Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Report 1

File: 120596_aacxh_03.txt
Page: 03
Total Pages: 53

UNCLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to quantitatively show the positive worth of weather support during Operation DESERT STORM. It underscores the need to get weather people involved early-on in the mission planning and execution process -responsive and accurate weather support did provide a decisive battlefield edge!

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM tested Air Weather Service's (AWS) ability to function successfully as a dedicated and integrated weather support force. Fifty-six weather Teams, comprised of about 500 people, effectively provided for the weather support needs of every Joint, Air Force, and Army echelon, from CENTCOM down to armored cavalry regiment and aviation brigade level. More important, however, DESERT STORM again proved the worth of dedicated, on-scene, weather support integrated into the strategic and tactical mission planning and execution cycle of the air tasking order process. One measure of weather support effectiveness, tbe number of sorties lost due to poor target weather, decreased significantly over time, despite recurring periods of poor weather throughout DESERT STORM. weather support proved to be a force multiplier in many areas, particularly in redirecting combat missions to less cloudy areas. Pivotal to providing this support was the high-resolution Defense Meteorological Satellite Program(DMSP) imagery-our prime source of weather information in data-denied Iraq.

The most telling impacts of weather on The air war were encapsulated by Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak, in his 15 March 1991 news briefing. Referring to The air war as a football game, he said, "There were several audibles called. Things didn't proceed precisely according to our pre-canned script... This is, perhaps, the thing that hurt us worse. It was certainly The poorest weather in 14 years in The Baghdad and Kuwait area.... As a consequence, we lost a lot of targets, especially to the F-117, where low cloud cover prevented them from acquiring the target, and they simply brought the munitions home." By Day 1 of the air war, air superiority allowed mission profiles for all aircraft to change to mid- and high-level attacks. A big impact of this change in tactics was a dramatic increase in the percentage of time weather was unfavorable for attacking targets in Iraq and Kuwait. About 11 percent of the time (twice the frequency climatology would suggest) Larger areas had ceilings below 10,000 feet--The operational flying threshold in this war. Suddenly, weather became a major impediment to the conduct of the air war. Yet, in spite of the poorer-than-normal weather, the accuracy of weather forecasts for target areas was generally above 75 percent for periods out to 72 hours. The capability of Air Force weather personnel to deliver high-quality forecasts allowed planners and executors at all echelons ofcommand to minimize the impact of poor weather and more effectively conduct the air war.

Additional Weather support contributions to winning the war are detailed in this report. From theater-level support for nominating reconnaissance assets, To detailed weather support for us Army Intelligence Preparation of The Battlefield, To-the microscale weather support by the XVIII Airborne Corps Staff Weather Officer (SWO) in extracting a compromised ground surveillance team, AWS personnel contributed to mission effectiveness, resource allocation, and protection of personnel.