 is.

18 MS. PORTER: Oh, okay. Yeah, sorry.

19 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: And so the, I would

20 suppose that the process conditions are those which,

21 which will allow the spore to survive, but will

22 sterilize the microorganisms.


1 MS. PORTER: But I don't if microplasma is

2 sensitive to thimerosal, for example?

3 DR. LARSON: It's just information we

4 need. If it is and somebody knows, fine.

5 MS. PORTER: We'll follow up.

6 DR. LARSON: Thanks.

7 DR. LASHOF: John, just to correct, you

8 killed the spore in making the vaccine. It's a kill,

9 it's a kill

10 vaccine.

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Oh, excuse me, yes.

12 The spore is the agent, excuse me.

13 DR. LASHOF: Yes, the spore is the agent

14 and we kill it.

15 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: It's been a long

16 time.

17 DR. LASHOF: We're not giving them long.

18 All right. Marguerite?

19 MAJOR KNOX: Joan, when they talked about

20 these vaccinations, there was some discussion about

21 receiving so many vaccinations at one time may depress

22 the immune system. Is there any work or any studies


1 that are ongoing that might look at that in the

2 future?

3 MS. PORTER: Not, not in a general way.

4 You'll recall at the May 1st and 2nd meeting, we had

5 a report on boosters that were given to personnel who

6 received both anthrax and botulinum toxoid vaccine in

7 the Gulf War to see if the boosters in any way

8 interfered with one another or caused health problems.

9 And the data that were reported there in this

10 particular study indicated that there were not any

11 unexpected adverse reactions.

12 I think that you might say that our immune

13 systems are challenged all the time with a variety of

14 antigens every day. And our immune system manages to

15 resist those.

16 Also, if you think of situations in which

17 people travel overseas and they receive a whole

18 battery of tests and a whole battery of vaccinations

19 and so on. One doesn't see effects on the immune

20 system.

21 MS. NISHIMI: Marguerite, -- medicine is

22 looking at, they have a committee to look at


1 combinations of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. And if

2 that study proceeds on time, the Committee would be

3 able to avail itself of the results of that study. So

4 I think that probably addresses your more broader

5 question.


7 DR. LASHOF: I think also from childhood

8 immunizations, the number of immunizations we're now

9 giving kids is I think probably even more than one

10 takes when one goes overseas on a relatively short

11 period of time without adverse effects.

12 All right. Any other comments? Any

13 problems with the staff recommendation and the

14 finding? Okay.

15 DR. TAYLOR: You know, I guess, one other

16 question I wanted to ask about the vaccines.

17 DR. LASHOF: Oh, sure. I'm sorry, please.

18 DR. TAYLOR: I remember earlier, we

19 weren't certain how many of our troops received the

20 vaccines versus those who didn't. Do we have any more

21 information regarding that, Joan? Or was that

22 investigated?


1 MS. PORTER: No. The estimates stand as

2 they were when the interim report was prepared. We

3 don't really have any more definitive information

4 because there hasn't been much progress identifying

5 medical records. So we still bank on the same

6 estimates.

7 MS. NISHIMI: I wouldn't expect that that

8 would change. The interim report quite directly makes

9 a point that medical recordkeeping was wholly

10 inadequate and we're just going to have to stop at

11 that point and I think acknowledge exactly what the

12 interim report said again in the final report.

13 DR. LARSON: I just want to make the point

14 that we do need to be very sure because while it's

15 highly, highly unlikely, practically impossible, these

16 things have happened and we need to be clear that we

17 have really looked at this. I mean, the numbers of

18 people that got these vaccines prior to the Gulf War

19 are very small. We would never have known about

20 guion-beret if there hadn't of been hundreds and

21 hundreds of thousands of people immunized for flu.

22 So, we just, we had a natural experiment,


1 if you will, with thousands and thousands of people

2 immunized at the same, or very similar time in a short

3 period of time, for the first time with these

4 vaccines.

5 So I'm comfortable with the

6 recommendations, but I really do want to make sure

7 that these ingredients were killing microplasma, which

8 are different to kill than bacteria.

9 MS. NISHIMI: I think we know where to

10 take this one and we'll report back to you on some of

11 the precise details.

12 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Very good. All right.

13 Moving right along, depleted uranium. Mike, that's

14 your baby.

15 MR. KOWALOK: Thank you. My remarks will

16 provide a few points about DU exposures during the

17 war, associates health effects, and preliminary staff

18 recommendations.

