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File: aabmf_02.txtevacuation of large numbers of US and allied casualties resulting from such offensive actions directed toward the liberation of Kuwait. The TAES mission consisted of the following five elements: a. Forward Area Evacuation. This entailed moving patients from second-echelon facilities in the combat zone to facilities farther to the rear or to strategic evacuation hubs. b. Redistribution of Patients. Redistribution involved moving patients between medical facilities within the theater. Termed "leveling," it ensured a balanced distribution of patients among available medical facilities capable of caring for specific types of injuries. c. Evacuation of Disease/Non-Battle Injuries (DNBIs1. Commensurate with the number of US forces in the area of responsibility (AOR) throughout Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, a need existed to move patients other than battle casualties. This element of the AE mission provided for the movement of such patients to and between medical facilities within the AOR. d. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support. In support of the air war, the AECC Director was asked to provide non-doctrinal support to the special operations forces (SOF) tasked-with recovering downed allied aircrew members. This required the deployment of a mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) to the classified recovery site. e. Strategic Evacuation. C-14ls were used to evacuate patients, including battle casualties, from the AOR to medical facilities in EUCOM. The decision to evacuate patients out of the AOR was primarily based on the theater evacuation policy. 4. Casualty Estimates. Requirements for AE forces (personnel and equipment) were based on casualty estimates provided by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Surgeon's staff. Initial estimates were for 1,100 intratheater and an additional 1,100 intertheater casualty movements/day. The President's November decision to bring additional forces into the AOR resulted in major changes in AE contingency planning due to the announced potential for offensive actions. Revised casualty estimates provided by CENTCOM/CCSG on 15 December 1990 are outlined in Table 1. 5. Theater Evacuation Policy. The pre-hostilities policy was established at 15 days, with the option to increase it to 30 days on a case-by-case basis. During hostilities the evacuation policy was set at seven days. 6. AE Manning Requirements. The AECC Director decided in late August that AE elements required to support initial casualty estimates would include one AECC, two aeromedical evacuation control elements (AECEs), seven aeromedical evacuation liaison teams (AELTs), five MASFs, 24 tactical aeromedical crews and 24 2
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