END NOTES

[1] Tab A lists acronyms, abbreviations and glossary terms.

[2] Different spellings of Al Jubayl can be found in numerous official and unofficial documents (e.g., Al Jubayi, Al Jubail, or Jubail). For clarity, Al Jubayl is used in this document.

[3] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia" (Case Narrative,) August 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/aljubayl.

[4] Lead Report 6494, Notes of meeting held between OSAGWI investigators and two concerned individuals, September 5, 1997.

[5] US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 7.

[6] There are many sources available to obtain information on chemical warfare agents. One source that is available from the World Wide Web is a site that is maintained by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/chemhome.htm (as of October 19, 2001). Located in The Hague, the Netherlands, this organization is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.

[7] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 1, 5.

[8] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 37, and Annex B, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[9] Tab B provides GulfLINK web site addresses for lists of units located in Al Jubayl.

[10] US Coast Guard, "A Chronology of the US Coast Guard's Involvement in the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991", web site www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/PersianGulfChron.html (as of October 23, 2001); Lead Report 5169, Interview of the commander of Port Security Unit 301-B, May 27, 1997, p. 1, 2.

[11] Report to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 60-67.

[12] Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.

[13] Lead Report 1097, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2.

[14] Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2.

[15] Interviews of NMCB-24 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) reaction team members about the use of M-8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarms conflict with each other. The NBC officer stated that the alarms did not go off but that they were working properly (Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2). Another NBC team member stated that the alarms were not operational because information contained in a manual indicated that the alarm was not effective in a desert environment (Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2)."

[16] All times reflect local time unless indicated otherwise.

[17] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19-21, 1991, entry 0332 January 19,1991; 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, Watch Log, entry 0330 January 19, 1991, p. 15.

[18] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entries 0338 and 0345 on January 19, 1991.

[19] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0501. This entry is most likely a result of information received from the Rear Area Operations Center. 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0456.

[20] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19-21, 1991, entry 0340 on January 19, 1991. MOPP level 0+ was a locally devised MOPP level for which there is no official definition. An entry made to the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Command Post log indicates that MOPP level 0+ involved the M17A1 protective mask and a poncho.

[21] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19, 1991, entries 0541 and 0545.

[22] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log for January 19-21, 1991.

[23] Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 66.

[24] Shenon, Phil, "Many Veterans of the Gulf War Detail Illnesses From Chemicals," New York Times, December 20, 1996.

[25] Lead Report 5290, Interview of NMCB-24 Air Detachment officer-in-charge, June 18, 1991, p. 2.

[26] Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 66.

[27] Lead Report 3872, Interview of NMCB-40 medical corpsman, May 15, 1997, p. 2.

[28] Lead Report 5570, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, July 25, 1997, p. 1.

[29] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, 0430 entry.

[30] The entry at 0430 hours may contain incorrect information. M9 paper can not discriminate among chemical warfare agents. M9 paper can detect the presence of blister agents and nerve agents in liquid form but it does not identify the specific agent that is present, i.e., it could not identify mustard. For a liquid agent, M8 paper or the M256 kit may determine the type of agent. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC), October 1995, p. 417-420. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 2001).

[31] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, entries 0430, 0440, 0510, 0615, and 0748.

[32] Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.

[33] Lead Sheet 12190, Interview of a Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, July 1, 1997, p. 1, 2.

[34] Shenon, Phil, "Many Veterans of the Gulf War Detail Illnesses From Chemicals," New York Times, December 20, 1996.

[35] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Medical Admin Log, January 20-22, 1991; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, January 19-20, 1991; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Sick Call Log, January 19-23, 1991.

[36] Lead Report 1151, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, Nov 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 11034, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, May 27, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 11189, interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 4, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 12051, interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 17, 1997, p. 1.

[37] Lead Report 24978, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.

[38] Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2.

[39] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0330.

[40] General Support Group 1, 1st Force Service Support Group, Deputy Commander, Critical Facility Force, "Command Chronology for January 1991," p. 6.

[41] I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991, entries at 0407, 0425, and 0525 hours, p. 94-95.

[42] Logistics Operations Center, Daily Update Log, January 19, 1991 entry 0800.

[43] Lead Report 5187, Interview of a Marine colonel, June 3, 1997, p. 2.

[44] US Space Command, "United States Space Command Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Assessment (U)" (SECRET/NF), January 1992, p. 74-76.

[45] US Air Force Central Command, "Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield Air Tasking Order (U)," (SECRET).

