I. METHODOLOGY

One prominent hypothesis used to explain the cause of illnesses of Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood of presence of chemical warfare agents, the DoD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence
• Testimony of eyewitnesses
• Multiple analyses
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DoD methodology (TAB F) for investigating suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor may a single individual’s observation be sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

II. SUMMARY

The 11^th Marines was a reinforced artillery regiment, tailored for the ground campaign ("task organized") by adding elements of other artillery units. It fought with five battalions, each having three or (in one case) four batteries. Most batteries had eight guns, mainly towed 155 mm howitzers. The 11^th Marines supported the entire 1^st Marine Division that entered Kuwait from the south and moved to the vicinity of Kuwait City during the 100-hour ground campaign (February 24-28, 1991). The battalions and batteries of the 11^th Marines deployed throughout the 1^st Marine Division sector. Most directly supported a reinforced infantry regiment (for example, Task Force Ripper, Task Force Papa Bear, Task Force Grizzly, etc.). Figure 2 summarizes the Operation Desert Storm scheme of maneuver and the relative role of the 1^st Marine Division.

Figure 2. 1^st Marine Division and the Scheme of Maneuver

In the unit chronologies and operational logs for the Gulf War, the 11^th Marines reported many alerts for chemical warfare agent. Elements of the 11^th Marines initiated some of these alerts. Others alerts began elsewhere and were passed by radio to 11^th Marines units.

This investigation addressed two questions: was chemical warfare agent (CWA) present during any nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) incidents; and why did the 11^th Marines record so many chemical alerts?

After studying the written documentation and interviewing witnesses, this investigation cataloged 18 potential NBC incidents associated with the 11^th Marines. Of the 81 individuals/positions selected as primary witnesses, 69 were contacted in person or by telephone. For various reasons, the remainder could not be identified, located, or contacted.

Most of the 18 NBC incidents caused at least some of the 11^th Marines to put on additional chemical protective garments and masks. In many cases, the units’ logs, chronologies, and messages contained scant detail. In our interviews, witnesses could recall little about some alerts. These we characterized as "Unlikely" because no evidence could be found of casualties or delivery means. Seven incidents fell in this category. For 11 incidents, substantial information was collected. In each case, investigators judged the chance of agent presence as "Unlikely." Five other potential incidents originally identified for investigation did not involve the 11^th Marines, and one other concerned precautionary increase in protective posture as the regiment approached enemy lines. These were set aside as beyond the scope of this case. The first five could be candidates for investigation in a future case. For all incidents, no chemical casualties were reported.

Positive chemical agent tests, using various detection devices, triggered some of the alerts. All of the devices available to Marine units could produce false positive readings in the presence of substances other than CWA. For much of the ground campaign in Kuwait, sabotaged oil wells exposed Marines of the 1^st Division to high concentrations of smoke and raw petroleum. In retrospect, it is clear that such pollution could affect detection equipment and could have caused many of the chemical alerts recorded by the 11^th Marines.

The units initiating alerts frequently failed to identify themselves and their locations. Units passing along alerts from elsewhere often did not note who alerted them. This probably caused more 1^st Marine Division units than necessary to mask as a precaution. As the ground campaign progressed, some commanding officers (COs), including COs of 11^th Marine units, responded by limiting their response to alerts which originated with other units. Theoretically, this could have increased the risk of exposure to chemical warfare agents (CWA) in these units. Conversely, stopping to don protective gear in response to alerts from afar would have increased the risk of conventional engagement by the enemy (moving targets being more difficult to find and bring under effective fire).

Table 1 summarizes the 18 incidents and the investigators’ assessments. Each incident has been assigned a letter. The numbers and letters that follow in parentheses were earlier designations that appear in interview lead sheets and can aid in following lead sheet references. These numbered designations no longer run sequentially because over time new incidents were inserted in the sequence and investigation of a few incidents led to adjustments in timing.

