TAB E - Lessons Learned
Chemical warfare agent detection
During the Gulf War, two primary methodologies existed for detecting chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. One was visual - munitions markings, like painted bands or symbols, or physical characteristics like thin, double-walled casings; burster tubes; welded construction; fill plugs; etc. However, these visual characteristics are not always reliable. Chemical detectors were the second available method. Unfortunately, a properly designed, manufactured, and filled chemical munition will often not emit enough chemical warfare agent vapor to be reliably detected by current M256 kits or CAMs. This presented EOD technicians with the very impractical and dangerous task of having to disassemble an unknown munition in order to positively identify if it is filled with a hazardous agent. A new detection method that can reliably detect munition contents by external sensors should be operationally deployed as soon as possible.
Policies and procedures for munition destruction
Under normal non-combat conditions, EOD technicians will carefully identify each munition to be destroyed, and implement a plan that, with a high degree of safety and reliability, would render each munition inert. Due to the large quantities of munitions captured during Desert Storm, and the limited amount of time, explosives, and EOD technicians available, this was not done. Entire bunkers full of munitions were rigged for destruction without conducting a complete item-by-item inventory, and much of the demolition rigging was done by non-EOD personnel - primarily combat engineers - who were not fully trained for this mission. Due to limited demolition materials, many of the munitions in these bunkers were either ejected intact or "cooked off" over an extended period of time. These ejections and "cook-offs" placed US personnel at increased risk. Policies or directives should be developed that clearly communicate these risks to commanders, and provide explicit guidance on when and how non-EOD personnel will be used to destroy large quantities of captured munitions.
Mission Coordination and Communications
Operational units responsible for demolition, including EOD and combat engineers, were not properly provided information necessary for the safe conduct of their mission. The US intelligence community had information on potential chemical and biological weapon storage sites that was not passed to the operators who occupied and destroyed them. Neither EOD nor the combat engineers who assisted them were briefed on the analytical association of S-shaped or 12-frame bunkers with chemical or biological weapons. Had this association been passed down to the operational level, these specific bunkers and a significant area around them would have certainly received additional attention from chemical and EOD specialists. Additionally, a special biological weapons sampling mission was flown to this installation without any type of coordination with the operators who occupied it and were conducting demolition operations there. This lack of knowledge endangered everyone on this mission. Since the US Army aviation community carefully coordinates and de-conflicts operations in artillery firing zones, this same level of planning and coordination should be developed when EOD conducts demolition operations.
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, and Training
This sampling mission was conducted on short notice with very little coordination among the aircrew and the sampling team, and without following existing doctrine. The aircrew was not completely briefed on the nature of the mission, the potential hazards (like the demolition), and the safety precautions necessary to prevent possible CW/BW contamination. The sampling crew did not insure that all team members knew the mission objective, their specific roles, and the tasks assigned to the other members. The lack of internal communications created a situation where one of the team members did not know they were inspecting a suspected BW storage site until after the mission and an aircrew member thought the burning of MOPP gear was an unusual event, vice a prudent, conservative, safety precaution. At the same time, the team members did not understand the sample testing procedures or the notification process for positive results (and lack of notification for negative results). Their lack of knowledge regarding the "big picture" led to erroneous speculation and unnecessary concern. A thorough pre-mission brief with both the crews and the sampling teams in future chemical or biological sampling surveys would further enhance mission safety and effectiveness, and reduce misunderstandings.
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