END NOTES

[1] 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 13, 1991, Attachment P.

[2] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 130.

[3] 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 13, 1991, Attachment P; 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 11, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 1-1; 5/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 1-1; 3/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 2; 1/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 15 February 1991, February 15, 1991; 3/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 30 Jun 1991, June 27, 1991, Section 1, p. 2.

[4] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.

[5] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.

[6] For this and other maps in this narrative, unit and other locations are generally based on multiple sources. Primary among these is: Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, augmented by various logs, journals, and command chronologies. Locations are approximate at the scales displayed.

[7] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 26-27.

[8] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.

[9] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 89.

[10] Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection, October 30, 1997, p. 4.

[11] Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2; General Dynamics Situation Report #116, February 6, 1991, p. 1; "Command Chronology 3rd Battalion 12th Marine Regiment Jan - Jun 1991."

[12] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 390-391, 408-409, 412-414, 426-428, 430-431. "Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact Judi Shetterly, CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC website (http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/)."

[13] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.

[14] Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, April 9, 1997.

[15] Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, 9 April 1997; "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program;" Testimony of Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 9, 1996; testimony of Charles Duelfer and Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.

[16] United Nations Special Commission Document 141, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, No S/24984, December 17, 1992, Appendix IV, "Destruction of Iraq's Chemical Agents and Munitions," paragraphs 2 and 3. CS is a riot control agent ("tear gas") and is not considered to be a chemical warfare agent.

[17] During the investigation, we discovered some incidents did not involve the 11th Marines and we added others based on witness testimony. In two cases (D and E) investigators corrected the dates of the events, and this reordered the sequence. Because various testimony texts (lead sheets) included the original serialization, we have retained the original numbering in parentheses after a letter indicating current sequence. All dates are for 1991, and all times are local.

[18] In some cases, one incident involved more than one battalion.

[19] 11th Marines message, subject: "Situation Report Number 135," Date-Time Group 181200C Jan 91.

[20] "Condition Red" meant attack is imminent; go to MOPP Level 4. "Condition Yellow" meant attack probable, units maintain MOPP Level 0 (no protection worn). Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, information paper on Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection, p. 16.

[21] " Incidents, Messages Journal Orders," 3rd Marines S-3 (operations officer) (but archived as 1/12), January 17, 1991, p. 1.

[22] Lead Sheet #5969, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, September 5, 1997, pp. 1-2.

[23] Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 2.

[24] 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 13, 1991.

[25] 3rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," 1st 12th, January 18, 1991, p. 1 (but archived as 1/12).

[26] Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12 Marines, September 5, 1997, p. 3.

[27] 3rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," January 19, 1991 (but archived as 1/12).

[28] This incident initially was reported for a later date and subsequently tied to an earlier timeframe. Initial serialization has been retained in parentheses because numerous lead sheets from interviews include the shorthand of incident numbers.

[29] Initial Call Report for field radio operator, Incident ID#460001225, November 3, 1995; Lead Sheet #5702, interview of (same) field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, p. 3.

[30] Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.

[31] 11th Marines, Command Chronology Jan Feb 91, March 13, 1991.

[32] Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.

[33] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, pp. 3, 4.

[34] Lead Sheet #6029, interview of operations officer, 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.

[35] Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.

[36] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.

[37] Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, September 11, 1997, pp. 1, 2.

[38] Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.

[39] Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12 September 16, 1997, p. 3.

[40] Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 3.

[41] Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22, 1997, p. 3.

[42] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, pp. 2-4.

[43] Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1-2.

[44] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.

[45] United Nations Special Commission Document 141, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, No S/24984, December 17, 1992, Appendix IV, "Destruction of Iraq's Chemical Agents and Munitions," paragraphs 2 and 3; The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656; testimony of Charles Duelfer and Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997.

[46] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22, 1997, p. 2.

[47] Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[48] Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997, p. 2.

[49] Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-14.

