END NOTES

[1] An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.

[2] Message, Subject: Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons, December 1, 1990. Document, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, US Government, 1998, Appendix B.

[3] Message, Subject: Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons, December 1, 1990.

[4] Message, Subject: Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas, December 28, 1990.

[5] Message, Subject: Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas, December 28, 1990. "S-shaped bunkers served as the primary factor for analysts in their identification of suspect chemical weapons storage sites before the war. The IC had assessed - for logical, analytical reasons - that S-shaped bunkers were the most likely storage sites for forward-deployed Iraqi chemical weapons. In the years following the war, however, it became clear that S-shaped bunkers were not a reliable signature for the presence of chemical munitions; in many cases the Iraqis had hidden munitions outside bunkers to protect them from Coalition airstrikes." "Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illnesses Issues", Persian Gulf Illnesses Task Force, December 1997, p. 8.

[6] The CW production facility near Samarra was also known in Iraq as Al Muthanna. According to Iraq's UN declarations, the 155mm mustard (HD) shells stored in bunker eight at the An Nasiriyah SW ASP from January to February 1991 (before being transferred to an open storage area 5 km west of the Khamisiyah ASP) were shipped from this facility.

[7] Message, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence, Subject: Information on Iraq's Biological Warfare Program, November 12, 1993. The most recent information on Iraq's BW program and UN declarations can be found in: Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, US Government, 1998, Appendix B. Additional information on biological agents can be found in the glossary.

[8] Message, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence, Subject: Information on Iraq's Biological Warfare Program, November 12, 1993. The most recent information on Iraq's BW program and UN declarations can be found in: Document, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, US Government, 1998, Appendix B.

[9] The Khamisiyah ASP has also been referred to as the An Nasiriyah SE ASP. Initial references to the storage of CW at An Nasiriyah were believed to refer to the SW ASP vice the SE (Khamisiyah) ASP due to presence of an S-shaped bunker at the SW ASP site. The SE (Khamisiyah) ASP did not contain any S-shaped bunkers.

[10] Message, Subject: Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites, May 1996, para 4B.

[11] Document, 505th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

[12] Message, Commander 82nd Airborne Division, No subject given, March 23, 1991. Interview with 82nd Airborne Division Chemical Officer, CMAT number: 1997109-024, April 21, 1997, and Interview Notes, June 17, 1996.

[13] To avoid confusing the reader, The Search for Chemical Weapons, The Search for Biological Weapons, and Demolition Activities sections of this narrative separately describe activities that in many cases occurred simultaneously. This is especially true in The Search for Biological Weapons section, since demolition related activities started almost as soon as the ASP was occupied on March 1st, while the helicopter inserted BW sampling mission, which is the focus of that section, did not occur until March 6th.

[14] Message, Commander 82nd Airborne Division, No subject given, March 23, 1991. (Fox paper)

[15] Interview with 82nd Airborne Division Chemical Officer, CMAT number: 1997109-024, April 21, 1997, and Interview Notes, June 17, 1996.

[16] Interview with 82nd Airborne Division Chemical Officer, CMAT number: 1997109-024, April 21, 1997, and Interview Notes, June 17, 1996.

[17] Interview with 82nd Airborne Brigade level Chemical Officer is documented in Transcript of Proceedings, Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, CMAT number 1997143-0000062, pp. 9-29.

[18] Interview with Fox vehicle crew member, CMAT number: 1997013-053, May 15, 1997 and Fox vehicle commander, CMAT number: 1997290-0000041, October 21, 1997. Note: Only two Fox vehicles were assigned to and conducted CW survey operations in the Tallil/ASP area. Since these two individuals were assigned to two different Fox vehicles, they would have been aware of any positive samples taken by this system.

[19] Interview with 307th Engineer Bn S-2 intelligence officer, CMAT number: 1997162-0000968, September 15, 1997.

[20] Interview with Fox vehicle crewmember, CMAT number: 1997013-053, May 15, 1997.

[21] Interviews with engineers who reported that they saw CW (based on color bands) include CMAT number: 1997162-0000837 and 1997162-0000255. The first reported that he destroyed six gray bombs with red and yellow strips painted on them, the second that 5 or 10 percent of the artillery shells he observed in bunkers had white or yellow markings on the nose of the projectiles. EOD interview CMAT 1997121-0000012 specifically mentioned finding gray munitions with red bands - and they were not CW. EOD interview CMAT 1997140-0000115 mentioned that CW could be recognized by filler plugs, color (two yellow bands), double walled construction, and thin skin. He also stated that it was taken for granted that CW may not be marked or marked inconsistently, making marking schemes an unreliable indicator of CW. Additional insights on this subject are contained in "Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illnesses Issues," Persian Gulf Illnesses Task Force, December 1997, p. 3-4. IAD is currently researching an information paper on CW markings for publication later in 1998.