[46] The speed of sound is approximately 750 miles per hour at sea level. At higher altitudes, the speed of sound is less than 750 miles per hour but factors such as the air temperature at the higher altitude determine the actual speed of sound. US Air Force, Fact Sheet 96-03, Subject: "Sonic Boom," web site www.af.mil/news/factsheets/Sonic_Boom.html (as of October 19, 2001).).

[47] 552d Computer Group Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," undated.

[48] US Air Force Environmental Technical Applications Center, Technical Note USAFETAC/TN 92/003, Subject: "Gulf War Weather," March 1992, p. 3-7.

[49] The formula F=1.8(C)+32 is used to convert degrees Celsius to degrees Fahrenheit while the formula C=(f-32)/1.8 converts degrees Fahrenheit to degrees Celsius. The Weather World 2010 Project, web site ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/guides/maps/ctof.rxml (as of October 23, 2001).

[50] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict,"paragraph 113, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997(as of October 19, 2001).

[51] Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," July 28, 2000.

[52] US Air Force, Air Force Research Laboratory, Letter, Subject: "Al Jubayl Sonic Boom Analysis," September 11, 2000.

[53] Although Air Force Research Laboratory used an F-16 as the subject of their analysis, any aircraft type capable of supersonic flight would produce the similar results. Lead Report 27735, E-mail from US Air Force's Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, September 18, 2000.

[54] A Styx missile is a Russian-made surface-to-surface missile used primarily as an anti-ship weapon. Slade, Stuart, "Russian Anti-Ship Missile Designations," June 5, 1999, web site www.warships1.com/Weapons/WMRUS_ASHmis.htm (as of October 19, 2001).

[55] "Dusty mustard" is not a new class of chemical warfare agent. Rather, it refers to a method of dispersing a chemical warfare agent absorbed onto a carrier (dust) and then dispersing it as an aerosol. In this narrative, the chemical warfare agent under discussion is mustard, hence the name "dusty mustard." US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. 1.

[56] Osa fast patrol boats are Russian-made naval vessels used for coastal patrol and defense. Jane's Fighting Ships, 95th ed., Jane's Information Group Limited, 1992, p. 529.

[57] Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 13.

[58] There is no evidence that indicates Iraq mated chemical warheads to Styx missiles. However, before the outbreak of hostilities, the Department of Defense Joint Staff reported that Iraq could manufacture a chemical warhead for the Styx missile. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "NADA INTSUM 341-90/DIA WASH DC," 211859Z Aug 90.

[59] 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, entry 0205 on January 19, 1991.

[60] US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. iii, 14.

[61] Central Intelligence Agency, E-mail message, Subject: "Questions Related to Al Jubayl," July 21, 2000, @ 5:05 PM.

[62] Roberts, Timothy, "Investigation of Gulf War 'Loud Noise' Incident," Center for Naval Analyses, November 1988, p. 2, 3. The Center for Naval Analyses is a federally funded research and development center that supports the Department of the Navy.

[63] Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "NADA INTSUM 341-90/DIA WASH DC," 211859Z Aug 90.

[64] 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 18-19, 1991. Unless indicated otherwise, information in this section is taken from the Rear Area Operations Center Radio log. A copy of the Rear Area Operations Center Radio Log is at Tab H.

[65] Presumably, A6B was the call sign for an unidentified unit in the port area during the war.

[66] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, entries at 0440, 0518, and 0748 hours.

[67] Lead Report 6233, Interview of a Marine warrant officer, October 1, 1997.

[68] Lead Report 6290, Interview of a Marine captain, October 2,1997.

[69] US Marine Corps, "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," Washington, DC, 1993, p. 41.

[70] Lead Report 15201, Interview of a Marine colonel, February 26, 1998.

[71] Lead Report 15448, Interview of a Navy admiral, March 12, 1997.

[72] Lead Report 15602, Interview of a Marine general, March 26, 1998.

[73] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entries 0338 and 0345 on January 19, 1991.

[74] Lead Report 24977, Interview of an NMCB-24 NBC officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.

[75] I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991, p. 94, 95.

[76] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, p. 1, 2.

[77] US Central Command, Staff Journal, January 19, 1991.

[78] 1st Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group, Significant Events Report, February 21, 1991, p. 2.

[79] Lead Report 1151, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, Nov 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, January 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 11034, interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, May 27, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 11189, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 4, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 12051, interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 17, 1997, p. 1.

[80] Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 11202, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 11191, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 24975, Affidavit from an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p.1; Lead Report 24976, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2; Lead Report 24978, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2; Lead Report 24979, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.

[81] Lead Report 982, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1.

[82] Lead Report 1173, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1207 Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 11191, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 24976, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2.

[83] Lead Report 24979, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.

[84] Lead Report 982, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1.

