END NOTES

[1] An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.

[2] Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36, 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.

[3] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.

[4] Drawing provided by GySgt George Grass. TRF stands for Task Force Ripper.

[5] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997 and Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.

[6] GySgt George Grass' Gulf War Journal.

[7] The Vehicle Orientation System (VOS) relied on number of wheel revolutions to determine its relative position. Therefore, anytime the wheels turned without moving the vehicle (for example, when stuck in the sand) the location displayed by the VOS would be inaccurate from that point on. Resetting the VOS required a major land feature to be in the line of sight - an infrequent occurrence in the desert. The VOS has since been replaced with the more accurate Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system.

[8] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96; Interview with member of EOD team, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026 and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[9] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96 and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[10] Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.

[11] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[12] GySgt George Grass' Gulf War Journal.

[13] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[14] Provided by GySgt George Grass.

[15] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[16] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325, dated June 18, 1997.

[17] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5263, dated June 13, 1997.

[18] Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary-dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions-the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.

[19] At this level unprotected personnel would experience moderate to severe symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.

[20] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects; June 1994 Table 18, Gulflink, http://www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/table18.gif.

[21] For more information on the Fox vehicle, please refer to the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Information Paper.

[22] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 11 Jan 94. This same information about the Fox Vehicle alerts in the ASP is also reported in the Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report: Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Section 11 (U) Possible CW Agent Release, June 16, 1997, p. 19-20. However, as noted in the section EOD Team Inspection on March 1, 1991 of this narrative, recollections of the results of the inspection differ. Based on Grass’s testimony, the Mitre report says the EOD team confirmed the presence of chemical weapons; but numerous interviews with the EOD team indicated their inspections turned up no evidence of chemical weapons in the ASP, which was reported up the chain of command. In addition to these interviews these results were confirmed in a letter sent to Congressman Shay by a member of the EOD team. Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.

[23] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.

[24] Testimony of Fox #5604 MM1 Operator, Lead Sheet 5183, dated June 4, 1997.

[25] For more on MOPP see the MOPP Information Paper (to be published and linked at a future date).

[26] Interview with Fox #5604 Wheel Operator, Lead Sheet 5411, dated July 2, 1997 and Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.

[27] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.

[28] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[29] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[30] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 68.

[31] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[32] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.

[33] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 62.

[34] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[35] Testimony of Fox #5604 MM1 Operator, Lead Sheet 5183, dated June 4, 1997.

[36] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[37] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.

[38] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 60. Grass described the Conex box as being like "the back of a tractor-trailer that's been set down on the ground and painted green."

[39] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.

[40] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997.

[41] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.

[42] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997.

[43] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.

[44] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.

[45] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.

[46] Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325, dated June 18, 1997.

[47] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.

[48] 1st MarDiv Radio Message Traffic from Ripper to PRIDE, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/123096_oct96_decls10_0001.html.

[49] 1st MarDiv Radio Message Traffic from Division to DSC, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/123096_oct96_decls11_0001.html.

[50] Command Chronology 5th Battalion 11th Marines Journal Files, Daily Journal 28Feb91, Gulflink http//www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/121096_sep96_decls24_0003.html.

[51] Command Chronology 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Jan - Mar 1991, Journal 1st Recon BN 28 Feb 91, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/121096_sep96_decls20_0004.html.

[52] Command Chronology 1st Battalion 12th Marine Regiment Mar - Jun 1991, Incidents Messages Orders Journal, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/gulflink/db/marines/102596_sep96_decls22_0001.html.

[53] CENTCOM SPOTREP 282150C, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/...082696_DOC_133_SIG_OPS_EVENTS_35.txt. (The geographic coordinates (geocoords) given correspond to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid coordinates recorded in other logs.)

[54] CENTCOM Logs, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink...centcom/100996_nbc_024-34.html.

[55] Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131 and Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026.

[56] Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026; Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively and Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997 and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131.

[57] Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96.

[58] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[59] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively; Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026; Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131 and Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000025.

[60] Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026.

[61] Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.

[62] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[63] Interview with 1st FSSG EOD Platoon Officer-In-Charge, Lead Sheet 5294, dated May 16-17, 1996, May 21, 1996 and June 18, 1997.

[64] Interview with 1st EOD Platoon Representative, Lead Sheet 5334, dated June 24, 1997.

[65] Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5263, dated June 13, 1997.

[66] CENTCOM SPOTREP 011930C, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/...082696_DOC_133_SIG_OPS_EVENTS_32.txt.

[67] CENTCOM Logs, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink...centcom/100996_nbc_024-34.html.

[68] ARCENT VII Corps After Action Report, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/army/970107_sep96_decls23_0027.html.

[69] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.

[70] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.

[71] Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.

[72] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[73] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait (U)," (U) - redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.) This is consistent with testimony presented by Mr. Charles Duelfer representing UNSCOM in testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses on July 29^th, 1997 in Buffalo, NY. Mr. Duelfer indicated that there is no evidence that chemical weapons were moved into Kuwait.

[74] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0087-97, "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait (U)," (S), June 1997. In addition to this reporting, OSAGWI interviewed the President of the division of the US contracting company responsible for clean-up in the US sector. This interview corroborates DIA’s conclusions that no chemical weapons were found in Kuwait after the war. Interview with Division President, Lead Sheet 1288, dated February 11, 1997.

[75] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)

[76] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)

[77] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0087-97, "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait (U)," (S), June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)

[78] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[79] Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997 (unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures) and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[80] Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.

[81] This was confirmed in a statement by Mr. Charles Duelfer, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 29, 1997. Major Cross of the PAC asked "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr Duelfer answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here." Mr. Duelfer was referring to movements of munitions to and from the depots near Baghdad and the three lower depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.

[82] Defense Intelligence Agency Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses , June 23, 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)

[83] Central Intelligence Agency Testimony to Presidential Advisory Committee, 9 Jul 96.

[84] Interview with Subject Matter Expert from Chemical Biological Defense Command, Lead Sheet 748, dated April 30, 1996 and e-mails from same dated November 12 ,1993 and July 28, 1997.

[85] Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.

[86] Summary of MM-1 Spectra, US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, 15 Feb 1994. For more information on the reported Lewisite alarm, see the Al Jaber Airfield case narrative.

[87] Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.

[88] Interview with Subject Matter Expert from Chemical Biological Defense Command, Lead Sheet 748, dated April 30, 1996 and e-mails from same, dated November 12 ,1993 and July 28, 1997.

[89] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997.) It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]

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