END NOTES

[1] Tab A lists abbreviations, acronyms, and glossary terms contained in this report.

[2] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3.

[3] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20," undated, p. 1-4.

[4] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3.

[5] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 2; Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Reports of Chemical Agent Detection During Operation Desert Storm," May 25, 1994, p. 2; Testimony of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997; Manley, Thomas F., Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper 92-0009, p. 18.

[6] Department of Defense, Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD, Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," p. 20-22.

[7] Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing, 1997, p. 155-156, 181-183.

[8] The three Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) officers assigned to the I Marine Expeditionary Force do not remember specifically tasking the 2d Marine Division to investigate the cement factory. See Lead Sheet 14343, Interview of I MEF NBC officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 7312, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer (Rear), December 18, 1998, p. 2; Lead Sheet 15664, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, March 31, 1998, p. 8-9. The US Central Command NBC officer does not recall the specifics of this incident. See Lead Sheet 15114, Interview of US Central Command NBC officer, February 16, 1998, p. 1. It is possible the tasking went through intelligence or operations channels rather than NBC channels. However, none of the six Marine intelligence or operations officers interviewed recall the tasking. See Lead Sheet 14146, Interview of 2d Marine Division intelligence officer, January 14, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 14341, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant intelligence officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15115, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant intelligence officer, February 16, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15501, Interview of 2d Marine Division operations officer, March 18, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15184, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant operations officer, February 25, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15143, Interview of 2d Marine Division weapons employment officer, February 18, 1998, p. 1.

[9] Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon group leader, March 20, 1991, p. 10.

[10] Numbered locations on Figure 2 correspond to sites listed in the US Central Command message. The closest listed site was approximately 18 kilometers to the east, near the Kuwait International Airport. US Central Command, Message, Subject: "RII-2622: Suspected Chemical and/or Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," February 28, 1991. In 1997, in testimony to the Presidential Advisory Commission, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative stated the closest site was a Kuwait City residential area "and we have no information on munitions storage in this area." Statement for the Record by Robert D Walpole, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: "16 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 MARCENT Message," September 4, 1997, p. 3.

[11] US Central Command, Message, Subject: "RII-2622: Suspected Chemical and/or Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War," February 28, 1991; US Central Command NBC Desk Log, March 12, 1991; Personal Award recommendation from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, September 12, 1991, p. 2.

[12] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3.

[13] US Central Command NBC Desk Log, March 12, 1991; Personal Award recommendation from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, September 12, 1991, p. 2.

[14] One possible explanation for this discrepancy is an error in writing a "3" as a "0". Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991. This is the correct Materiel Courier Receipt for this mission as this was the only time Marines took samples during the Gulf War. Lead Sheet 15664, Interview of I Marine Expeditionary Force NBC officer, March 31, 1998, p. 10.

[15] Mroczkowski, Lt. Col. Dennis, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. II-22.

[16] US Central Command NBC Desk Log, March 12, 1991.

[17] Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991. The Materiel Courier Receipts are the chain-of-custody documents for the soil samples.

[18] Fox 1 tape, March 14, 1991.

[19] Lead Sheet 5431, Interview of Fox subject matter expert, June 12, 1998, p. 2. Lead Sheet 16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1. This was the only time the Marines went to the cement factory.

[20] Personal Award recommendation from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, September 12, 1991, p. 2.

[21] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[22] Personal Award recommendation from 2d Marine Division NBC officer, September 12, 1991, p. 2.

[23] Photograph reprinted with permission of Fox 2 wheelman.

[24] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc.

[25] Lead Sheet 7310, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[26] Lead Sheet 14996, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal NCO, February 11, 1998, p. 3; Lead Sheet 15160, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal officer, February 24, 1998, p. 1.

[27] Map representation drawn by 2d Marine Division NBC NCO, December 12, 1997.

[28] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[29] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[30] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3.

[31] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1. According to the group leader, these overlays showed possible planning for offensive chemical weapons use.

[32] Lead Sheet 14996, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal NCO, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

[33] Photograph from MineFacts, v. 1.2, Charlottesville, Virginia: Department of Defense, 1997 (CD database).