[22] Interview with senior 60th EOD technician, CMAT number: 1997140-0000115, May 23, 1997.

[23] 60th EOD Incident Journal, Desert Storm. This journal references the discovery of a single suspected chemical shell at coordinates several kilometers east of the An Nasiriyah SW ASP on March 7th, 1991. As indicated in the journal entry, Fox vehicles detected no chemical agents in the munitions or in the area at the coordinates given. See Figure 3 for the position of the munition.

[24] These photos were obtained from the senior 60th EOD technician, CMAT nunber: 1997140-0000115, that spotted the munition and filed the 60th EOD report.

[25] This veteran did not/could not remember the specific location of the warehouse. It very well could have been the warehouse complex on the access road between Tallil and the ASP, which contained large quantities of captured equipment and weapons removed from Kuwait. See 505th PIR interview CMAT number: 1997175-0000203. (Figure 3).

[26] 505th PIR interview CMAT number: 1997175-0000203, July 14, 1997.

[27] To avoid confusing the reader, The Search for Chemical Weapons, The Search for Biological Weapons, and Demolition Activities sections of this narrative separately describe activities that in many cases occurred simultaneously. This is especially true in The Search for Biological Weapons section, since demolition activities started almost as soon as the ASP was occupied on March 1, 1991, while the helicopter inserted BW sampling mission, which is the focus of this section, did not occur until March 6, 1991.

[28] History report section, 9th Chemical Detachment, 9th Infantry Division, Ft. Lewis, Washington; Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center (JCMEC) Historical Report, Operation Desert Storm.

[29] History report section, 9th Chemical Detachment, 9th Infantry Division, Ft. Lewis, Washington; Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center (JCMEC) Historical Report, Operation Desert Storm.

[30] Message, Subject: 513th Military Intelligence Bde Task Force Kuwait Restoration SITREP, March 7, 1991, para 1A.

[31] The door gunner mentions in his interview (CMAT number: 1996176-0000016) that he showed his photos of their landing site to two analysts, one from the Presidential Advisory Committee and the other a Senate staffer, and both 'confirmed' that the photos were from Khamisiyah, which also had the same type of munition storage bunkers. This March 6, 1991, sampling mission to An Nasiriyah took place only 2 days after the very large 36 bunker demolition 'blow' at the Khamisiyah ASP, approximately 25 km to the south, on March 4, 1991.

[32] When Iraq declared where their CW was located to UNSCOM inspectors, they referred to the site as being near "Khamisiyah (An Nasiriyah)". The inspectors believed that they were going to visit the An Nasiriyah SW ASP site (next to Tallil) and were surprised when they were taken to a site known to the US at that time as Tall al Lahm (Khamisiyah), about 25 km farther to the south. This confusion occurred because in the 1990-91 time frame, the Intelligence Community associated the storage of CW/BW with specific bunker types. Since the An Nasiriyah SW ASP contained one CW associated S-shaped type bunker and four 12-frame BW associated storage bunkers while the Khamisiyah ASP were not thought to contain either type, Iraqi UN declarations initially were believed to be deceptive. UNSCOM inspectors later confirmed during Khamisiyah ASP inspection visits the presence of 155mm mustard-filled artillery shells (which Iraq said were originally stored at the An Nasiriyah SW ASP) and 122mm artillery rockets with Sarin-filled warheads. For additional background on this subject, see Message, Subject: Chemical Rocket Destruction at Khamisiyah, June 1992; Message, Subject: Working Paper Mentioning Possible CW Exposure, 1992; and Message, Subject: UNSCOM 20 (CW 6) Inspection Results of Kamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility.

[33] Interview with mission pilot, CMAT number: 1997105-017, April 15, 1997.

[34] Interview with co-pilot, CMAT number: 1997107-001, April 17, 1997.

[35] Rod Hafemeister, "Gulf War Veteran Details his Illness," News-Democrat, Belleville, IL, July 23, 1995, p.1. Interview with Blackhawk crewchief, CMAT number: 1995361-0000001, February 2, 1997 and April 18, 1997. Other News-Democrat articles on this mission include: "Chemical Weapons Found Before Blast," July 1, 1996, and "Reservists Questioned About Weapons", October 1, 1996 http://www.gulfweb.org.