19 During the Gulf War, U.S. tanks and some

20 U.S. aircraft fired munitions made of depleted

21 uranium. DU is nearly twice as dense as lead and is

22 effective in enhancing the performance of armor and


1 armor penetrators.

2 Like other munitions, DU rounds produce

3 shrapnel and an aerolized dust whenever they strike a

4 hard target or ignite in an accidental munitions fire.

5 As you know, many veterans are concerned

6 that exposures to DU-contaminated debris are a

7 contributing factor in their reported illnesses.

8 According to my first slide here, is a sort of summary

9 of the exposures.

10 A review by the U.S. General Accounting

11 Office found that only a few dozen soldiers are known

12 to have been exposed to DU during friendly fire

13 episodes, or from duties in retrieving or servicing

14 vehicles damaged by DU munitions.

15 However, as evident in the testimony

16 provided to this Committee, there is much public

17 concern that thousands of troops could have

18 inadvertently and unknowingly inhaled DU dust

19 particles whenever they had incidental contact with a

20 vehicle that may have been destroyed by DU munitions

21 or whenever they lived or worked in areas that may

22 have been contaminated with DU dust from accidental


1 munitions fires.

2 Let me have the second slide, please.

3 About the health effects of uranium.

4 Uranium is a naturally occurring heavy

5 metal that is chemically toxic and slightly

6 radioactive. Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the

7 process by which uranium, natural uranium is depleted

8 of its most diginible isotope.

9 DU has the same toxicology properties and

10 approximately half of the radioactivity of natural

11 uranium and the health effects of DU mimic those of

12 natural uranium.

13 Years of occupational health experience

14 within the domestic uranium industry, has shown that

15 natural uranium poses little radiological or

16 toxicological health threat, while external to the

17 body. Internalized uranium, however, is associated

18 with kidney toxicity and may be linked to radiation

19 induced lung or bone cancer.

20 The literature indicates that the kidney

21 is the most sensitive organ to uranium's toxicological

22 effects and is the critical target organ for risk


1 assessment.

2 The data about uranium's radiological

3 effect is equivocal. Human and animal studies do not

4 indicate that uranium causes cancer and if it does,

5 any such cancer risk would be small because of

6 uranium's long half life and low specific activity.

7 In fact, the specific activity of uranium is so low,

8 that kidney damage will likely appear from uranium's

9 chemical effects at doses that are lower than those

10 that would cause an appreciable risk of cancer from

11 its radiation effects.

12 It is for this reason that uranium is

13 regulated, based on its chemical toxicity, not on its

14 radiological properties.

15 May I have the next slide, please? This

16 is a look at the clinical observations within the DOD

17 and VA registered programs.

18 It is important to note that clinical data

19 from the DOD and VA registry programs demonstrate that

20 few Gulf War veterans are experiencing kidney diseases

21 of any type and of any origin. Another key point is

22 that the soldiers who received the greatest internal


1 exposures to DU are the ones who survive friendly fire

2 episodes. These troops have the greatest potential to

3 inhale or ingest DU aerosols and many of them still

4 retain imbedded fragments of DU shrapnel.

5 The VA is monitoring the health status of

6 these individuals and to date, no evidence of kidney

7 toxicity has been observed within this group.

8 These points bring us to staff

9 recommendation. Staff recommend that the Committee

10 conclude the following:

11 (1) It is unlikely that exposures to

12 depleted uranium are responsible for the symptoms

13 reported by Gulf War veterans.

14 (2) The VA should continue to monitor and

15 treat those individuals with imbedded fragments of DU

16 shrapnel.

17 (3) Further research is needed to better

18 evaluate the long-term health risks associated with

19 imbedded fragments of DU shrapnel.

20 And (4) The VA should consistently gather

21 data about bone and lung cancer in future mortality

22 follow-up studies.


1 DR. LASHOF: Thank you. Questions for

2 Mike? John?

3 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Thanks. How does the

4 toxicity of lead compare with that of uranium?

5 MR. KOWALOK: I, I do not know. Much more

6 is known about the toxicity of lead. But relative to

7 the other, I wouldn't want to speculate about.

8 MR. BROWN: Well, I can just add, I think

9 that they are somewhat similar, as to their acute

10 toxicity. But a major difference is that lead

11 persists in the body, to many routes of administration

12 at any rate, for much longer rates than does uranium.