[50] Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 January 1991, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.

[51] Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.

[52] Initial Call Report from veteran, Incident ID# 460001225, November 3, 1995; Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, p. 1, 2, 3.

[53] Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22 and October 23, 1997, pp. 2-3; Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, pp. 2, 3.

[54] Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997 and April 27, 1998, pp. 2, 3.

[55] Lead Sheet #5952, Interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 4.

[56] Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 2.

[57] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6.

[58] Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[59] Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12 September 16, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6; Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.

[60] Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, pp. 1, 2.

[61] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 431.

[62] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.

[63] Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[64] Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Mission Database, USAF, 1993, SECRET.

[65] 11th Marines, Command Chronology Jan Feb 91, March 13, 1991.

[66] Army Field Manual No. 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Chapter 2, "Chemical Agents and Their Properties," pp. 14-51 excluding pp. 17, 20, 24, 29, and 36, (also known as Navy Publication No. P-467 and Air Force Manual No. 355-7), December 12, 1990.

[67] In his initial interview, this witness stated that the unit did not increase MOPP level to MOPP Level 4. In a follow-on interview, he stated that the unit did "mask-up". See Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997 and January 29, 1998, pp. 3, 4.

[68] Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 4; Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 104.

[69] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 2-3.

[70] 1/12, Attachment to Command Chronology 16 February - 28 February 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.

[71] Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 4.

[72] Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, pp. 3-4.

[73] XVIII Airborne Corps, "Message from Journal Log."

[74] 1st Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center, "Journal," January 28-30, 1991.

[75] 1st Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center, "Journal," January 28-30, 1991.

[76] "Lucky TAC Spot Report" dated January 30, 1991 at 2112C (9:12 PM local).

[77] 11th Marines Message, Subject Situation Report Number 148, Date-Time Group 311200C Jan 91.

[78] 5/11, Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, pp. 3-1.

[79] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 85.

[80] The 11th Marines War Journal, G Day 24 Feb 91, contained the following entries. "1507- 5/11 detected nerve vapor. 1510- 3/11 sends 'gas gas gas'".

[81] Initial Call Report from survey officer, 5/11, Incident ID# 651001124, April 4, 1997, p. 1.

[82] 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb. 91.; "1st MARDIV Situation Chronology;" 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.

[83] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 81.

[84] 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.

[85] Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2. The S Battery did not have a qualified 5711 (chemical NCO). The Battery executive officer stated that the XM21 was fielded "on the fly" with only a small amount of training. See Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1. None of the witnesses interviewed have been able to identify the Marine who operated the XM21.

[86] Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.

[87] The 11th Marine Command Chronologies recorded that the "all-clear" was sounded at 3:41 PM, 34 minutes following the XM21 alert. See 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.

[88] Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1.; Lead Sheet #15515, interview of commanding officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 10, 1997, p. 1.

[89] In another interview, a Marine NCO assigned to the S Battery, 5/11 cited problems with the XM21, e.g., it went off at least once or twice a day. His unit was worried that the XM21 would detect fumes from the oil well fires. See Lead Sheet #7010, interview of NCO, S Battery, 5/11, November 14, 1997, p. 1. The commanding officer of T Battery, 5/11, also cited problems with the XM21. He noted recurring false alarms. See Lead Sheet #15783, interview of commanding officer, T Battery, 5/11, March 31, 1998, p. 2.

[90] Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2.

[91] No other personnel interviewed stated that they recalled hearing an M8 alarm sound.

[92] The NBC NCO recalled that the convoy was moving at the time of the incident. He conducted his test after the convoy stopped, although he could not recall exactly how long after the incident he did the test. See Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, October 2, 1997, p.2. The 5/11 S-3 (operations officer) recalled that the convoy he was in was stopped, waiting for units up ahead to move out. See Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.

[93] Lead Sheet #15783, interview of commanding officer, T Battery, 5/11, March 31, 1998, p. 1.