Table 1. Incident Assessment Summary

To explain why the 11^th Marines recorded and participated in so many alerts, one must consider the following factors:

• The 11^th Marines elements had extensive communications and liaison with each other and with supported infantry units. They became aware of, and passed on, many alerts. Operational logs and journals throughout the 1^st Marine Division recorded these warnings, often citing 11^th Marines units as the source.
• Artillery units moved in leapfrog fashion. While infantry units advanced more continuously, artillery units spent more time in stationary locations. Therefore, artillery units had more time to observe their surroundings and conduct NBC tests. Because they often were stationary and could not always maneuver to avoid chemical threats, they were more motivated than infantry elements to mask in response to alerts. They also could do so more easily.
• Three of the 16 batteries that fought under the 11^th Marines arrived shortly before the ground campaign. They did not have the benefit of the same in-theater training and familiarization as the units that had been on the ground for several months. Also, training did not stress discipline and completeness in passing alerts by radio.
• Some in the regiment assumed that the unit was a priority target with above average chance of exposure if Iraqi forces used chemical weapons. Consequently, they were unusually sensitive to any indication of CWA presence.
• For much of the ground campaign, elements of the 11^th Marines and the units they supported were immersed in the extraordinarily heavy contamination from the sabotaged oil wells that were burning and spewing raw petroleum. The smoke turned day into night. To some degree, this contamination affected all available NBC test equipment, potentially producing false positive readings for a chemical agent when none was actually present. The detection equipment was not designed to work in this environment and was often ineffective. Many detector operators did not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of their equipment in heavy pollution.
• At times, the 11^th Marines relied on detection equipment (particularly the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle) that was not sensitive enough and was not designed to detect low concentrations of agent in ambient air. Not understanding this, some Marines stopped using other detection devices that were sensitive enough and appropriately designed to alert for small concentrations of CWA in the air.
• In propagating NBC alerts, the Marines of the 11^th Regiment worked to preserve the safety and operational capability of the 1^st Marine Division. They faced what they had every reason to perceive was a serious chemical warfare threat. They believed in their detection and alerting capability and generally did as they were trained under the stress of combat in a unique environment. Post-war assessment of the chemical threat, training, detection equipment shortcomings, and lessons learned should not be construed as critical of the consummate professionalism of these Marines.

The 11^th Marines case remains open. As relevant facts come forward, this narrative will be updated.

III. NARRATIVE

A. Background

1. Reason for Case Selection

During Operation Desert Storm, the 11^th Marines was a reinforced artillery regiment supporting the 1^st Marine Division. The regiment had a relatively high number of NBC alerts recorded in its units’ command chronologies, field message traffic, and operational logs. This observation derives from impressions by several investigators, but was not verified with any statistical precision. This narrative presents a preliminary analysis of NBC incidents involving the 11^th Marines. Ultimately, it seeks to address the likelihood that the Marines and sailors of this regiment may have operated in areas where chemical warfare agent was present.

Unlike other narratives, this paper does not focus on a single location or small number of incidents. Instead, it covers the experience of a specific unit involving 18 separate incidents. These incidents extended over more than 160 miles, during a 42 day period, immediately before and during the coalition ground campaign.

Six incidents initially investigated were found not to involve the 11^th Marines or involved a precautionary increase in protective posture not triggered by a perceived threat. For completeness, and because these incidents were included in 1997 testimony and summaries provided to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, these incidents and the reasons they were set aside are briefly covered in Tab D.

2. Summary of 11^th Marines Organization for the War

The 11^th Marines, based in California during peacetime, was tailored or "task organized" for the Gulf War. This involved adding elements of other regiments, particularly the 12^th Marines, which was based in the Pacific (Hawaii and Okinawa). As they entered the ground campaign, the 11^th Marines had five artillery battalions:

• The 1^st Battalion, 11^th Marines (1/11 or "one-eleven" in Marine parlance);
• The 3^rd Battalion, 11^th Marines (3/11);
• The 5^th Battalion, 11^th Marines (5/11);
• The 1^st Battalion, 12^th Marines (1/12); and
• The 3^rd Battalion, 12^th Marines (3/12).
  

Not all of the batteries fought with the battalion to which they were assigned in peacetime. Figure 3 diagrams the regiment as it went into the ground campaign.