[34] Lead Sheet 14996, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal NCO, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

[35] MineFacts, v. 1.2, Charlottesville, Virginia: Department of Defense, 1997 (CD database). A bounding fragmentation mine detonates after lifting into the air two to three feet, increasing the probability of injury to the upper torso.

[36] Lead Sheet 14996, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal NCO, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

[37] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of mine warfare expert, National Ground Intelligence Center, January 15, 1998, p. 2.

[38] Lead Sheet 15160, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal officer, February 24, 1998, p. 1.

[39] Photograph reprinted with permission of Fox 2 wheelman.

[40] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[41] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[42] Lead Sheet 7310, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[43] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[44] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), April 27, 1998, p. 2.

[45] Lead Sheet 7310, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[46] Lead Sheet 14132, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC NCO, January 13, 1998, p. 1.

[47] Lead Sheet 15788, Interview of Fox 2 vehicle wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1.

[48] Lead Sheet 7330, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 16, 1997, p. 1.

[49] Fox 1 tape, March 14, 1991.

[50] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 2.

[51] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[52] Lead Sheet 15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1.

[53] Lead Sheet 15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 18148, Interview of Fox 2 MM-1 operator, July 20, 1998, p. 1.

[54] Lead Sheet 7350, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 16, 1997, p. 1.

[55] Lead Sheet 17781, Interview of Fox 2 commander, July 2, 1998, p. 1.

[56] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, p. 4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc.

[57] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 26408, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), March 27, 2000, p. 2. See also Lead Sheet 15160, Interview of US Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal officer, February 24, 1998, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 26393, Interview of 2d Marine Division explosive ordnance disposal officer, March 28, 2000, p. 2.

[58] Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon group leader, March 20, 1991, p. 15.

[59] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 2-3.

[60] US Central Command NBC Desk Log, March 12, 1998.

[61] The wheelmen from both Fox 1 and Fox 2 remember taking five samples each. The Fox 1 commander recalls his wheelman took three soil samples and a liquid sample. Lead Sheet 16153, Interview of Fox 1 commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1. The Fox 1 MM-1 operator also recalls taking three soil and three liquid samples. Lead Sheet 16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1. Additionally, an NBC gunnery sergeant attached to Fox 2 says he took two samples while he was in MOPP 4 outside the vehicle. Lead Sheet 7330, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 16, 1997, p. 1. The Fox 2 wheelman remembers the gunnery sergeant was outside the vehicle but taking the five samples from inside the vehicle. Lead Sheet 15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1. The records show the crew sent seven samples. In addition to sending two soil samples for further analysis, the Fox 1 commander, wheelman, and MM-1 operator remember taking a liquid sample from one of the large liquid containers. They believe a liquid sample, along with the other samples, was sent to the Army CRDEC in the United States. The Fox 1 wheelman and the MM-1 operator recall liquid samples were taken to the division headquarters, where the operator and the crew of yet another Fox vehicle could not get the sample to register on the MM-1. The liquid samples were then buried. Lead Sheet 16153, Interview of Fox 1 commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15148, Interview of Fox 1 wheelman, February 19, 1998, p. 1.

[62] The Materiel Courier Receipt, a standard military form, establishes the chain of custody for possible chemical or biological warfare agent samples. It is not a sample analysis document. Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991.

[63] US Central Command NBC Desk Log, March 12, 1991. The log entry uses the letter L to denote lewisite, but the precise notation is barely legible.

[64] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20," undated, p. 2.

[65] Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon group leader, March 20, 1991, p. 12. The group leader referred to sarin as GB.

[66] Lead Sheet 15107, Interview of Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5.

[67] Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991.

[68] Lead Sheet 16153, Interview of Fox 1 commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1.

[69] Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet 7330, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 16, 1997, p. 1; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991.

[70] Lead Sheet 7330, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC non-commissioned officer, December 16, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 7174, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC officer, p. 2; Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.

[71] Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991.

[72] Lead Sheet 15107, Interview of commander, JCMEC, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5.

[73] The CRDEC was renamed the US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command after the Gulf War and again renamed the US Soldier Biological and Chemical Command in 1998.

