Case Narrative

The Cement Factory

Final Report

August 4, 2000

Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans’ concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate those incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996.

Case Narratives are reports of what we know today about specific events that took place during the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991. This particular narrative focuses on concern arising from chemical alerts and suspected chemical samples taken at a former cement factory outside Kuwait City in March 1991, and exacerbation of the concerns because the Marines who took those samples were never notified of the results. The narrative was initially published on April 15, 1999. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has not received any new information on the material presented, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. For this reason, this is a final report. However, if you believe you have information that may change this case narrative, please contact my office by calling:

1-800-497-6261

Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
US Department of Defense

2000161-0000001 Ver 2.0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. METHODOLOGY
 
II. SUMMARY
 
III. NARRATIVE
A. Background
B. Initial Suspicions about the Cement Factory
C. Cement Factory Location
D. Date of the Cement Factory Reconnaissance
E. Selection and Composition of the Reconnaissance Group
F. Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Capabilities
G. The Cement Factory Reconnaissance
H. Soil Samples
 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Soil Samples
B. Fox 1 Tape
C. Iraq's Chemical Warfare Capabilities
D. Discussion
 
V. ASSESSMENT
 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
A. Feedback
B. Sample-Processing Procedures
 
TAB A - Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary
 
TAB B - Units Involved
 
TAB C - Bibliography
 
TAB D - Methodology for Chemical Warfare Incident Investigation
 
TAB E - Iraq’s Land Mines

TAB F - Changes in this Report
 
END NOTES

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