[85] We have uncovered no record of anyone in the Al Jubayl area dying or becoming incapacitated as a result of an exposure to a chemical warfare agent during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm, nor has anyone alleged to our investigators that someone died or became incapacitated as a result of an exposure to a chemical warfare agent during the war.

[86] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), August 13, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[87] After examining postwar Iraqi declarations, UNSCOM inspection data, and other information, the Central Intelligence Agency compiled a list of the chemical warfare agents included in Iraq's Gulf War chemical warfare agent arsenal; lewisite is not on that list. Lead Sheet 25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999, p. 1.

[88] United Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 189, "Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657; Lead Sheet 25196, Interview of CIA expert on Iraqi chemical warfare, October 8, 1999, p. 1.

[89] Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 204.

[90] Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 219.

[91] Siedell, Frederick, R., "Nerve Agents," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 142, 143, 144, 145.

[92] Baskin, Steven J., and Thomas G. Brewer, "Cyanide Poisoning," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, ed. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 276, 277, 278.

[93] Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 201, 202.

[94] Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 218, 219.

[95] The effective dose for liquid mustard on the eye has not been reliably established. Eyes are the most sensitive organ to mustard and the most severe eye injuries are produced by liquid mustard. It follows, therefore, that an amount that is less than the effective dose for liquid mustard on the skin would cause an effect on the eye. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 201, 208, 210.

[96] Although the liquid form of mustard would certainly irritate or damage a person's airway, liquids are not normally inhaled. If one were to inhale liquid blister agent, an amount that is less than the effective dose for the particular liquid agent on the skin would cause an effect on the airway. The severity of the effect is dependent upon the dose received. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 211.

[97] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 1, p. 39.

[98] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31, 32.

[99] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 39.

[100] National Safety Council Crossroads, "Ammonia (Anhydrous) Chemical Backgrounder," web site www.crossroads.nsc.org/Chemical Template.cfm?id=80&chempath= chemicals (as of October 22, 2001).

[101] Roberts, Timothy, "Investigation of Gulf War 'Loud Noise' Incident," Center for Naval Analyses, November 1988, p. 12.

[102] During the September 5, 1997, meeting, the two individuals presented a table from an unidentified document as proof that Coalition aircraft shot down the Iraqi Mirages. The table also shows that Iraq lost two MiG-25s and two MiG-29s to Coalition aircraft. The table is titled "Table VI-8, Operation Desert Storm Air-to-Air Victories by Coalition Air Forces, 17 January to 28 February."

[103] The AWACS is an airborne system that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications to commanders of US, NATO, and other allied air defense forces. US Air Force, Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, "E-3 Sentry (AWACS)," July 2000, www.af.mil/news/factsheets/E_3_Sentry_AWACS.html (as of October 22, 2001).

[104] US Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, "Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Special Operations" 1993, p. 320.

[105] US Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, "Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Special Operations" 1993, p. 323.

[106] Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," December 15, 1997.

[107] 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," undated.

[108] 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," undated.

[109] US Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Special Programs Office, Letter from the Deputy Director, Subject: "Information on Iraqi A/C Shootdowns 19 Jan 91," September 22, 1997.

[110] Lead Sheet 12190, Interview of Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, July 1, 1997, p.1, 2

[111] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 41, web site http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[112] Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 petty officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.

[113] For additional information on Scud missiles see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles " (Information Paper), February 12, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud_info_ii/.

[114] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entries 2150 through 2230, January 20, 1991.

[115] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 0046, January 21, 1991.

[116] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entry 0054, January 21, 1991.

[117] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 0115, January 21, 1991.

[118] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entry 0142, January 21, 1991.

[119] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log, entry 2200, January 20, 1991, and entries 2445 [0045], 0330, and 2150, January 21, 1991.

[120] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 20-21, 1991.

[121] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraphs 1, 38, 40, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[122] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,"A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraphs 47, 53, 58, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[123] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 41, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[124] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 57, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[125] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 25, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October19, 2001).

[126] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 139, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[127] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,  "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraphs 109-115, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[128] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 32, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[129] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 139, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[130] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[131] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict,"paragraphs 67-73, 102, 103 and 106, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October, 2001).

[132] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, entry 0748, January 19, 1991.

[133] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, entry 0440, January 19, 1991.

[134] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 109, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[135] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 111, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[136] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 113, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[137] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 114, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[138] British Liaison Officer (Gulf Health), Letter, July 9, 1998.

[139] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 32, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[140] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 128, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[141] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 130, web site www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=997 (as of October 19, 2001).

[142] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,"A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," paragraph 132, web site www.mod.uk/info/jubayl (as of October 19, 2001).

