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downlinked to a theater tactical meteorological satellite van and processed locally. DMSP imagery gave a final go/no-go discriminator. 
	[(b)(l) sec 3.4 (b)(5)]

									Thirty-four
forecasts were correct for a 95 percent correct rate, The SRC relied on these
forecasts, and correctly canceled six missions for weather and changed three
from optical to radar sensors. In Feb 91, the DOWSR supported 90 missions, with 
81 correct forecasts. Of the nine missed forecasts, five were weather cancels
when the mission could have flown. Thus, the overall forecast accuracy of
theater reconnaissance forecasts over the war period was 91 percent. The added
value of weather support here is indeed significant, especially when contrasted
with the much lower success rate reconnaissance missions would have experienced
without accurate, timely weather support. 

5.2. (U) CENTAF. CENTAF received weather support at three different levels. 
The staff weather office provided planning support at HQ CENTAF. SWOs provided 
execution support at the force- and unit-levels. The TACC weather support cell 
supported force-level execution, while weather teams at each field location sup-
 ported unit-level execution. 

5.2.1. (U) CENTAF Planning. Support to CENTAF planning cell evolved through the training/force build phase and the early portion of the air war into an institutionalized structured product by 29 Jan 91. To understand the evolution of planning support, we describe the actual planning cycle. Doctrinal planning and air tasking order (ATO) generation took place under the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS)/Operations, who examined long-term target nomination candidates. A "frag" cell then built the ATO. In Operation DESERT STORM, CENtaf used the GAT cell, known as the "black hole," to nominate target candidates. CENTAF formed the black hole in late Oct-early Nov 90, with a weather officer brought into this Special Access Category (SPECAT) program early. The weather officer provided climatological data assessment based on expected weather. Since the weather in late fall was "good," the operators did not really foresee weather as a major discriminator for combat operations.   On 4 Jan 91, Lt Gen Horner asked Lt Col Riley, CENTAF SWO, for a series of long-range planning forecast to be 1 updated every two days. The CENTAF SWO also provided this long-range planning forecast to Brig Gen Glosson, director of the GAT cell. When the air war began, weather support to the GAT cell consisted of twice-daily briefings to Brig Gen Glosson and his senior staff. The SWO also posted a two-day Horizontal Weather Depiction (HWD) of the AOR along with the latest meteorological satellite imagery. The products were posted in the GAT offices responsible for Iraq and the KTO. The HWD showed major cloud areas, sensible weather, and fronts. The GAT cell looked at targets planned for two days in the future, then developed  target planning worksheets (TPWs) for release to the fragging shop for ATO generation.  The GAT cell released the TPWs at 0430L to the fraggers for the next day's ATO (ATOs were valid from 0200L to 0200L). The fray shop then built the ATO for the next day's missions and targets. The ATOs were released at 1800L for the ATO effective at 0200L the next day.       Upon release of the ATO to the units, the process switched from planning to execution. Early in the air

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