[74] Lead Sheet 15107, Interview of Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5.

[75] Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991; Materiel Courier Receipt (Items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991. For a discussion of sample handling see US Army Central Command, Information paper, Subject: "Analysis of Soil Samples Obtained in Southwest Asia," March 18, 1990.

[76] The sample analysis included these tests: vapor analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry; thermal desorption into a mass selective detector; chloroform extracts of the samples analyzed by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry; and high performance liquid chromatography/ion chromatography to identify any degradation products. See Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum for Record from team leader of analytical chemistry, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26, 1996, p. 1. The Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center was an element of US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.

[77] Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 1-4.

[78] Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Message, Subject: "Results of Analysis," 271930Z Mar 91, p. 2-3.

[79] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 2-3.

[80] This is a common phrase used to restrict dissemination of classified information. However, even if JCMEC had determined the group leader did have a need to know, JCMEC had not yet been notified of the analysis results and was not notified until March 27, 1991. Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 2. Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3; Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Message, Subject: "Results of Analysis," 271930Z Mar 91, p. 2-3.

[81] Memorandum from 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat During Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, p. 3.

[82] Lead Sheet 15107, Interview of Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5.

[83] Lead Sheet 15664, , March 31, 1998.

[84] Testimony of I MEF NBC officer to the Presidential Advisory Committee, Charleston, S.C., May 7, 1997, p. 9.

[85] Many 2d Marine Division NBC specialists heard about this exchange from the group leader. The Army major in charge of JCMEC denied telling this to the group leader. However, he does admit his unit redeployed during this period and someone unfamiliar with this case may have taken the call. He also stated JCMEC did not normally notify a unit when samples tested negative. Only if a unit requested notification would JCMEC inform them of a negative result. If the sample tested positive, JCMEC would have notified the unit. According to the JCMEC commander, no soil or munitions samples taken during Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm, or the post-war period tested positive for chemical warfare agents. Lead Sheet 15107, Interview of Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5. We interviewed six Marine intelligence and operations officers from the 2d Marine Division for this investigation and none remember calling JCMEC at the request of the group leader. However, several of the officers admit it is possible they called JCMEC, but no longer remember doing so. See Lead Sheet 14146, Interview of 2d Marine Division intelligence officer, January 14, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 14341, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant intelligence officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15115, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant intelligence officer, February 16, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15501, Interview of 2d Marine Division operations officer, March 18, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet 15184, Interview of 2d Marine Division assistant operations officer, February 25, 1998, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 15143, Interview of 2d Marine Division weapons employment officer, February 18, 1998, p. 1.

[86] Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Message, Subject: "Results of Analysis," 271930Z Mar 91, p. 2-3.

[87] For a discussion of proper packaging procedures for the TEU and JCMEC see US Central Command, Fact Paper, Subject: "CBW Agent Sampling Procedures," January 2, 1990.

[88] Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Message, Subject: "Results of Analysis," 271930Z Mar 91, p. 2-3.

[89] Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum for Record from team leader of analytical chemistry, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26, 1996, p. 3.

[90] Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 4.

[91] Previously, the US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command and before that the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center.

[92] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, p. 13, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.

[93] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Letter from research chemist, November 3, 1998, p. 1.

[94] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Letter from research chemist, November 3, 1998, p. 1. The Fox MM-1 manufacturer was asked to analyze the tape, but did not respond.

[95] Xylyl bromide is a tearing agent the Germans used as a chemical warfare agent in 1915. It is expensive to produce and its effects are easily protected against. The Fox vehicles had this substance in their 60-substance library when the German manufacturer delivered them. See Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 3.

[96] Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Evaluation of the Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) Tapes, Dated 14 March 1991," June 18, 1998, p. 1.

[97] Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Evaluation of the Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) Tapes, Dated 14 March 1991," June 18, 1998, p. 1.

[98] Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 3.

[99] Lead Sheet 16893, Interview of two cement subject matter experts, May 28, 1998, p. 1.

[100] Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum, Subject: "Evaluation of the Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) Tapes, Dated 14 March 1991," June 18, 1998, p. 3.

[101] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Letter from research chemist, November 3, 1998, p. 1. M/z is a chemical term for the mass-to-charge ratio.