[94] The survey officer of the 5/11 and the executive officer of the battalion's S Battery recalled two airbursts. The CO of the 5/11 recalled four. The operations officer remembered two to three. See Lead Sheet #10228, interview of survey officer, 5/11, April 17, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 10/13, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p 2.

[95] Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 10, 1997, p. 2.; See also Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.

[96] Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 13, 1997, p. 2. This witness could not recall the exact date of the incident he described.

[97] Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-87.

[98] Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2. The Al Burqan Oil Fields were just beyond the second obstacle belt. The smoke from the oil well fires would affect Marines during the offensive against Al Jaber airfield, and later during the trip towards Kuwait City.

[99] Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, November 3, 1997, p 2.

[100] Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), April 9, 1998, p. 5. This witness added that what he saw would not have been an effective Chemical Warfare Agent delivery system.

[101] Lead Sheet #6612, interview of field radio operator, Headquarters Company, 7th Marines, December 17, 1997, p. 2-3.

[102] Lead Sheet #6493, interview of survey officer, 5/11, December 15, 1997, p. 3.

[103] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, April 14, 1998, p. 6.

[104] Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division, April 9, 1998, p. 5.

[105] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, pp. 1-2. This witness later clarified that he was referring to the 1st sergeant of the 5/11, not the S Battery 1st sergeant.

[106] Lead Sheet #15155, interview of commanding officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 19, 1998, p. 2.

[107] Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 18, 1998, p. 2.

[108] Memorandum from 11th Marines regimental surgeon to commanding officer, 11th Marines, Chronological Report - Regimental Medical for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, March 11, 1991.

[109] Lead Sheet #16083, interview of chief hospital corpsman, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 1.

[110] For example, canaries have been used in the past as sensitive detectors of methane gas in coal mines.

[111] 5/11, Command Chronology for period 1 January to 28 February, 1991, March 12, 1991.

[112] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, p. 2.

[113] Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[114] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., pp. 99-100.

[115] Lead Sheet #6530, interview of commanding officer, H Battery, 3/14, October 22, 1997, p. 1.

[116] Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, April 9, 1997.

[117] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 101.

[118] The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656.

[119] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, p. 2.

[120] Index to 3/12, Command Chronology January to June, 1991, p.3.

[121] 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).

[122] 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).

[123] 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).

[124] 6th Draft Additional Notes, March 9, 1991.

[125] Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 1.

[126] Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.

[127] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.

[128] 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).

[129] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.

[130] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991; 1st Marine Division, Ripper 24 Feb 91; 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Command Chronology 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan - Jun 1991.

[131] 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Command Chronology 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan - Jun 1991.

[132] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 5.

[133] Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 4.

[134] Lead Sheet #6071, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/12, November 19, 1997, p. 2.

[135] Case Narrative, "Al Jaber Air Base," Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, pp. 12-18.

[136] Lead Sheet #6990, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Ripper, November 4/5, 1997, pp. 2, 3; Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, pp. 4-5.

[137] 1st Marine Division, Situation Chronology; 1/11, Summary of Action 1st Bn 11th Mar.

[138] 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 13, 1991; 11th Marines, 11th Marines Oper DS Summary of Significant Events; 1-11, Summary of Action 1st Bn 11th Mar; US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, February 26, 1991.

[139] Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[140] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.

[141] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 431.

[142] Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, p. 4.

[143] Lead Sheet #13797, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Papa Bear, December 22, 1997, p. 2.

[144] NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.

[145] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 4.

[146] Lead Sheet #5823, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 3/11, August 22, 1997, p. 1.

[147] Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, pp. 1-2.

[148] Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, p. 2.

[149] Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, pp. 1-2.

[150] Lead Sheet #6033, interview of executive officer, A Battery, 1/11, September 17, 1997, p. 2.

[151] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.

[152] Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer) 1/11, September 3, 1997, p. 2.

[153] 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, Enclosure 1, Section 3.