Figure 3. Gulf War Organization of the 11^th Marines^[1]

All of these battalions, except the 5/11, had three firing batteries, each with eight towed 155mm guns (Figure 4). The 5/11 included four batteries tasked with general support for the 1^st Marine Division. As such, it engaged targets wherever the Division Commander determined the need was greatest. In addition to two batteries of six towed 155 mm guns each, the 5/11 had two batteries of six self-propelled guns each -- one 155 mm (Figure 5) and one 8 inch caliber (Figure 6).^[2,3] A more detailed presentation of the regiment’s components appears in TAB B.

Figure 4. Most 11^th Marines Battalions had Model M198 155 mm
Towed Howitzers.

Figure 5. One 11^th Marines Battery had Six Model M109 155 mm
Self-propelled Howitzers.

Figure 6. One 11^th Marines Battery had Six Model M110 8-inch
Self-propelled Howitzers.

The 11^th Marines also had a variety of heavy trucks to carry ammunition and tow the artillery pieces, as well as numerous command and control and utility vehicles. A typical battalion had about 600 men. The regiment had over 3,600 as they entered the ground campaign.

Except for the 5/11, the 11^th Marines battalions supported particular infantry task forces built around infantry regiments and various reinforcing elements. As the ground campaign unfolded, commanders adjusted these artillery support missions, based on the tactical situation. Unlike the 2^nd Marine Division, the 1^st Marine Division used arbitrary code names for the infantry task forces rather than the unit designation of the core regiment. These task force names (Ripper, Papa Bear, Grizzly, etc.) appear in chronologies and logs of the time as the principal maneuver elements. Tab B lists the 1^st Marine Division units and their compositions pertinent to this narrative.

To coordinate requirements, maneuver, and fire missions, the 11^th Marines maintained close contact with the primary maneuver elements of the 1^st Marine Division. This contact was maintained through tactical radio nets and by placing 11^th Marines forward observer and liaison teams with other units’ command posts. With this dense and far-flung network, the artillery regiment had up-to-the-minute awareness of the situation across the division. The regiment was also in a position to rapidly communicate (and log) NBC alerts well beyond the unit that initiated them.^[4] The commanding officer of the 11^th Marines said that senior commanders always liked to visit the artillery command post. Unlike other tactical units, artillery had the "big picture" because the artillery monitored everyone’s nets and actions.^[5]

3. Tactical Situation

The geographic and temporal flow of the 1^st Marine Division and the 11^th Marines during Operation Desert Storm provides a backdrop for the analysis of incidents to follow.

a. Leading Up to the Ground Campaign

In the weeks prior to the February 24th start of the ground campaign, several NBC alerts occurred among the elements of the 11^th Marines. These generally occurred in association with reports of Iraqi SCUD long-range missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and incoming Iraqi artillery fire near the border with Kuwait. As a precaution, some units donned protective gear in case chemical warfare agents had been employed.

Figure 7 shows the general location of the 11^th Marines leading up to the ground campaign.^[6]

Figure 7. 1^st Marine Division Pre-offensive Deployment

Beginning on the night of January 20-21, elements of the 11^th Marines began conducting occasional artillery "raids" against Iraqi targets near the border.^[7] On a typical raid, a battery of artillery and supporting trucks and command elements would move with stealth to the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border area. Under cover of darkness, they would wait to receive the location of a priority Iraqi target (like a multiple rocket launcher about to fire). Often this intelligence came from unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles (UAVs). The artillery unit would fire on the target and rapidly depart the area to avoid any return fire.^[8]

b. During the Ground Campaign

As the coalition ground offensive began on February 24^th, 11^th Marines battalions entered Kuwait, moved north, and began crossing the two obstacle belts in southern Kuwait. The 3/11, supporting Task Force Ripper, was the first artillery unit through the first obstacle belt.^[9] Figure 8 depicts the situation.

Figure 8. 11^th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 1

On the second day of the ground campaign, most 11^th Marine elements moved through the second obstacle belt and were heading north to positions between Al Jaber Airfield and the Al Burqan oilfield. Key unit locations are shown in Figure 9. These units spent most of the day in intense pollution from burning oil wells (see Figure 10). Some elements of the regiment remained farther south between the obstacle belts.

