TAB D - Incidents Not Associated with 11^th Marines NBC Threats

This investigation assessed six incidents that might have affected the 11^th Marines. Five of these incidents (U-Y below) were first identified in operational reports filed by the Marine Corps with material from 1/12. Subsequent analysis determined that these documents were created by the 3^rd Marines, an infantry regiment, with no indication the incidents affected the 11^th Marines. Other 3^rd Marines NBC-related reports that did mention elements of the 11^th Marines were analyzed as part of the appropriate incident discussed in the body of this report. A sixth incident (Z below) derived from reporting of the 11^th Marines going to MOPP Level 2 as they approached the first obstacle belt in Kuwait. Investigation revealed that this was a precautionary increase in protective posture and not associated with a perceived NBC threat. These six incidents were set aside as outside the scope of this investigation. Because they were reported to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses as under early investigation, they are discussed briefly here for completeness.

u. INCIDENT U (#1A)

Initial Reporting

A log entry at 3:00 AM on January 18, 1991, originally thought to be from an 11^th Marines element, contained the entry, "NBC team on 100% alert." At 4:00 AM, another entry indicated "NBC Team going to 50% alert."^[255]

Additional Evidence

After the Gulf War, this log was archived with materials associated with the 1/12. However, on closer inspection, it was determined that the operations officers for the 3^rd Marines (Task Force Taro) kept the log. An authoritative source indicated that there were no SCUD launches into the coastal areas of Saudi Arabia at the cited time.^[256]

Assessment

This incident was set aside and was not investigated further. It may be considered for analysis as part of another investigation.

v. INCIDENT V (#4)

Initial Reporting

A log entry for 11:10 PM on January 29, noted that a gas alert was passed. It was not clear if the message was outgoing or incoming. Thirty minutes later, the log recorded an "all clear." Approximately 35 minutes after the alert, the log indicated an NBC-1 report came in from the 3/3 (in Task Force Taro).^[257]

Assessment

As with event 1A, this alert was initially misidentified as associated with the 11^th Marines. Therefore, it was set aside.

w. INCIDENT W (#7)

Initial Reporting

Just before noon on the first day of the ground campaign (February 24), Marine Air Group 26 (MAG-26) reported nerve agent about 11 miles southwest of Al Jaber airfield. A few minutes later, an NBC-1 (initial incident report) was filed.^[258] Another official chronology echoed these events verbatim.^[259]

Additional Evidence

Available reporting contained nothing further on the detection process, who masked as a result, or if an "all clear" was sounded. At the time, the nearest 11^th Marines element was a forward-deployed component of the 3/11 located about nine miles to the southeast of the reported CW threat.^[260] No documentation or testimony indicated that this alert affected any part of the 11^th Marines or that they even received it.

Assessment

This incident was set aside and was not investigated further.

x. INCIDENT X (#16)

Initial Reporting

At 1:00 PM on February 26, a command chronology for the 1^st Combat Engineer Battalion noted a report of "Flash! Gas!" and that Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The "all clear" came an hour later.^[261]

Additional Evidence

There is no evidence that the 11^th Marines recorded or reacted to this alert, although the 1/11 directly supported Task Force Papa Bear at the time. No witness recalled an alert at this time.

Assessment

Because there was no evidence that this incident affected 11^th Marine units, this incident was set aside and was not investigated further.

y. INCIDENT Y (#19)

Initial Reporting

A command chronology of the 1^st Combat Engineer Battalion reflected an alert at 9:30 AM on February 27, with the annotation "Flash! Gas!" As a result, Task Force Ripper went to MOPP Level 4.^[262]

Additional Evidence

Although 11^th Marines were in the general vicinity of Task Force Ripper, none of the artillery regiment’s chronologies or logs recorded this incident.

Assessment

Because there was no evidence that this incident affected 11^th Marine units, it was set aside and was not investigated further.

z. INCIDENT Z (#6)

Initial Reporting

At 10:20 AM, on the morning the Coalition attack through the obstacle belts in Kuwait began (February 24), 11^th Marine elements were instructed to go to MOPP Level 2.^[263] During the same timeframe, intelligence reported preparation for, and conduct of, Iraqi NBC attacks.^[264] It was not initially clear whether the transition to MOPP Level 2 involved an increase or decrease in protective posture.

Additional Evidence

Analysis determined that this was the initial precautionary upgrade from MOPP Level 0 to MOPP Level 2. This upgrade occurred as 11^th Marines battalions were approaching the first obstacle belt about 13 miles north of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. As they approached the first obstacle belt, the 1^st and 2^nd Marine Divisions took such precautions.^[265]

Assessment

As this "incident" was a precautionary MOPP upgrade and not the result of agent detection, incoming fire, or other alert, the potential presence of CWA is assessed as "Definitely Not." There were no reports of actual delivery of Iraqi chemical weapons associated with the intelligence reports.

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