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File: 120596_aacxh_14.txtUNCLASSIFIED blending satellite imagery, surface, and upper air observations. Fig. 1 shows the daily variation, 14-year average, and 1991 average eighths of cloud coverage below 10,000 feet for the period 15 Jan-28 Feb 91 at Baghdad. For Jan 91, the mean eighths of cloud coverage was 3.4, compared to the 14-year average of 1.7. For Feb 91, the means were 2.5 and 1.5, respectively. The observed cloud coverage for 1991 was nearly twice the amount climatology led us to anticipate. Fig. 2 shows the same parameters for the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). These data are not from Kuwait City, but north of Kuwait City in the vicinity of Republican Guard locations. Again, we superimpose daily variation with 1991 and 14-year climatic expectations. For the KTO, the average monthly eighths of cloud coverage below 10,000 feet was 2.0 for 1991, compared to 1.0 (14-year average), and 2.2 for Feb 91 compared to 0.8 14-year average). For the KTO, the weather was more than twice as "bad" as climatological expectations. 3.2. (U) STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CLIMATOLOGY. United States Air Force Environmental Technical Applications Center (USAFETAC) applied simple statisti- cal techniques to estimate the probability of 1991 cloud coverage occurring F based on the previous 14-year climatology. The probability of 1991's weather occurring was less than 2.5 percent for the month of Jan and 5 percent for th) month of Feb for Baghdad, and less than a 1 percent chance for both months 1n Kuwait. We conclude 1991 was an unusually poor weather year over widely sepa-- rated locations in the Operation DESERT STORM AOR, inferring poor conditions over the entire AOR. 4. (U) OPERATION DESERT SHIELD WEATHER SUPPORT. Weather support evolved as planned through the deployment and force build-Up phases. The lack of traditional "sensible" weather in the form of significant low clouds and reduced visibility from Aug-Dec 90 may have led operational decision makers to expect weather would not be a significant recurring factor in the war. There were, however, weather factors which adversely affected weapons systems during Aug-Dec 90. Examples are the very high absolute humidity observed at coastal training ranges along the Indian Ocean degrading infrared (IR) systems like Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN), and blowing and suspended dust damaging equipment. The dry, hot atmosphere over the summer and fall Southwest Asia caused unexpected Electro-Optical Tactical Decision Aid (EOTDA) system performance. An on-site technical evaluation identified and implemented manual work-arounds while experts developed a long-term fix in the United States. 4.1. (U) WEATHER SUPPORT STRUCTURE EVOLUTION. The first weather support to Operation DESERT SHIELD came from weather personnel deploying with their supported unit and the respective MAJCOM and Numbered Air Forces Weather Support Units (WSUs). AFCWC, Offutt AFB, NE provided the first theater-wide support and products. On 9 Aug 90, AFGWC issued the first Operation DESERT SHIELD products F with theater-tail0red horizontal weather depicti0ns, satellite discussions, flight-level winds and flight hazards, as well as forecasts for key bases both in-theater and enroute. AFGWC continued to produce the operational theater tailored products until the in-theater Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM Forecast unit (DSFU) became operational. AFGWC distributed their products via existing communications circuits and automatic digital network (AUTODIN) to all support elements in theater and in the rear. 14 Aug 90, AFGWC support had expanded 3 UNCLASSIFIED
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