Figure 9. 11^th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 2

Figure 10. Burning Oil Well Head

On the third day of the offensive, all but the A Battery, 1/12, moved north and east to establish positions to the south and west of Kuwait International Airport on the outskirts of Kuwait City. On the fourth day (February 27), the 11^th Marines assisted the 1^st Marine Division in consolidating their positions and establishing security. General locations appear in Figure 11. Over the following days, the 11^th Marines returned to port areas in Saudi Arabia and eventually to their respective home stations.

Figure 11. 11^th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 3-4

4. 11^th Marines and Chemical Protection

a. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Like the rest of US forces in the Gulf War, the 11^th Marines responded to NBC alerts by following the procedures of the Mission Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) system. As the level of the perceived chemical agent threat increased, Marines first donned two-piece chemical protective garments (MOPP Level 1), then vinyl overboots (MOPP Level 2), followed by protective hood and mask (MOPP Level 3), and finally butyl rubber gloves (MOPP Level 4).^[10] Additional information on MOPP appears in Tab A. (See also at this site the separate Information Paper on Mission Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection.) From the initial breach of the Iraqi protective belts to the end of the ground campaign, most elements of the 11^th Marines maintained at least MOPP Level 2 as a precaution. In response to a specific alert, affected elements of the regiment generally went to MOPP Level 4 (full protection). The log records of these alerts and the directions to increase or decrease MOPP Level represent a significant part of the contemporaneous written record of the incidents covered in this narrative.

b. Chemical Detection Equipment

Brief descriptions of the various types of chemical detection equipment mentioned in this narrative appear in the Glossary at Tab A. They include the M256A1 chemical agent detection kit, the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), the Fox NBC reconnaissance system (vehicle) and the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm. The CAM, the XM21, and the Fox vehicle were all fielded with the 1^st Marine Division just days or weeks before the beginning of the ground campaign.^[11] Consequently, operators of this equipment were not as familiar with using these items as they were with older detectors.

It should be noted that all the chemical warfare agent detection devices available to the Marines could, at times, produce false positive readings in the presence of interferents such as oil well smoke.^[12] The commanding officer of the 11^th Marines noted that this was not clearly understood by most of the 11^th Marines as they entered the ground campaign.^[13]

5. Iraqi Chemical Weapon Capabilities During the Gulf War

At the time of the Gulf War, it was widely believed that Iraq had chemical warfare agent munitions in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. The US Intelligence Community found that Iraq had chemical weapons capability, and had used chemical weapons against its own citizens, as well as against Iran.^[14]

Following the war, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), via its chemical inspections program, identified Iraqi chemical weapons and their delivery means. Table 2 summarizes Iraqi CWA delivery capability during the Gulf War. Discussion of CWA and their toxic and other effects appears in TAB A.

When assessing the 11^th Marines’ NBC incidents, investigators considered the post-war data on Iraq’s ability to deliver particular types of agents.

UNSCOM and CIA experts have testified recently^[15] that they believed Iraq did not deploy chemical weapons or agents out of Iraq and into Kuwait before or during the war. Along with the neutralization of the Iraqi Air Force, this would have greatly limited Iraqi CWA delivery capability. However, investigators did not assume Iraq lacked forward-deployed chemical capability in investigating and analyzing the 11^th Marines case.

Table 2. Iraqi Chemical Weapon Capabilities at the time of the Gulf War^[16]

6. Interview Approach

Investigators took several factors into consideration in applying the previously described methodology. In selecting key witnesses to interview, investigators:

• Tried to choose individuals who might have first hand knowledge of NBC incidents;
• Examined all 11^th Marines battalions (but not necessarily all the batteries in each battalion) and other relevant units;
• Put the most weight on witnesses from those 11^th Marines elements that had the most alerts, positive detection tests, and other corroborating information;
• Focused on command, operations, and NBC personnel; and
• Relied on witnesses to help identify others who could help.

Tab C contains an organizational diagram annotated with the witnesses’ positions. In a few cases, despite repeated efforts, investigators could not locate or contact individuals key to particular incidents.

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