[102] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare Data," undated, p. 1.

[103] United Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996," Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657.

[104] United Nations Special Commission, Letter from Charles Duelfer to Congressman Glen Browder, April 5, 1994, p. 2-3.

[105] The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996," Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657. This lists all the chemical munitions UNSCOM destroyed. No chemical mines are listed.

[106] Responding to a Presidential Advisory Committee question whether UNSCOM had any evidence Iraq deployed land mines containing chemical warfare agents, the UNSCOM witness replied, "We've seen nothing, absolutely nothing." Testimony of a United Nations Special Commission Inspector to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997, p. 1.

[107] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.

[108] Responding to a question the Presidential Advisory Committee posed whether Iraq had deployed chemical munitions in Kuwait, the UNSCOM witness stated, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place." Testimony of a United Nations Special Commission Inspector to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997, p. 1.

[109] During clearing operations in Kuwait, no contractors reported finding chemical weapons anywhere in Kuwait. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, "During the 3-year post-Gulf War ordnance clearing operations in Kuwait, chemical warfare agents were never detected." Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait (U)," [redacted], June 1997.

[110] Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait (U)," [redacted], June 1997.

[111] The Fox vehicle sampling wheel was made of a silicon-based material that releases chemicals that could be perceived as lewisite, possibly leading to false positive alerts for lewisite. Performing a spectrum analysis would show no agent present, but the initial alert could cause some questions among Fox crews. US Army Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, Memorandum, Subject: "Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity MM-1 Excursion Test," Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, July 14, 1993, p. 2.

[112] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20," undated, p. 2.

[113] We inquired about how quickly G-series agents vaporize. The wet spot at the cement factory could have been on the ground since the ground war ended 12 days previously. One subject matter expert believes it is quite possible some GF would remain in Kuwait's soil after 10 days. Lead Sheet 14092, Interviews of Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997. Soldier Biological Chemical Command, E-mail from chemical warfare agent experts, November 6, 1998, p. 15.

[114] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 17-18.

[115] Lead Sheet 7311, Interview of 2d Marine Division NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 3.

[116] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Letter from research chemist, November 3, 1998, p. 1.

[117] Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center, Memorandum for Record from team leader of analytical chemistry, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26, 1996, p. 3.

[118] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[119] US Army Materiel Safety Data Sheet, "HQ Mustard," June 30, 1995.

[120] US Army Materiel Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," December 2, 1999.

[121] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[122] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 7, 12, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[123] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 22-23.

[124] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).

[125] Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of September 2, 1999).

[126] US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Test Operations Procedure Number 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989, p. 37.

[127] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 3-4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.

[128] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 17-18; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Chapter 2, p. 1, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[129] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.

[130] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39..

[131] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39.

[132] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 421-424.

[133] US Army Technical Manual, 43-0001-26-1, "Army Equipment Data Sheets: Chemical Defense Equipment," May 12, 1982, p. 1-25.

[134] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

[135] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, p. 4, 5, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

[136] US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.

[137] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/ .

[138] US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).

[139] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 15.

[140] Chemical Weapons Convention, web site www.acda.gov/treaties/cwcart.htmII (as of January 1999).

[141] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 19.

[142] US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm (as of September 2, 1999).

[143] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.

[144] US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p 23, 112.

[145] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded to by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.

[146] Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report 2-340-0458-91, Subject: "Chemical Mines (U)," 1991.

[147] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1.

[148] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1.

[149] United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Document 189, "Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," New York, NY: 1996, p. 656-657. Of all the munitions UNSCOM destroyed, no mines are listed.

[150] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2. Iraqi Armed Forces Manual for the Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Official Special Manual No. 469, Manual for the Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Volume Two, Part One, December 1987, discusses employing chemical mines: "Description of a chemical mine (theory): The description of a chemical mine is a theory only for the purpose of study and discussion. However, it is the description of a real mine."

[151] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.

[152] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.

[153] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.

[154] Lead Sheet 14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1, 2.

[155] Marine Corps Research Center, Paper 92-0004, "Breaching Operations in Southwest Asia," July 1991, p. 3.

[156] Type found at the cement factory.


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