13 In other words, uranium has a shorter half life.

14 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But uranium is

15 cumulative as well, is it not?

16 MR. BROWN: I'm sorry?

17 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Isn't uranium

18 cumulative as well?

19 MR. BROWN: It is, but is has a shorter

20 half life.

21 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In the body? And do

22 you know what method is used to assay for uranium in


1 circulation? Is there a current assay?

2 MR. KOWALOK: There, the current assay,

3 the one that's used the most frequently is a 24-hour

4 urine analysis.

5 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: With a key later?

6 That is, do you know how this is done?

7 MR. KOWALOK: With a serum sample as well.

8 To create, to correct for --

9 DR. LARSON: Yesterday somebody

10 recommended whole body counting for DU?

11 MR. KOWALOK: Yes.

12 DR. LARSON: What's, what's the rationale

13 or why would --

14 MR. KOWALOK: There is, depending upon the

15 ability of the uranium that's inhaled or ingested,

16 determines whether it's rapidly removed from the body

17 or whether it stays, in the case of inhalation, which

18 I think is the greatest concern here, whether it

19 remains within the lung.

20 There is a, a way of scanning for trapped

21 particles, called whole body exposure analysis. And

22 it is looking for gama rays that are given off by


1 uranium daughter products.

2 There is much debate right now about

3 whether this process can be calibrated to detect the

4 levels that would be expected in lung tissue. It's

5 just, there are, there are major uncertainties in the

6 level of science.

7 DR. LARSON: Well has this procedure been

8 used with the most heavily exposed people?


10 DR. LARSON: And what are the results?

11 MR. KOWALOK: The results are negative.

12 There, there is work going on within the VA to develop

13 the process further and to, to better correlate it, to

14 see if it does correlate with uranium, excuse me,

15 urine assays. Urine uranium assays.

16 DR. LASHOF: How often have they

17 recommended, I mean the people who wanted to do the

18 whole body counts? How often did they want to try to

19 do that?

20 MR. KOWALOK: Well, in the VA follow-up

21 study of the 35 members who, the 35 individuals who

22 were exposed in friendly fire incidents, most of those


1 individuals who have had two urine uranium samples.

2 And eight, eight have received a whole body count and

3 all of those were negative. And they key point is

4 that there was no evidence of kidney toxicity evident.

5 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: By negative, you mean

6 no counts detected above background?

7 MR. KOWALOK: I do not know the specific,

8 how those results were characterized. But the, the in

9 vivo monitoring did not suggest that this was going to

10 be a --

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Just, direct

12 detection of the alpha radiation doesn't make, doesn't

13 make any sense.

14 MR. KOWALOK: You cannot detect the alpha

15 radiation from outside the body.

16 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: And the number of

17 outer products is so small because of the extremely

18 long half life.

19 MR. KOWALOK: That's the problem with the

20 science right now. Is that it's very difficult to get

21 a trial that's clean enough to differentiate from

22 background radiation.


1 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Are there question?

2 Other concerns? If not, I guess we will move along to

3 oil well fires. Can't move without my attendant, oil

4 well fires.

5 Lois, I guess you're, you're doing oil

6 well fires, right, Lois?


8 DR. LASHOF: Pretty picture?

9 MS. JOELLENBECK: More than 600 oil wells

10 and several pools of spilled oil were ignited in the

11 Kuwaiti oil fields by the retreating Iraqi troops in

12 February of 1991. These oil fires were a very visible

13 and dramatic health risk factor present during the

14 Gulf War and for the nine months following until

15 November of 1991.

16 Black clouds of billowing smoke rose into

17 the atmosphere, forming a super plume that was visible

18 for hundreds of miles.

19 The oil well fires raised serious health

20 concerns, both nationally and internationally because

21 oil well fires can generate toxic gases and combustion

22 products which pose health hazards.


1 Can I have the next slide?

2 For that reason, an interagency task force

3 was organized with team members from the Environmental

4 Protection Agency, National Institute for Science and

5 Technology, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric

6 Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and

7 Prevention, who arrived in theater by March 10th, 1991

8 and began carrying out sampling and interviews.

9 Similarly, other teams from around the

10 world participated in various assessment projects,

11 coordinated by the World Meteorological Organization.

12 Later in May, the Army's Environmental Hygiene Agency

13 began an extensive air pollution monitoring program,

14 which collected over 4,000 air and soil samples from

15 over eight different sites in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

16 with a particular interest in the potential long-term

17 effects from exposures.