[143] US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, p. 1, 2.

[144] Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," July 21, 1998.

[145] 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," December 1998.

[146] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles," (Information Paper), February 12, 2001, p. 14-15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud_info_ii.

[147] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles," (Information Paper), July 25, 2000, p. 14-15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil (as of July 25, 2000).

[148] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 11.

[149] 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," December 1998.

[150] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.

[151] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 18.

[152] Lead Report 1410, Interview of Port Security Unit-301A engineering officer, March 7, 1997, p. 2.

[153] Although possibly missile fuel, we do not know the source of the fumes. Iraq used kerosene as the fuel for its Scuds and Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) as the oxidizer. Exposure to even small amounts of IRFNA can cause severe and life threatening injuries. Unlike IRFNA, kerosene is a common substance used in diesel fuels and aircraft fuel. An exposure to kerosene should not pose a serious health risk. To date, we have found no records indicating that any personnel who responded to the impact site or participated in the Scud recovery operation sought medical attention for injuries associated with exposure to either substance. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Nitric Acid Fact Sheet, web site www.hhmi.org/science/labsafe/lcss/lcss62.html (as of October 22, 2001); Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA)" (Information Paper), August 13, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/irfna; Mattie, David R., PhD, "Toxicity of Rocket Fuels: Comparison of Hydrogen Peroxide with Current Propellants," 1st Hydrogen Peroxide Propulsion Workshop, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, .July 29-31, 1988, web site www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/SSC/H2O2CONF/dmattie.htm(as of October 22, 2001).

[154] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996, (SECRET), p. 18.

[155] Photograph provided by a member of US Cost Guard's Port Security Unit 301.

[156] Photograph provided by a member of US Cost Guard's Port Security Unit 301.

[157] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996, (SECRET), p. 18.

[158] Lead Report 1232, Interview of Navy warrant officer, January 10, 1997, p.2

[159] Lead Report 1257, Interview of an Army captain, January 21, 1997, p. 2.

[160] Defense Intelligence Agency, Letter, Subject: "Declassification of Sentence," August 11, 1997.

[161] The M18A2 Chemical Agent Detection Kit is used to detect dangerous concentrations of chemical warfare agents whether they are in vapor, aerosol, or liquid form. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 421-424.

[162] Lead Report 1232, Interview of Navy warrant officer, January 10, 1997, p. 2.

[163] Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.

[164] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 1445 on March 19, 1991.

[165] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 1.

[166] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Medical Administrative Log, March 19, 1991, entry 1445.

[167] Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, March 19, 1991.

[168] Lead Report 1181, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 18, 1996, p. 2.

[169] Lead Report 1282, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, February 7, 1997, p. 1.

[170] Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1.

[171] It is possible that more people could have experienced or been exposed to the same substance as the nine Seabees discussed in this narrative. During an interview, one NMCB-24 medical corpsman said that "14-15 persons presented with purple t-shirts on the windward side of clothing and boots." However, the NMCB-24 sick call log shows that only seven persons reported to the medical section for treatment. Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2, and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, March 19, 1991.

[172] Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 1445 on March 19, 1991.

[173] Lead Report 1181, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 18, 1996, p. 1.

[174] Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2.

[175] Lead Report 1400, Interview of NMCB-24 senior petty officer, February 27, 1997, p. 2.

[176] Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 1400, Interview of NMCB-24 senior petty officer, February 27, 1997, p. 2.

[177] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia, November 29, 1990.

[178] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 4, 10, and Enclosure 1.

[179] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 10.

[180] Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2.

[181] Other than the source document identified in the following footnote, investigators have not found any other information regarding tests conducted on T-shirts by the US Army's material Test Directorate. Investigators did attempt to obtain additional information from the test directorate. Unfortunately, the directorate had undergone reorganization in the intervening period between the T-shirt test and the commencement of DoD's investigation of the Purple T-shirt incident. We have been unable to locate any current or former test directorate employee that could provide us with any additional information on the tests. It is included in this discussion of the purple T-shirt incident to inform the reader that post-war testing was conducted in an attempt to identify what may have caused the T-shirts to change color. In addition, investigators have found no information during the investigation to suggest that testing of combat boots was ever conducted.

[182] US Army White Sands Missile Range, Material Test Directorate, Letter, July 20, 1993.

[183] Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center, Memorandum to the US Army Aviation and Troop Command, Subject: "Color Changes of T-Shirts Worn During Operation Desert Shield/Storm," May 17, 1994.

[184] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 3.

[185] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5.

[186] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.

[187] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.

[188] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990.