[36] Interview with Blackhawk door gunner, CMAT number: 1996176-0000016, May 13, 1997.

[37] Interview with 513th MI Bde chemical officer, CMAT number: 1997337-0000024, December 3, 1997.

[38] Interview with AFMIC medical intelligence officer, CMAT number: 1998069-0000011, March 9, 1998.

[39] Interview with 9th Chemical Company BW sample team SFC, CMAT number: 1997329-0000018, December 1, 1997.

[40] Interview with 9th Chemical Company BW sample team SFC, CMAT number: 1997329-0000018, December 1, 1997. Note: The M256 chemical agent testing kit requires performing more than a dozen steps, some timed, over a 20-30 minute period at a specific location. The 513th MI Bde chemical officer tasked the NCOs to perform M256 CW testing while he collected BW samples without the NCOs' direct observation or knowledge of the chemical officer's specific actions or activities.

[41] Interviews with 60th EOD and 307th Engineer personnel indicate that they did not wear MOPP gear during their activities at Tallil and the ASP since it had been searched and cleared by 82nd chemical personnel.

[42] Interview with Operations officer, HHC/307th Engineer Battalion, CMAT number: 1997109-0000034, April 17, 1997.

[43] Interview with Commander, JCMEC CMAT number: 1997339-0000003, December 16, 1997.

[44] Interview with Operations officer, JCMEC, CMAT number: 1997344-0000033, January 9, 1998.

[45] US Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Special Pathogens Section, Department of Epidemiology, Disease Assessment Division Specimen Report, March 27, 1992. The testing identified several substances to include 2, 4, 5 trinitrotoluene (TNT, an explosive filler used in conventional munitions), water (with environmental contaminates to include bacteria, and various minerals). The three soil samples tested negative for anthrax. A case narrative on BW related operations during Desert Storm is being coordinated and will be published later in 1998. It will provide additional details on how samples were collected, escorted, tested, results, etc., and background on BW agents, effects, and countermeasures.

[46] Interview with 307th Engineer, CMAT number: 1997162-0000792, November 4, 1997.

[47] 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm), Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[48] Interview with 82nd Airborne Division Chemical Officer, CMAT number: 1997109-024, April 21, 1997, and Interview Notes, June 17, 1996.

[49] 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm), Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[50] Naval EOD Technical Center, Indian Head, Md. letter dated January 27, 1998, para 1.a.

[51] Naval EOD Technical Center, Indian Head, Md. letter dated January 27, 1998, para 1.b.

[52] 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm), Item 60-70-DS, April 1, 1991.

[53] Naval EOD Technical Center, Indian Head, Md. letter dated January 27, 1998 para 1.e. and 1.f.

[54] B Company, 307th Engineers also participated in demo activity at Tallil and the ASP, but had a more limited role due to being reassigned in early March 1991.

[55] Interviews with C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, 1st platoon leader, CMAT number: 1997162-0000175 and lead sheet 1079, October 23, 1996; 2nd platoon leader, CMAT number: 1997113-0000145, April 29, 1997; 3rd platoon leader, CMAT number: 1997-10930, April 17, 1997; and Lead sheet 1080, interview with Battalion XO, December 18, 1996.

[56] Interview with Fox vehicle crew member, CMAT number: 1997013-053, May 15, 1997 and Fox vehicle commander, CMAT number: 1997290-0000041, October 21, 1997. Note: Only two Fox vehicles were assigned to and conducted CW survey operations in the Tallil/ASP area. Since these two individuals were assigned to two different Fox vehicles, they would have been aware of any positive samples taken by this system.

[57] The best illustration of this occurred when the two 60th EOD technicians discovered a possible CW munition near the ASP. They immediately left the area (vice using an M256 kit) and reported the sighting. Fox vehicles responded to their report, testing the area with negative results. See Transcript of Interview with 60th EOD technician, April 10, 1997, p 21-23; Interview with senior 60th EOD technician, CMAT number: 1997140-0000115, May 23, 1997. 60th EOD Incident Journal, Desert Storm.

[58] Interview with 307th Engineering Battalion Commander, CMAT number: 1997294-0000049, May 7, 1997.

[59] Message, 307th Engineer Battalion Operations Summary, March 23, 1991, p. 1-5. Note: this summary does not include aircraft destroyed by US Air Force munitions nor aircraft destroyed by other units.