18 The conclusions of all of these groups has

19 been similar. Levels of pollutant gases were much

20 lower than had been feared or anticipated and below

21 guidelines set by EPA and other organizations, but

22 ground-based measurement did suggest high levels of


1 particulates.

2 May I have the next?

3 An explanation for the finding that levels

4 of toxic gases and combustion products were so low,

5 seems to lie partially in the fact that the plumes

6 joined in a large super plume that rose quickly up

7 into the atmosphere to levels of 1,500 to 13,000 feet

8 and traveled, and dissipated at that great height.

9 There were times when the plume touched

10 down to the ground. And perhaps you've seen

11 photographs of such instances when it was dark in

12 broad daylight.

13 Transient higher exposures took place at

14 these times.

15 The Army took some worst case industrial

16 hygiene measurements at such a time when the plume had

17 touched down at Camp Freedom. These data indicated

18 that particulates were indeed high at this time, but

19 levels of other contaminants of concern were at low or

20 non-detectable levels.

21 So the acute effects were not as dire as

22 had been feared. To assess the long-term effects,


1 Congress mandated construction of a unit-locator

2 database, which you've had a briefing on, with the

3 locations of each unit on each day between January

4 15th and December 31st of 1991. The Army's Center for

5 Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine is using a

6 GIS database to combine this information with a model

7 of the oil smoke plume location for every day, to

8 estimate exposures to the troops.

9 In the meantime, the Army carried out a

10 risk assessment using EPA methodology of the long-term

11 health risks, both cancer and non-cancer, which might

12 be expected at the eight sites where ambient air

13 monitoring took place between May and December.

14 Risks from cancer were estimated not to

15 exceed 3 excess cancers per 1 million people exposed,

16 which is a value well within EPA's acceptable range.

17 The risk estimate for non-cancer health effects also

18 suggested low risks of potential adverse health

19 effects among the DOD population.

20 Can I have the next, please?

21 The health effects one might expect from

22 high exposures to oil well fire smoke include


1 coughing, wheezing, increased airway resistance,

2 respiratory infections, and causing particular

3 problems in asthmatics or others with chronic lung

4 disease. Toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfite and

5 sulfur dioxide, are known to cause irritation to eyes

6 and nose, pulmonary function decrements, and increased

7 airway. However, these gases did not appear to be

8 present at high levels in the Gulf.

9 High levels of particulates which did

10 occur intermittently in the Gulf are associated with

11 increased asthma morbidity and the exacerbation of

12 other chronic respiratory conditions.

13 With long-term exposure to lower levels of

14 smoke, some loss in lung function or chronic

15 bronchitis might develop.

16 Some constituents of smoke, such as

17 benzene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons are human

18 carcinogens.

19 The next slide, please.

20 Often in occupational health, you turn to

21 the highest exposed groups for a sense of what health

22 outcomes you might be most likely to see in the


1 extreme. In this case, the highest exposed group is

2 that of the civilian firefighters, who worked 28-day

3 stints at the well heads with no respiratory

4 protection. Most were over 30 and had 10 or more

5 years experience fighting similar oil well fires.

6 Many of them in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Middle

7 East.

8 The physician who examined them before and

9 after each tour of duty, found upon follow-up through

10 1994, no cases of illnesses resembling those reported

11 by Gulf War veterans, nor had he observed such

12 complaints in work among thousands of firefighters who

13 had spent years with similar experiences.

14 To conclude, staff recommend the Committee

15 conclude that it is unlikely that exposure to oil fire

16 smoke is responsible for the symptoms reported by Gulf

17 War veterans. This conclusion is supported by a large

18 body of data collected from sampling in the Kuwait and

19 Saudi Arabia environment while the fires were burning,

20 and by research on human and animal health effects of

21 exposure to air pollutions.

22 DR. LASHOF: Questions for Lois?


1 DR. TAYLOR: I have one, Joyce.

2 DR. LASHOF: Andrea, go ahead.

3 DR. TAYLOR: Lois, do we know how soon

4 after the fires were started that they were able to

5 actually come in and conduct sampling of the area?

6 MS. JOELLENBECK: The first sampling that

7 was done, that I'm aware of, was in March, starting in

8 March 10th, when the Interagency Air Assessment Team,

9 consisting of people from EPA, NOHA, National

10 Institute for Science and Technology, and CDC came and

11 began doing sampling.

