Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

5.1. (U) CENTCOM. HQ CENTCOM's primary mission was planning and policy, with most operational decisions except for major decisions like the timing of the start of the air/ground war) delegated to component level commanders. The single recurring HQ CENTCOM operational mission was directing theater reconnais- sance assets.

5.1.1.  (U) CENTCOM Planning and Forecast Accuracy. The CENTCOM SWO supported the CENTCOM planning function through staff briefings and field unit coordination. The CENTCOM SWO also set theater-level policy on weather issues.  Examples of theater-level policy included the level of control of weather data, when and how to obtain meteorological satellite equipment in theater, and how to blend host-nation weather support with USAF weather support. The SWO provided briefings twice daily to CINCCENT, the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), and the Joint Operations Center (JOC). The CENTCOM SWO staff provided four structured briefings per day during the war phase.   The amount of weather data required the CENTCOM staff as the war approached more than doubled. The number of briefing slides went from four to nine when operators recognized the need for additional information. The scope of the briefing expanded from a next 24-hour briefing to a detailed 0- to 7,-hour unfavorable-marginal-favorable briefing for the AOR. In addition to the direct support planning function, CENTCOM controlled the DSFU operational weather data (e.g., the JOAF, SSB) produced for  all operational users in the AOR. The DSFU verified the 558 products produced from 15 Jan to 28 fete 91 for Baghdad and the KTO. Again, the KTO here refers to the area along the Iraqi/Kuwaiti border west of Basrah. The forecasts for the 12- to 24-hour period were verified against persistence (a no change forecast; i.e., the weather observed at the beginning of the period remains throughout the period). We provide one other measure of merit: the "just fly" forecast which assumes no weather input, and an air crew "just flies." figure 4 displays the percent of correct SSB forecasts for DSFU forecasters and persistence. Correct forecasts are those where conditions occurred as forecast, whether favorable (ceiling at or above 10,000 feet) or unfavorable. Figure 4 shows the forecasts for Baghdad were slightly more accurate than those for the KTO, even though per sistence for each was about the same. Performance against the "just fly" measure was also very good. The "just fly" percentages with favorable conditions  for Baghdad and KTO for the war period were 64.8 and 62.7 percent, respectively. Using any measure of merit, the DSFU SSB forecasts provided significant value added to operational planning compared to "no-skill" forecasts.

5.1.2. CENTCOM Execution. The CENTCOM SWO directly supported theater reconnaissance missions using forecasts from the DSFU and the Strategic Air  Command (SAC) Directorate of Weather for Strategic Reconnaissance (DOWSR),  Offutt AFB ME According to CAPT Agnew (USN), Director of the JIC, the JIC. nominated targets, recommended routes (routes were planned at Taif), and  collection platforms to the Strategic Reconnaissance Center (SRC), HQ SAC. The 
	[(b)(1)sec 3.4 (b)(5)]


								 primary tool used for these last-minute forecasts was DMSP imagery. The DMSP imagery was directly 

						8

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search