DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: aabas_01.txt
Page: 01
Total Pages: 6

SUBJECT: DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT - 1ST MEDICAL GROUP
COMMANDER�S SUMMARY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
lST MEDICAL GROUP (lAC)
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE VA 73665 53

1ST ATH DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT
Commander's Summary

1. The 1st Air Transportable Hospital deployed to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in
support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm on 11 August 1990. The -
hospital reported that it was fully functional to CENTAF/SG on 16 August 1990
The 1st ATH provided continuous medical care to the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing
and other U.S. Armed Forces as well as Allied Armed Forces until the 10th of
March 1991. This summary will detail by department the accomplishments and
problems encountered during the 7-1/2 months of this deployment.
a. HOSPITAL SERVICES. For the first six weeks of the deployment, the 1st
Air Transportable Hospital was essentially the only military hospital in the
Eastern half of the Arabian peninsula that was functional. As a result, the
1st Air Transportable Hospital supported the deployment of the 18th Airborne
Corps including the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions as well as elements of
the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division. Average outpatient and emergency
visits per day during this period were between ~O and 130, and an average
dally inpatient census was 40 and above. After the first six weeks, other
military hospitals became functional, including the 5th MASH and 28th Combat
Support Hospital, and our outpatient daily census dropped between 35 and 60
patients a day and our average inpatient census was between 4 and 10. The
professional staff performed well displaying an aggressive attitude toward
trauma and patient care, and responding to all contingencies with skill and
innovation. Problems were as follows:

(1) A 30-day supply of medicine for deployment was found to be
inadequate. It is recommended that patients deploy with a 90-day supply of
maintenance medications.

(2) Many medicines included on the Table of Allowances were obsolete
and many medicines commonly used and needed by personnel were not available.
We recommend the Table of Allowance for ATHs be reviewed in an ongoing fashion
and changed as needed. See The text of the report for recommended changes.

(3) The Air Transportable Hospital was not set up as quickly or efficiently as it could have been
upon arrival. This was due, for the most part, to lack of civilian engineering and forklift help.
It is recommended that, If possible, more civilian engineering resources be deployed if such a
situation arises again.

(4) The mix of medical and surgical specialists and subspecialists, while adequate, could be more
appropriate. Two OB-GYN surgeons were deployed and their skills on a day-to-day basis were not
needed. On the other hand, a urologist and an ear, nose and throat surgeon would have been of
great benefit. It is recommended that a urologist and otolaryngologisc be added and obstetric and
gynecologic specialists be deleted from the ATH.

(5) Degradation of skills of physicians during prolonged} deployments.
It is noted that both surgical and medical subspecialists were unable to