12 DR. TAYLOR: And when were the fires

13 started, were they started --

14 MS. JOELLENBECK: The fires began at the

15 end of February.

16 DR. TAYLOR: End of February. What, were

17 they sampling for total particulate as well as sulfur

18 dioxide, or some of the others, I'm not sure what all

19 they sampled.

20 MS. JOELLENBECK: Yes. Later when the

21 Army came in and began its program in May, they were

22 sampling for a very broad spectrum. The initial


1 sampling that took place in March did include some

2 sampling for particulates, including the risk for full

3 fraction.

4 DR. TAYLOR: And all these levels were

5 within EPA standards, that we know of?

6 MS. JOELLENBECK: Particulates did exceed

7 EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

8 DR. TAYLOR: They did exceed it?


10 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

11 DR. LASHOF: The particulates were, what

12 chemicals in those particulates?

13 MS. JOELLENBECK: Particulates describes

14 a whole range of different chemical constituents.

15 Often what is focused on with particulates are those

16 that are sized less than 10 micrometers and those are

17 considered most easily inhalable deep into the lung.

18 DR. LASHOF: And those particulates are a

19 range of chemicals, right? But you do, when you

20 measure for those small particulates, are you

21 measuring the chemicals or just the particles?

22 MS. JOELLENBECK: Well, there are


1 sometimes, the chemicals adhere to some of the

2 particulates.

3 DR. LASHOF: Yeah.

4 MS. JOELLENBECK: Right. Both are

5 measured. If you're concerned with the chemical-by-

6 chemical, then you can measure that aspect of the

7 sample.

8 DR. TAYLOR: Separately. Right, but most

9 of these were total particulate though. They didn't

10 measure separate chemical samples at all.

11 MS. JOELLENBECK: Well, they did measure,

12 for example, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.

13 DR. TAYLOR: Okay.

14 MS. JOELLENBECK: And specific volatile

15 organic compounds.

16 DR. TAYLOR: That's right. Okay.

17 DR. LASHOF: That's what I was trying to

18 find out. John?

19 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I wanted really to

20 make the same comment. That the real potential

21 villain here is the, is the fraction of poly aromatic

22 hydrocarbons and the long-term cancer risk. And those


1 typically have very, very high melting points so they

2 condense on the particulates.

3 And so, if you really want to understand

4 the exposure to these poly aromatics, then you have to

5 extract, take the particular fraction and do an

6 extraction.

7 MS. JOELLENBECK: That was done. And they

8 found frequently levels of polycyclic aromatics to be

9 nondetectable, but otherwise to be in the very low

10 range.

11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I find that, I find

12 that, yeah, hard to believe.

13 DR. TAYLOR: That's very, that's really

14 hard to believe that, I don't know.

15 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. And especially in view

16 of the, I mean, I don't think in terms of the acute

17 symptoms or the chronic symptoms we're seeing now, but

18 in terms of long-term disease and chronic disease, the

19 most recent study called taking breath or

20 breathtaking, from NRDC that came out about a month

21 ago, which concentrated on the cities and the country

22 that had the highest level of small particulates


1 having higher death rates than with cities with lower

2 level. And they came up with excess death, or

3 premature deaths really, probably primarily in

4 chronically ill people, having earlier deaths if they

5 live in a city that has high small particulate matter.

6 Is that relevant to what their studies and

7 the findings of that study relevant to what we're

8 discussing here today?

9 MS. JOELLENBECK: There certainly has been

10 increasing interest in particulates and this

11 association with increased morbidity and asthma

12 exacerbation and also mortality with the particulates.

13 So I would say it is relevant. Particulates are still

14 something of an enigma. And these associations that

15 are seen in the six city for example, and probably the

16 one by NRDC, there's controversy and still, I think,

17 not complete understanding of what components of the

18 particulates are responsible and what the biologic

19 mechanism is.

20 They would be relevant for this situation

21 where there were intermittent high levels of

22 particulates. What implications that has for the


1 long-term health effects are the same questions we

2 have for situations in our cities.

3 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I guess I think much

4 more is known about this than you imply. That is, for

5 typical poly aromatics, such as the benzethracine, you

6 know, the root of metabolism, in fact it's the

7 metabolites that are the, that are the active

8 carcinogens.

9 MS. JOELLENBECK: I'm referring to

10 particulates as respirable particulates. Certainly we

11 understand, well, that many polycyclic aromatics are

12 human carcinogens.