[154] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6.

[155] Walters, Kenneth R. Sr., Maj Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D. Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, and TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-26.

[156] Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, p. 3.

[157] The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656.

[158] 1st Marine Division, Situation Chronology, Task Force Ripper section; 1st CE Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.

[159] Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, p. 3.

[160] 1500 "TF (Papa Bear) went to MOPP-4 on a report from 1/11. After ten minutes the FOX vehicle sounded the "all clear." 1 MARDIV - Situation Chronology: 1510: "Flash! Gas! TF Ripper goes to MOPP 4;" and 1520: "All clear" 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 15 Mar 91.

[161] "Summary of Action for Operation Desert Storm," February 24-27, 1991 (various Marine Corps).

[162] NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, p. 13.

[163] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.

[164] Regarding the intelligence report that warned of the Iraqi the use of yellow smoke, the Papa Bear NBC officer stated in his interview that his unit received this intelligence perhaps one or two months prior to crossing the line of departure. (See NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 11-12.).

[165] NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 11-12.

[166] Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/11, November 12, 1997, p. 3.

[167] Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 2.

[168] Lead Sheet #6311, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 2.

[169] Lead Sheet #5783, interview of S-3Z (operations officer), 1/11, November 17, 1997, p. 2.

[170] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, pp. 2-3.

[171] Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, pp. 1-2.

[172] NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report) Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, p. 13.

[173] Personal Journal of 1/11 Battalion S-3Z (operations officer), p. 6. This witness explained that he wrote numerous journal entries after the fact. His February 28 entry included many events that had occurred over the previous 4 days. He noted he was simply too busy with the ground war to make timely entries in his personal journal.

[174] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.

[175] NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report) Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 12-13.

[176] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.

[177] Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, p. 2.

[178] Lead Sheet #6970, interview of executive officer, Task Force Papa Bear, November 11, 1997, p. 1.

[179] Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 2. This witness did not recall conducting any M256 tests or operating a CAM in response to this incident.

[180] Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, p. 2.

[181] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4.

[182] Initial Intelligence Report (IIR) 6 884 0825 90/ "Iraqi Corps Boundaries Identified." From Joint Staff Wash DC, To DIA WASHDC, DTG [Date/Time Group] 181418 Z SEP 90, forwarded by Joint Staff Washington DC to numerous commands, DTG 181423Z SEP 90, para 8.

[183] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4.

[184] Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 2.

[185] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.

[186] Lead Sheet #6492, interview of EOD specialist, 2nd EOD Platoon, 2nd MEF, October 20, 1997, p. 2.

[187] Lead Sheet #7130, interview of armor officer, 2nd ACR, 7th Corps., November 12, 1997, p. 1.

[188] 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 11, 1991.

[189] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5803, interview of NBC NCO, 1st Marine Division, August 20, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6370, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 8, 1997, p. 2; The S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, thought the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle was the best thing for chemical detection (Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 2.

[190] Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), December 12, 1996, p. 4.

[191] "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, Table 18.

[192] Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions, the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.

[193] At this level unprotected personnel would experience symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.

[194] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, p. 431.

[195] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 2.

[196] Lead Sheet #5803, interview of NBC NCO, 1st Marine Division, August 20, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, November 3, 1997, p. 3.

[197] Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, p. 2.

[198] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, April 21, 1998, p. 4.

[199] Sonneman, George B., Bendix Corporation, Phase I Report, July 1974 - April 15, 1975, Development of the XM256 Chemical Agent Detection Kit, Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, July 1975, P. 128.

[200] Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (forward), July 25, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, April 26, 1996, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6031, interview of survey officer, 3/11, September 15, 1997, pp. 1-2.

[201] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 3.

[202] Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, April 27, 1998, p. 5.

[203] Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 5-6.

[204] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 31, 1997, p. 3.

[205] Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2.

[206] Lead Sheet #16123, interview of NBC equipment expert, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, April 20, 1998, p. 1.