[189] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5, 6, 7, 8; and Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990. The numbers in parentheses next to company names correspond with the industries shown in Figure 21.

[190] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.

[191] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.

[192] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 3, 4.

[193] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5.

[194] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990.

[195] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.

[196] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995.

[197] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 2-4.

[198] Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990; and Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995.

[199] Berg SW, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, "Post Persian Gulf Medical Findings in Military Reservists," Report presented to National Institute of Health Technology Assessment Conference on the Persian Gulf Experience and Health, Bethesda, Maryland, April 1994, and to the Institute of Medicine Committee to Review the Consequences of Service during the Gulf War. The report is reviewed in the report of the Institute of Medicine, "Health Consequences of Service during the Gulf War: Initial Findings and Recommendations for Immediate Action," National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1995.

[200] Haley, R.W., T.L. Kurt, J. Horn, "Is there a Gulf War Syndrome? Searching for Syndromes by Factor Analysis of Symptoms," The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1977, 277:215-22.

[201] Haley, R.W., J. Horn, P.S. Roland, et al., "Evaluation of Neurologic Function in Gulf War veterans; a blinded case control study, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1997; 277:223-30.

[202] Haley, R.W., T.L. Kurt, "Self-reported Exposure to Neurotoxic Chemical Combination in the Gulf War; a

[203] Haley, R.W., S. Billecke, B.N.La Du., "Association of Low Pon1 Type Q (Type A) Arylesterase Activity with Neurologic Symptom Complexes in Gulf War Veterans," Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, 1999;57:227-33.

[204] Roland, P.S., R.W. Haley, W. Yellin, K. Owens, A.G. Shoup, "Vestibular dysfunction in Gulf War syndrome," Otolaryngol Head Neck Surgery, 2000;122:319-29.

[205] Gray, G.C., K.S. Kaiser, A.A.W. Hawksworth, F.W. Hall, E. Barrett-Connor, "Increased Postwar Symptoms And Psychological Morbidity Among US Navy Gulf War Veterans," American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1999;60:75-766.

[206] Gray, G.C., K.S. Kaiser, A.W. Hawksworth, H.L. Watson, "No Serologic Evidence Of An Association Found Between Gulf War Service And Mycoplasma Fermentans Infection," American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1999, 60:752-7.

[207] Gray, G.C., Personal communication, Subject: "Seabee Health Study: Comparison of NMCB24 and NMCB40, G[ulf] W[ar] V[eterans] only, February 1999," January 17, 2000.

[208] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 26.

[209] Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," ed. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, ed. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 198, 199, 204, 218, 220, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedAspects/contents.html (as of October 22, 2001).

[210] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II, Definitions And Terms," [undated], web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 23, 2001).

[211] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II. Definitions And Terms," [undated], web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 23, 2001).

[212] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 27.

[213] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[214] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 3, p. 58.

[215] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 46.

[216] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Technical Secretariat, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents;" April 29, 1997, www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 23, 2001).

[217] US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, Subject: "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. 1, 2, 3.

[218] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 265.

[219] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 271.

[220] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 295.

[221] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 299.

[222] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.

[223] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.

[224] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.

[225] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.

[226] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 30.

[227] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31.

[228] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 417.

[229] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 39.

[230] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 544.

[231] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) And Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[232] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430.

[233] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II. Definitions And Terms," [undated], web site http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of October 23, 2001).

[234] Jane's Fighting Ships, 95th ed., Jane's Information Group Limited, 1992, p. 529.

[235] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 766.

[236] Department Of The Navy -- Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC, November 13, 1997, web site www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq67-3.htm (as of October 23, 2001).

[237] Trinity University, Marrs McLean Science Center web site www.geos.trinity.edu/ece/air_pollution/thermal_inversion.htm (as of October 17, 2000).

[238] Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Washington, DC, April 12, 2001, web site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf (as of October 23, 2001).

[239] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p 23-25.

[240] Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 944.

[241] Harrison's Principles Of Internal Medicine, 14th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998, p. 104-105.

[242] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.

[243] Based on locations reported for battalion-level Unit Identification Codes derived from the Geographic Information System; Unit Identification Code-based personnel strengths from the Defense Manpower Data Center.

[244] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. As of June 26, 2001, 174 states have signed, ratified or acceded to it. The United States signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified the Convention on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. We found other protocols and guidelines in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.

[245] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm", January 3, 1995, p. 8.

[246] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.

[247] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8.

[248] Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p.4, 10, and  Enclosure 1.

[249] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," (as of October 19, 2001).

[250] 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Log," January 18-19, 1991.

[251] US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 30, 31.

[252] US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 35.

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