13 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I mean, the products

14 of combustion of all kinds typically contain these,

15 these compounds. It's the problem with cigarette

16 smoking as well as exposure to particulates in urban

17 environments.

18 MR. BROWN: Excuse me, but the previous

19 study you referred to had to do with effects not

20 directly due to lung cancer, for instance, from

21 exposure to PAH's, but just an effect, a health effect

22 caused by the particulates, inhalation of


1 particulates.

2 DR. LASHOF: Well, I think we're talking

3 about two different studies. John is talking about

4 the cyclic --

5 MR. BROWN: Polycyclic aromatic

6 hydrocarbons and PAH's.

7 DR. LASHOF: Yeah.

8 MR. BROWN: In other words, but the --

9 DR. LASHOF: And the NRDC study was

10 looking at nitrous oxide and other chemicals that were

11 attached to the small particulates.

12 MR. BROWN: But they weren't looking at

13 lung cancer, for instance, isn't it?

14 DR. LASHOF: No.

15 MR. BROWN: Just other health effects.

16 DR. LASHOF: The NRDC study was looking

17 more, well, they were looking at general mortality,

18 respiratory disease, cardiac disease.

19 MR. BROWN: And of course the other

20 difference is that that's a lifetime exposure --

21 DR. LASHOF: Well, I was going to say, I

22 think the big difference is and whether it's relevant


1 here or not, you may want to do a little more digging

2 before we come to a firm conclusion, but certainly the

3 NRDC study is talking about people exposed for a

4 lifetime and it was especially the elderly dying

5 somewhat prematurely in those cities.

6 So that would have been a long-time

7 exposure and you certainly wouldn't expect that from

8 a short exposure to fires.

9 I think making the comparison to

10 firefighters is much closer to the situation than

11 trying to look at the NRDC study, even though I

12 brought it up. I just brought it up because I think

13 we want to uncover anything that's been written

14 around, consider it, either accept or reject its

15 applicability. I don't know about the cancer.

16 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Well again, it's the

17 issue latency I think that's the difficult one here.

18 I would be comfortable with the recommendation that

19 said that the short-term effects are, are unlikely to

20 be the cause of the symptoms that we're seeing.

21 MS. NISHIMI: I think that as staff --

22 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: On the other hand, I


1 think there is potentially major long-term risk.

2 MS. JOELLENBECK: Well, actually, the

3 sampling and the risk assessment that took place were

4 based on long-term health risks, including cancer, and

5 based upon their measurements of polycyclic aromatics,

6 benzene and other carcinogenic components. So it was

7 based on their measurements that these were low, that

8 they arrived at very low risks for excess cancer for

9 the long term.

10 DR. LARSON: there are two experts here

11 who I don't think agree with you and that makes me

12 uncomfortable.

13 MS. NISHIMI: Well, anyway, I think I know

14 where staff needs to go on this one and we can report

15 back to you on this particular risk factor.

16 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. I think we just wanted

17 more information and that's where we need to go. And

18 Don has a question.

19 ADMIRAL CUSTIS: Where did the wind blow

20 this stuff? It didn't go north, northeast?

21 MS. JOELLENBECK: As you can imagine, over

22 the nine months that the oil fires were burning, the


1 wind blew in every different direction.

2 ADMIRAL CUSTIS: Was there significant

3 contamination down in Saudi Arabia?

4 MS. JOELLENBECK: That's now being, the

5 short answer is no, depending on how you define

6 significant. Because as I've explained, there doesn't

7 seem to be any --

8 DR. LASHOF: Lois --

9 MS. JOELLENBECK: The short answer is no.

10 DR. TAYLOR: Based on what we know about

11 the airborne levels of exposure that they had. They

12 sampled in the area nearby and the levels were low.

13 So, in Saudi Arabia, you would expect they be less,

14 right?

15 MS. JOELLENBECK: Right. And I mentioned

16 and will mention again that the Army is carrying out

17 modeling for the time before when the very extensive

18 ambient air monitoring took place, they are carrying

19 out modeling of where the concentrations of the plume

20 might have been highest during those months of

21 February, March, April. That would extend down into

22 Saudi Arabia as well.


1 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Well, on this one,

2 you'll get back to us before we finally sign off.

3 And now we go to petroleum products?

4 Lois? Are closely related.

5 MS. JOELLENBECK: Petroleum products were

6 used widely during the Gulf War for various activities

7 such as fueling vehicles, stoves, heaters, and

8 generators, suppressing dusts, and burning wastes.