[207] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 412-414.

[208] Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5658, interview of NBC officer, 1/7, August 14, 1997, p. 2.

[209] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.

[210] Memorandum from 11th Marines regimental surgeon to commanding officer, 11th Marines, Chronological Report - Regimental Medical for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, March 11, 1991.

[211] Lead Sheet #16158, interview of regimental surgeon, 11th Marines, April 22, 1998, p. 1. Investigators also checked the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program database and discovered only 123 Marines registered out of over 35,000 Marines from units involved with events recounted in this narrative.

[212] Lead Sheet #16083, interview of chief corpsman, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #16173, interview of Medical Team Member, 11th Marines, April 24, 1998, p. 1.

[213] Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/11, September 3, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 3.

[214] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 4.

[215] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.

[216] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, pp. 2-3.

[217] Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 3.

[218] Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.

[219] Lead Sheet #6311, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 1. So far, we have been unable to contact the NBC NCO.

[220] Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 2.

[221] Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, pp. 2, 5.

[222] Lead Sheet #5530, interview of fire direction controlman/NBC NCO, A Battery, 1/11, July 31, 1997, p. 2.

[223] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 4, 5.

[224] Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 3.

[225] Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), July 25, 1997, p. 4.

[226] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.

[227] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, pp. 3-4.

[228] Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.

[229] Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, pp. 2, 3.

[230] Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 2.

[231] Lead Sheet #5969, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 4.

[232] Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.

[233] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 5.

[234] Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 3.

[235] Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 3.

[236] Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, Section 2, p. 30, 32.

[237] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 390-391.

[238] Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, July 31, 1997, pp. 2, 8-9.

[239] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 430-431.

[240] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 408-409.

[241] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 412-413.

[242] Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm, October 30, 1997.

[243] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 418-419.

[244] United States Marine Corps FactFile, MK19 40MM Machine Gun, MOD 3, October 15, 1995.

[245] U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 21, 1985, Chapter 2, pp. 2-1, 2-3.

[246] U.S. Army Field Manual 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington D.C., September 29, 1994, pp. 1-13, 1-14.

[247] Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1990, pp. 17-18.

[248] Derived from Natural Emirates, "Geology and Fossils."

[249] Derived from Field Manual No. 3-4, NBC Protection, Headquarters, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 21 October 1985, p. 5-2.

[250] Fleet Marine Force Field Manual, FMFM 3-22-1, UAV Company Operations, November 4, 1993.

[251] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 426-428.

[252] Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 5-6; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 31, 1997, p. 3.

[253] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., pp. 20-21.

[254] Entire units or only some individuals from the unit may have been in the vicinity of the 11th Marines.

[255] "Incidents, Messages, Orders Journal," 3d Marines, January 17, 1991 (but archived as 1/12). Percents refer to proportion of NBC personnel on alert.

[256] Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message 271603 Feb 91, subject: "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 25 February 1991," SECRET.

[257] 3rd Marines, "Incidents, Messages, Journal, Orders," January 29, 1991.

[258] 1st MARDIV, Ripper 24 Feb 91.

[259] Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Breaching Operations 7th Marines Log 24 Feb 91.

[260] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 69.

[261] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.

[262] 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.

[263] 1st MARDIV, Situation Chronology, Task Force Taro Section; 1/12, Command Chronology 16-28 Feb 91, March 7, 1991; 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 11, 1991.

[264] 1st MARDIV, Significant Events for 2400 1026 on 24 Feb 91.

[265] Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 66; Mroczkowski, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 45

[266] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified or acceded by 106 States (as of February 1998). It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army FM 3-4/USMC FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992; Army FM 8-285/NAVY NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/MARINE CORPS FMFM 11-11 (adopted as NATO FM 8-285), Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Injuries, US Army FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Headquarters , Department of The Army, November 25, 1985, and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for the development of this DoD methodology.


| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page |