[60] Interviews with 1703rd EOD members: CMAT number: 1997121-0000012, May 27, 1997; CMAT number: 1997118-0000043, May 6, 1997; CMAT number: 1997063-004, March 3, 1997; CMAT number: 1997141-000081, May 29, 1997; CMAT number: 1997121-0000014, May 14, 1997.

[61] 146th EOD Incident Journal, Desert Shield/Storm, May 15, 1991.

[62] Interviews with 146th EOD Commander, CMAT number: 1997112-0000040, June 3, 1997; Lead Sheet 895, Aug 13, 1996.

[63] The "controversy" concerning this specific demolition was due to its size, visibility, and "lack of warning" to nearby units. The "lack of warning" aspect was primarily due to the demolition being repeatedly delayed for several hours from late afternoon to early evening due to ASP safety clearance concerns. (Iraqi nationals were grazing their sheep in the ASP -- see the 84th Engineer Company Commander comments in Interviews concerning activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, transcript, May 6, 1997, p. 131-134.). The repeated warnings and subsequent delays evidently caused the actual demolition time not to be taken seriously -- hence the "surprise." The dates, times, and locations of munition demolitions for both Tallil air base and the An Nasiriyah SW ASP are listed in the 60th and 146th EOD Incident Journals. Both installations were located in the "PV" grid zone, with multiple bunker locations being listed under a single UTM coordinate.

[64] Interviews concerning activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991, transcript, May 6, 1997, p. 132-134.

[65] 146th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Shield), Activity items 146-073-DS and 146-74-DS.

[66] Document, Operation Desert Shield (History of 82 Engineer Battalion), May 16, 1992.

[67] Interview with 210th Field Artillery Executive Officer, CMAT number: 1997318-0000023, November 20, 1997.

[68] Message, Subject: Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites, May 1996, para 4(A) - 4D.

[69] Message, Subject: Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites, May 1996, para 4G.

[70] Message, Subject: Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites, May 1996, para 4(A) - 4D.

[71] Unlike Sarin (GB), which evaporates rapidly, mustard (HD) is a persistent agent that would have remained effective during the period of US activities. "The persistence of hazard from mustard vapor or liquid depends on the degree of contamination by the liquid, type of mustard, nature of the terrain and soil, type of munition used, and weather conditions. Mustard may persist much longer in wooded areas than in the open. Mustard persists two to five times longer in winter than in summer. The hazard from the vapor is many times greater under hot conditions than under cool conditions." US Army FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Chapter 4-6 (b). http://www.nbc-med.org/FMs/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm

[72] Message, Subject: Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites, May 1996, para 4(A) - 4D.

[73] A case narrative on BW operations during Desert Shield/Storm is being coordinated and is expected to be published in the spring of 1998.

[74] The sensitivity of biological agents to high temperatures, sunlight, etc., varies according to the specific agent; a listing of biological agents and their environmental sensitivities is available in the glossary section.

[75] The glossary listing has more on the association of anthrax with sheep and farm animals. The soon to be published BW case narrative will cover positive livestock-associated anthrax samples in greater depth.

[76] Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Fredrick, Md. Second Edition, August 1996. http://www.nbc-med.org/FMs/medman/index.htm

[77] Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Fredrick, Md. Second Edition, August 1996. http://www.nbc-med.org/FMs/medman/index.htm

[78] Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Fredrick, Md. Second Edition, August 1996. http://www.nbc-med.org/FMs/medman/index.htm

[79] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

[80] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds. Washington, D.C., December 1990.

[81] FM 3-4 pp. 1-13 and 1-14, and CBDCOM Fact sheet for the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM).

[82] Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents. http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm

[83] NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (Fox) Operations, US Field Manual 3-101-2, 10 August 1994.

[84] Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, p. 430.

[85] Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, p. 412.

[86] US Army Field Manual 3-4, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 1985.

[87] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

[88] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

[89] UN Security Council Resolution 687, dated April 1991.

[90] Units listed were within 5 km of the center of the ASP; entire units or only some individuals from the unit may have been in the vicinity.

[91] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified or acceded by 106 States (as of February 1998). It was signed by the US on January 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army FM 3-4/USMC FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992; Army FM 8-285/NAVY NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/MARINE CORPS FMFM 11-11 (adopted as NATO FM 8-285), Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, US Army FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Headquarters , Department of The Army, November 25, 1985, and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for the development of this DoD methodology.




| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page |