9 Fuels used included jet fuel, diesel, and

10 gasoline. Thus, some soldiers were exposed to

11 petroleum fuel vapors and combustion products with

12 components such as toluene, benzene, carbon monoxide,

13 sulfur dioxide, particulates, lead, and other

14 pollutants that could accumulate in unvented areas.

15 Concerns have been raised that exposures

16 to these fuels and combustion products in the Gulf

17 might have caused health effects in veterans reporting

18 illnesses since the war. Little exposure data is

19 available on groups who might have had such elevated

20 exposures. Instead, there are a variety of reports

21 and anecdotes that suggest the likelihood of elevated

22 exposures for certain sub-sets of the veterans.


1 For example, during about four months of

2 the deployment over the winter, it was cold enough for

3 heaters to be needed in sleeping quarters, such as

4 tents. The heaters require fuel and service members

5 are thought to have used whatever fuel was available

6 to burn in the heaters. There has thus been some

7 speculation that leaded fuels were available and used

8 and may have caused lead overexposure in certain

9 service members.

10 Other reports relate to the use of diesel

11 fuel as a dust suppressant. A sanitary engineer who

12 served in the Gulf reported one brigade's use of

13 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel daily to try to keep the

14 dust down on the roads. The truck drivers applying it

15 complained of nausea and were provided with

16 respirators.

17 Workers at petroleum, oil, and lubricant

18 points, POC points, were similarly at increased risks

19 of elevated exposures to petroleum products.

20 The health effects from inhaling petroleum

21 fuel vapors are of short-term effects on the central

22 nervous system, ranging from fatigue, headache,


1 nausea, blurred vision, and dizziness, to convulsions,

2 paralysis, and loss of consciousness with increasing

3 dose. Exposure to high non-lethal levels however, is

4 in nearly every case followed by complete recovery.

5 Fuel oils on the skin can cause acne and

6 folliculitis and high concentrations or extended

7 exposure can lead to redness and peeling.

8 Exposure to the combustion products of

9 petroleum fuels can cause respiratory effects such as

10 though described for oil fire smoke, coughing,

11 wheezing, increased airway reactivity.

12 Long term, high exposure to petroleum

13 fuels can cause chronic effects. Breathing diesel

14 fuel vapors over a prolonged period can damage kidneys

15 or lower blood clotting ability. Chronic high dose

16 exposure to hydrocarbon solvents over many years can

17 cause neurotoxic effects in humans.

18 Certain components of petroleum fuels,

19 such as benzene or 13 butadiene, are known human

20 carcinogens. Lead can act as a neurotoxican. Effects

21 of lead exposures can range from subtle biochemical

22 changes in blood to acute central nervous system


1 effects at very high doses. Symptoms can include

2 headaches, dizziness, sleep disturbances, memory

3 deficit, and increased irritability. Short-term

4 exposures are unlikely to cause symptoms many years

5 later.

6 Staff review of data found that transient

7 high exposures to petroleum products do not appear to

8 lead to long-term effects. A small sub-set of service

9 members might have had repeated high exposures during

10 their deployment, but this would still be months of

11 exposure as opposed to the many years of exposure

12 associated with neurotoxic effects.

13 Next slide, please.

14 Three environmental hazard centers are

15 assessing neurotoxic effects in studies they now have

16 underway. With regard to lead, short-term effects of

17 lead poisoning were not picked up in the Gulf, as far

18 as we are aware, and there were only four admissions

19 to Army field hospitals by virtue of carbon monoxide

20 poisoning, which might have been expected to be a more

21 frequent occurrence if heating with unvented heaters

22 were taking place routinely.


1 Furthermore, lead poisoning would not be

2 expected to cause chronic effects without symptoms

3 becoming evident at the time of the exposure.

4 An ongoing study at the Department of

5 Veteran's Affairs Medical Center in Birmingham,

6 Alabama, is carrying out extensive neuropsychological

7 testing on Gulf War veterans, complaining of cognitive

8 disfunction. To examine, among other questions,

9 whether lead exposure might explain these symptoms.

10 About 100 veterans have been examined with no apparent

11 relationship observed between symptoms and blood lead

12 levels. Blood lead levels measured in the veterans

13 have been very low, suggesting that their current

14 symptoms are not caused by lead intoxication.

15 Finally, a study is now planned to better

16 characterize the combustion products to which service

17 members might have been exposed from the use of leaded

18 fuels in tent heaters.

19 Staff recommend the Committee conclude it

20 is unlikely that health effects reported today by most

21 veterans can be accounted for by exposure to petroleum

22 products during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.


1 Do you have questions.

2 DR. LASHOF: Questions?

3 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: One detailed comment.

4 In the studies that were reported yesterday by the DOD

5 for funding, they spoke of leaded diesel fuel. I

6 never heard of a lead additive to diesel fuel. Does

7 that make any sense?

8 MS. JOELLENBECK: No one I've spoke to has

9 heard of it either.

10 SPEAKER: I'd like you to explain that,

11 yeah, what is that?

12 MS. JOELLENBECK: The issue of lead in the

13 fuels, and in diesel fuel in particular is one that at

14 this point more information needs to be acquired about

15 the fuels that were available in the Gulf. Fuels that

16 were widespread, from reports that we have, fuels that

17 were used in a widespread were not, were very clean-

18 burning fuels and did not have lead in them.

19 However, units tended to be able to

20 procure their own supplies in the case of the Gulf War

21 and so it's a question of not being able to rule out,

22 necessarily, the acquisition of other fuels that


1 soldiers then might have had available for their use

2 in the heaters.

3 So that study is being carried out to test

4 that possibility and what might be seen in emissions.

5 DR. LASHOF: Other questions? I want to

6 thank the staff for an excellent job. There are a

7 number of more researches going on. There are a

8 number of other things that we're going to be looking

9 into but this is a good start on where we need to go,

10 at least on these specific risk factors. And we have

11 a few areas where you'll get back to us, so.

12 Are there any other questions of staff at

13 this point? If not, let me thank you again for a very

14 thorough job.

15 And let us now move our attention to some

16 of our plans for the next period. Robyn, you want to

17 run through the schedule and then we could discuss the

18 format for -- okay. Okay. Let's just run through the

19 schedule and any other issues anyone wants to bring

20 up.

21 MS. NISHIMI: What we will do from here,

22 obviously is take back your comments on the specific


1 risk factors and get back to you, in particular, the

2 one on the oil well fires and then some of the

3 questions that surrounded the vaccine.

4 The next full Committee meeting is in

5 Washington D.C. on September 4th and 5th. Then we

6 have scheduled on October 8th and 9th, a full

7 Committee in Tampa, Florida, and another full

8 Committee meeting in November on the 13th and 14th.

9 That would be back in Washington.

10 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Those dates again?

11 MS. NISHIMI: September 4th and 5th in

12 Washington. October 8th and 9th in Tampa. And

13 November 13th and 14th in Washington.

14 Between now and the next full Committee

15 meeting, we have scheduled a panel meeting in

16 Cincinnati, that Dr. Hamburg will chair, looking at

17 the biological and psychological implications of

18 stress.

19 From here, as I said, on the specific risk

20 factors, we'll be getting back to you. As you know,

21 the charter also requires us to look at the Federal

22 Government's research portfolio, as I mentioned, we


1 anticipate getting back to you on a preliminary

2 analysis and evaluation of that for the September

3 meetings. We will get back with you on finishing some

4 of the outreach questions that you raised and then as

5 Dr. Larson pointed out at the last meeting, the staff

6 anticipates reporting to you on the clinical access

7 issues at the September meeting. And we'll continue

8 to round out the entire range of remaining pieces that

9 we have to move towards delivery, I believe on time.

10 Of the full report by the end of the year.

11 DR. LASHOF: Does anyone on the Committee

12 have any other areas of concern that haven't been

13 mentioned that they are, wish the staff to address at

14 any of our forthcoming meetings? Or is this

15 adequately covered for all of you.

16 Let me urge you all to review where we

17 stand and where you stand in your understanding of all

18 of the issues because I think we are going into that

19 last legs of our efforts. And identify any areas

20 where you feel we need to do more, any areas of

21 concern that you have, and get to Robyn as soon as you

22 can so we can move ahead expeditiously and cover our


1 mandate. So as you look back over the mandate, if you

2 have anything, please get back to Robyn or me.

3 If not, I guess I give it to Cliff to

4 close the meeting.

5 MR. GABRIEL: I want to thank the

6 Committee and staff for I think was a very productive

7 meeting. And with that, the meeting is adjourned.

8 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned.)















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